Décrivant les grandes lignes de l’avant-projet de révision des lois de bioéthique de 1994, le Premier ministre de l’époque, Lionel Jospin, s’est exprimé en faveur de l’autorisation des recherches sur l’embryon humain. Il cherchait alors à devancer les objections possibles en opposant la recherche fondamentale à la réflexion philosophique et tentait de préciser la question suivante :..

Issues surrounding human embryos are poignant and profound. Should research be conducted on them? Should they be discarded? Should they be donated to infertile couples? The Warnock Report was a landmark in providing guidelines limiting experimentation on human embryos to the first 14 days after fertilization, at which time implantation of the embryo is complete and the primitive streak has appeared.2 However, these embryological features were not considered sufficiently distinctive to bestow upon this 14‐day period a separate classification. This situation (...) changed when, in 1986, Anne McLaren suggested the use of the terms ‘pre‐embryo’ or ‘conceptus' to designate “the entire product of the fertilized egg up to the end of the implantation stage” and the term ’embryo‘ for “that small part of the pre‐embryo or conceptus, first distinguishable at the primitive streak stage, that later develops into the foetus.”3 In this paper we look critically at the term ‘pre‐embryo’, and we shall present the case for an alternative set of terms, namely, embryo‐placenta and embryo‐fetus. We consider this latter to be biologically‐based terminology, that does not have any connotation of restricted moral value as the term pre‐embryo does for some. (shrink)

In most parts of the world, research on the human embryo is subject to tight controls. In the United Kingdom it is restricted by means of both a fourteen-day time limit and the permitted purposes of the research. One of the ways in which the argument for these restrictions has been put is in terms of respect. That is, the human embryo is said to be the kind of thing that is worthy of a measure of respect such that there (...) are limits to what can be done to it. This paper considers some of the ways in which this principle of respect has been understood as well as some objections to the very idea that research resulting in the destruction of the human embryo can claim to show that embryo respect. It will be argued that an account of ‘respectful destruction’ can be articulated on the grounds of our shared finitude as human moral agents, and in particular on the grounds of our shared lack of certainty regarding the moral status of the embryo. (shrink)

Issues surrounding human embryos are poignant and profound. Should research be conducted on them? Should they be discarded? Should they be donated to infertile couples? The Warnock Report was a landmark in providing guidelines limiting experimentation on human embryos to the first 14 days after fertilization, at which time implantation of the embryo is complete and the primitive streak has appeared.2 However, these embryological features were not considered sufficiently distinctive to bestow upon this 14‐day period a separate classification. This situation (...) changed when, in 1986, Anne McLaren suggested the use of the terms ‘pre‐embryo’ or ‘conceptus' to designate “the entire product of the fertilized egg up to the end of the implantation stage” and the term ’embryo‘ for “that small part of the pre‐embryo or conceptus, first distinguishable at the primitive streak stage, that later develops into the foetus.”3In this paper we look critically at the term ‘pre‐embryo’, and we shall present the case for an alternative set of terms, namely, embryo‐placenta and embryo‐fetus. We consider this latter to be biologically‐based terminology, that does not have any connotation of restricted moral value as the term pre‐embryo does for some. (shrink)