Three hundred forty middle-level managers from two private and two public sector manufacturing companies in India rated their superiors on 22 items of ethical leadership. Factor analysis of the scores on such items yielded two dimensions of ethical leadership: (a) empowerment, and (b) motive and character. Items of the scale had high reliability, validity, and discriminative power. On two dimensions of ethical leadership, the superiors self-rated themselves more favorably than their subordinates rated them. This justified the proposal to consider the (...) subordinates' ratings to their superiors in assessing ethical leadership. Subordinates perceived their superiors more ethical in private sector than in public sector. Subordinates' manipulative behavior, and cheating in performance and misuse of finance were less frequent in the presence of ethical superiors. Also, ethical superiors enhanced the job performance, job involvement and affective commitment of their subordinates but not their continuance commitment. (shrink)

Human societies are examined as distinct and coherent groups. This trait is most parsimoniously considered a deeply rooted part of our ancestry rather than a recent cultural invention. Our species is the only vertebrate with society memberships of significantly more than 200. We accomplish this by using society-specific labels to identify members, in what I call an anonymous society. I propose that the human brain has evolved to permit not only the close relationships described by the social brain hypothesis, but (...) also, at little mental cost, the anonymous societies within which such alliances are built. The human compulsion to discover or invent labels to “mark” group memberships may originally have been expressed in hominins as vocally learned greetings only slightly different in function from chimpanzee pant hoots (now known to be society-specific). The weight of evidence suggests that at some point, conceivably early in the hominin line, the distinct groups composed of several bands that were typical of our ancestors came to be distinguished by their members on the basis of multiple labels that were socially acquired in this way, the earliest of which would leave no trace in the archaeological record. Often overlooked as research subjects, these sizable fission-fusion communities, in recent egalitarian hunter-gatherers sometimes 2,000 strong, should consistently be accorded the status of societies, in the same sense that this word is used to describe tribes, chiefdoms, and other cultures arising later in our history. The capacity of hunter-gatherer societies to grow sufficiently populous that not all members necessarily recognize one another would make the transition to larger agricultural societies straightforward. Humans differ from chimpanzees in that societal labels are essential to the maintenance of societies and the processes giving birth to new ones. I propose that anonymous societies of all kinds can expand only so far as their labels can remain sufficiently stable. (shrink)

(1999). Sponsorship, academic independence and critical engagement: A forum on shell, the Ogoni dispute and the royal geographical society (with the institute of British geographers) Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 248-251.

This paper gives a normative assessment of the problem of forced environmental migration, or, migration driven primarily by environmental events, drawing particular attention to the framing of citizen and non-citizen rights in the context of anthropogenic climate change. It explores a moral imperative to install special migration rights for Environmentally Displaced Peoples and briefly assesses the ability of current domestic migration policy to offer such rights. The paper concludes by offering three theoretical policy-oriented exercises, ultimately locating tiered citizenship as the (...) most immediate ethically robust and politically acceptable solution to the challenge of environmental displacement. (shrink)

. Sponsorship, Academic Independence and Critical Engagement: a Forum on Shell, the Ogoni Dispute and the Royal Geographical Society Ethics, Place & Environment: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 219-257.

“Virtual water,” water needed for crop production, is now being mainstreamed in the water policy world. Relying on virtual water in the form of food imports is increasingly recommended as good policy for water-scarce areas. Virtual water globalizes discussions on water scarcity, ecological sustainability, food security and consumption. Presently the concept is creating much noise in the water and food policy world, which contributes to its politicization. We will argue that the virtual water debate is also a “real water” and (...) food and agricultural policy debate and hence has political effects. Decisions about food strategies and resource allocation play out on the national political economy, benefiting some while harming others. Therefore, a policy choice for virtual water is not politically neutral. “Real␣water” interventions are, likewise, inspired by economic as well as political considerations like control of the countryside, geopolitical strategy, and food sovereignty (independence from international political conditionality and market uncertainties). To illustrate these ideas, we look into case studies of Egypt and the State of Punjab in India. In India, a debate on the merits and demerits of a virtual water strategy is now emerging. In Egypt, which switched to food imports in the early 1970s, a long-standing taboo on debating virtual water is now being relaxed. (shrink)

The conduct of hostilities is very bad for the environment, yet relatively little attention has been focused on environmental military ethics by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. Contemporary ecological concerns pose significant challenges to jus in bello. I begin by briefly surveying existing literature on environmental justice during wartime. While these jus in bello environmental issues have been addressed only sparsely by just war theorists, environmental jus ad bellum has rarely been tackled within JWT or the morality (...) of war. In line with the theme of this special issue, I focus my discussion of war and the natural environment primarily on the jus ad bellum level. I set out with the presumption against the use of force, and its possible exceptions. The principal question raised is whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war. Beyond just cause, I consider what might be a proportionate response to “environmental aggression,” or negligent harm to nature. The use of force is clearly justified in response to military attacks, against the natural environment or otherwise. Where harm to nature or its inhabitants are not caused by military aggression, just war theory criteria point in favor of responding via measures short of war. Finally, I suggest that responding by means that are not themselves harmful to nature serves to fulfill the further jus ad bellum criterion of “right intention.”. (shrink)