There has been renewed interest over the last twenty years in Ryle's claims and arguments about knowledge-how. Elzinga (2018) and Löwenstein (2017) have both recently defended independent Ryle-inspired accounts of knowledge-how. In what follows, I will propose and defend an amendment to accounts of knowledge-how like those of Elzinga and Löwenstein. I argue that this amendment provides an additional needed distinction between the performance robustness provided by certain performance methods (or styles), and the robustness of an agent's ability to perform (...) according to such methods (or styles). Additionally, the proposed amendment, if adopted, will make the amended views even more Rylean. I argue for this, in part, through original exegetical work on an under-discussed theme in Ryle's philosophy of mind: the relation between semi-hypothetical statements, methodological act-description, and knowledge-how. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account.