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  1. (1 other version)Fischer's Fate With Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - 2017 - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):25-38.
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...)
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  • Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
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  • Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge.E. M. Zemach & D. Winderker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19 - 28.
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  • Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Necessity of the Past.Larry Wayne Hohm - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    There is an ancient puzzle about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If God has already known that you will do a certain thing tomorrow, then it must already be a settled fact that God has known this. Since knowledge entails truth, it must also be a settled fact that you will do it. In that case, you really cannot avoid doing it. If so, then when you do it tomorrow, you won't do it freely. ;This dissertation consists of a careful (...)
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  • Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.
    Nelson Pike’s article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” is one of the most influential pieces in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Published over forty years ago, it has elicited many different kinds of replies. We shall set forth some of the main lines of reply to Pike’s article, starting with some of the “early” replies. We then explore some issues that arise from relatively recent work in the philosophy of time; it is fascinating to note that views suggested by recent work (...)
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  • ‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP.Greg Janzen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):646-657.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence (...)
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  • ‘Nice Soft Facts’: Fischer on Foreknowledge.William Lane Craig - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):235 - 246.
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  • Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Martin Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.
    I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument.
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  • Prophets against Ockhamism. Or: why the hard fact/soft fact distinction is irrelevant to the problem of foreknowledge.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.
    In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem (...)
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