Switch to: References

Citations of:

Actual Consciousness

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2014)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Timelines: Short Essays and Verse in the Philosophy of Time.Edward A. Francisco - 2024 - Morrisville, North Carolina: Lulu Press.
    Timelines is an inquiry into the nature of time, both as an apparent feature of the external physical world and as a fundamental feature of our experience of ourselves in the world. The principal argument of Timelines is that our coventional ideas about time are largely mistaken and that what we think of as independent physical time is actually our calibration of a certain relation between events. Namely, the relation between time-keeping events and the causal sequential differences of physical processes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness.Christian List - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, ‘first-person realism’, ‘non-solipsism’, ‘non-fragmentation’, and ‘one world’ – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a ‘quadrilemma’. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The first-personal argument against physicalism.Christian List - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a seemingly straightforward argument against physicalism which, despite being implicit in much of the philosophical debate about consciousness, has not received the attention it deserves (compared to other, better-known “epistemic”, “modal”, and “conceivability” arguments). This is the argument from the non-supervenience of the first-personal (and indexical) facts on the third-personal (and non-indexical) ones. This non-supervenience, together with the assumption that the physical facts (as conventionally understood) are third-personal, entails that some facts – (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.
    The starting point of this paper is the thought that the phenomenal appearances that accompany mental states are somehow only there, or only real, from the standpoint of the subject of those mental states. The world differs across subjects in terms of which appearances obtain. Not only are subjects standpoints across which the world varies, subjects are standpoints that we can ‘adopt’ in our own theorizing about the world (or stand back from). The picture that is suggested by these claims (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The many‐worlds theory of consciousness.Christian List - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):316-340.
    This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: A task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition.Jim Davies & Kourken Michaelian - 2016 - Cognitive Processing 17 (3):307-319.
    This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems ("scaling down") and some supra-individual cognitive systems ("scaling up"). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations