Reinterpreting Ryle: A nonbehaviorist analysis

Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):265-90 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper argues that the behaviorist label yields a caricature of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind that cannot be adequately fleshed out by reference to the larger corpus of Rylean texts. On the interpretation of Ryle that I offer here, he is best characterized as an "ontological agnostic." Ryle's aim, I believe, is to develop a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental-conduct terms--a theory of meaning which does not presuppose any metaphysical or ontological theory and, hence, does not presuppose behaviorism.

Author's Profile

Shelley M. Park
University of Central Florida


Added to PP

1,191 (#5,882)

6 months
80 (#18,272)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?