The many-worlds theory of consciousness

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LISTMT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-03-02
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-03-26

Total views
450 ( #14,566 of 64,191 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
249 ( #1,797 of 64,191 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.