Are we justified in keeping the demented in prison for crimes they committed when they were still healthy? The answer to this question is an issue of considerable practical importance. The problem arises in cases where very aged criminals exhibit symptoms of dementia while serving their sentence. In these cases, one may wonder whether lodging these criminals in penal institutions rather than in normal caretaking facilities is justifiable. In this paper, I argue that there are justificatory reasons for punishing the (...) demented for their past crimes. In part 2, I examine three theories of punishment—retributivism, prevention theories and expressivism—with regard to the question of whether they provide justificatory reasons for punishing the demented. I argue that only expressivism provides these reasons. In part 3, I defend the view that expressivism, though not convincing as a general theory of punishment, is plausible if applied only to a specific subclass of punitive actions. More precisely, expressivism, or so I argue, is plausible with regard to those acts of punishment that consist in intending to inflict suffering without actually inflicting suffering. Since the punishment of demented patients falls within this class, it can be justified on an expressivist basis. In part 4, I discuss six objections to my view and rebut them. (shrink)

Among those who reject the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies, it is popularly held that death is bad for the one who dies, when it is bad for the one who dies, because it deprives the one who dies of the good things that otherwise would have fallen into her life. This view is known as the deprivation account of the value of death, and Fred Feldman is one of its most prominent defenders. (...) In this paper, I explain why I believe that Feldman’s argument for the occasional badness of death fails. While staying within an Epicurean framework, I offer an alternative that adequately accounts for a significant range of widely held intuitions about prudential value. My account implies that death is almost always good for the one who dies, yet often less good than not dying. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that remain for my account and hint at possible ways to address them. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the nature of consent in general, and as it applies to Carlos Nino’s consensual theory of punishment. For Nino the criminal’s consent to change her legal-normative status is a form of implied consent. I distinguish three types of implied consent: 1) implied consent which is based on an operative convention (i.e. tacit consent); 2) implied consent where there is no operative convention; 3) “direct consent” to the legal-normative consequences of a proscribed act – this is (...) the consent which Nino employs. I argue that Nino’s conception of consent in crime exhibits many common features of “everyday” consent, which justify that it be classed as a form of (implied) consent. h us, Nino is right to claim that the consent in crime is similar to the consent in contracts and to the consent to assume a risk in tort law. (shrink)

There are uses of the term merit in Indian religions which also appear in secular contexts, but in addition there are other uses that are not encountered outside religion. Transfer of merit is a specific doctrine in whose connection the term merit is used with an intention which is not the same as that found in nonreligious contexts. Two main types of transfer of merit can be distinguished. First, the transfer of merit has been associated with certain ritual practices in (...) Hinduism and in Buddhism. Another main type of transfer of merit is connected with Mahāyāna belief in bodhisattvas' loving-kindness towards other beings. In the orthodox Hindu schools, in Hnayāna Buddhism and in Jainism, transfer of merit has been rejected on account of the doctrine of karma according to which the person can acquire karmic outcomes for only those actions he or she has performed by himself. (shrink)

Gibt es rechtfertigende Gründe dafür, demente Menschen für ihre im früheren Zustand der Kompetenz begangenen Taten staatlich zu strafen? Im folgenden Beitrag wird für eine bejahende Antwort auf diese Frage plädiert. Zunächst werden drei zentrale Straftheorien daraufhin befragt, ob das von ihnen verteidigte Kriterium der Strafrechtfertigung in Anwendung auf die Bestrafung Dementer erfüllt, also die Bestrafung Dementer ihnen zufolge gerechtfertigt sein kann: die Retributionstheorie, die Präventionstheorie und die Expressionstheorie. Es zeigt sich, dass einzig der Expressionstheorie zufolge die Bestrafung Dementer gerechtfertigt (...) sein kann. Im Folgenden wird für die These argumentiert, dass die Expressionstheorie, obwohl nicht überzeugend als allgemeine Theorie der Strafrechtfertigung, in Bezug auf einen bestimmten Teilbereich von Strafhandlungen plausibel ist. Dabei handelt es sich um diejenigen Strafhandlungen, mit denen wir beabsichtigen, ein Leiden zuzufügen, die aber de facto kein Leiden bewirken. Da die Bestrafung Dementer in diese Klasse von Strafhandlungen fällt, lässt sie sich auf der Grundlage einer Expressionstheorie rechtfertigen. Vier Einwände gegen diese These werden diskutiert und entkräftet. Abschließend wird auf praktische Konsequenzen dieser Ansicht verwiesen. (shrink)

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related (...) to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness. (shrink)

This book is the Studies in G.W.F. Hegel's Philosophy of Right; Hegel's 'elements of the Philosophy of 'right is his last major published statement not only on the philosophy of law but on ethical theory, natural law, social and political theory as well. The studies of Right, Morality, Ethical Life duscuss Hegel's views both historically and systematically, contrubuting to the lively discussions concerning the signifigance of Hegel's view in the present philosophical context. This book is ment for students of Religion/philosophy.

Current sentencing practice in England and Wales is incoherent. This stems from the combination of conflicting philosophies of punishment, with no clear method adopted by sentencers in choosing between them. This presents a significant challenge as sentencing can have a profound impact on an offender’s life, as well as having wider implications for family members. Therefore, a coherent decision-making process is essential in order to limit arbitrary sentencing and support the legitimacy of the penal system. This thesis argues that Restorative (...) Justice might offer a more coherent decision-making process. Restorative Justice is hypothesised to operate as a kind of mediation process between the philosophies of punishment and understandings of justice held by participants. Their voluntarily agreed outcome should therefore represent the best possible compromise between participants’ ideas of justice and philosophies of punishment. Analysis of existing empirical research has been undertaken, involving the examination of existing studies of Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand. This empirical research has explored problems which can arise in practice for the theoretical conception of Restorative Justice as a mediation process between ideas. The thesis concludes that Restorative Justice can in theory offer a more coherent process of sentencing, but that there are a number of obstacles to realising this in practice. (shrink)