Victims of oppressive (e.g., sexist, racist or ableist) structures sometimes internalize the unjust norms that prevail in society. This can cause these victims to develop preferences or make deci-sions that seem bad for them. Focusing on such cases, we ask: is self-discrimination disrespectful? We show that some of the most sophisticated respect theories fail to provide any clear guidance. Specifically, we show that the widely recognized view that respect has two dimensions—an interest dimension and an autonomy dimension—delivers completely opposite verdicts (...) depending on how these two dimensions (and the relation between them) are specified. A main takeaway point is that we need to distinguish between at least four different respect-based views. Whether self-discrimination caused by internalized oppression is disrespectful depends on which view one supports. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

What justifies differences in the acceptance of paternalism towards competent minors and older people? I propose two arguments. The first argument draws on the widely accepted view that paternalism is easier to justify the more good it promotes for the paternalizee. It argues that paternalism targeting young people generally promotes more good for the people interfered with than similar paternalism targeting older people. While promoting people's interests or well-being is essential to the justification of paternalism, the first argument has certain (...) unfair implications in that it disfavours paternalism towards the worse off. The second argument caters to such fairness concerns. It argues that priority or inequality aversion supports age-differentiated paternalism because young people, who act imprudently and thereby risk their interests or well-being, are worse off than older people who act in similar ways. I suggest that both arguments are pertinent in evaluating specific paternalistic acts and policies. (shrink)

Informed by behavioral science research, recent defenses of paternalism point to people’s need for help in making and carrying out good decisions. Authors in this literature typically focus on defending paternalist policies against objections that frame them as threats to autonomy. But they often neglect a second category of objections to paternalism. Paternalism expresses disrespect not only for the target’s autonomy but also for her equal status. I argue that this second kind of wrong is more independent of autonomy-based objections (...) than has been recognized. Therefore, we need to evaluate paternalism in two dimensions, rather than treating egalitarian objections as a mere supplement to autonomy concerns. This allows us to see why welfare paternalism can be objectionable even when choices are not significantly constrained or when the choices at stake are relatively trivial. The barrier to justifiable welfare paternalist policies has less to do with the specific techniques of influence adopted than with their asymmetrical distribution and the inegalitarian structures through which they are delivered. (shrink)