It is shown how the development of physics has involved making explicit what were homocentric projections which had heretofore been implicit, indeed inexpressible in theory. This is shown to support a particular notion of the invariant as the real. On this basis the divergence in ideals of physical intelligibility between Bohr and Einstein is set out. This in turn leads to divergent, but explicit, conceptions of objectivity and completeness for physical theory. *I am indebted to Dr. G. McLelland. Professor F. (...) Rohrlich and an anonymous referee of this journal for several improvements in the formulation of the paper. (shrink)

This work is a conceptual analysis of certain recent developments in the mathematical foundations of Classical and Quantum Mechanics which have allowed to formulate both theories in a common language. From the algebraic point of view, the set of observables of a physical system, be it classical or quantum, is described by a Jordan-Lie algebra. From the geometric point of view, the space of states of any system is described by a uniform Poisson space with transition probability. Both these structures (...) are here perceived as formal translations of the fundamental twofold role of properties in Mechanics: they are at the same time quantities and transformations. The question becomes then to understand the precise articulation between these two roles. The analysis will show that Quantum Mechanics can be thought as distinguishing itself from Classical Mechanics by a compatibility condition between properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations. -/- Moreover, this dissertation shows the existence of a tension between a certain "abstract way" of conceiving mathematical structures, used in the practice of mathematical physics, and the necessary capacity to specify particular states or observables. It then becomes important to understand how, within the formalism, one can construct a labelling scheme. The “Chase for Individuation” is the analysis of different mathematical techniques which attempt to overcome this tension. In particular, we discuss how group theory furnishes a partial solution. (shrink)

The philosophical debate about quantum logic between the late 1960s and the early 1980s was generated mainly by Putnam's claims that quantum mechanics empirically motivates introducing a new form of logic, that such an empirically founded quantum logic is the `true' logic, and that adopting quantum logic would resolve all the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Most of that debate focussed on the latter claim, reaching the conclusion that it was mistaken. This chapter will attempt to clarify the possible misunderstandings surrounding (...) the more radical claims about the revision of logic, assessing them in particular both in the context of more general quantum-like theories (in the framework of von Neumann algebras), and against the background of the current state of play in the philosophy and interpretation of quantum mechanics. Characteristically, the conclusions that might be drawn depend crucially on which of the currently proposed solutions to the measurement problem is adopted. (shrink)

By quoting extensively from unpublished letters written by John von Neumann to Garret Birkhoff during the preparatory phase (in 1935) of their ground-breaking 1936 paper that established quantum logic, the main steps in the thought process leading to the 1936 Birkhoff–von Neumann paper are reconstructed. The reconstruction makes it clear why Birkhoff and von Neumann rejected the notion of quantum logic as the projection lattice of an infinite dimensional complex Hilbert space and why they postulated in their 1936 paper that (...) the quantum propositional system should be isomorphic to an abstract projective geometry. Looking at the paper now I see, that I forgot to say this, which should be said somewhere in the first §: That while common logics did apply to quantum mechanics, if the notion of simultaneous measurability is introduced as an auxiliary notion, we wished to construct a logical system, which applies directly to quantum mechanics – without any extraneous secondary notions like simultaneous measurability. And in order to have such a consequent, one-piece system of logics, we must change the classical class calculus of logics. (J. von Neumann to G. Birkhoff, November 21, 1935). (shrink)

Patrick Heelan, with background in quantum theory and in hermeneutic phenomenology, investigated not only the hermeneutical philosophy of science but also the parallels between quantum mechanics and human experience in general and the logic of changes of worldview. Heelan’s closeness to Aristotle and Lonergan, often neglected, is discussed, and issues concerning Heelan’s treatment of the social context of science are raised.

This paper reviews the structure of standard quantum mechanics, introducing the basics of the von Neumann-Dirac axiomatic formulation as well as the well-known Copenhagen interpretation. We review also the major conceptual difficulties arising from this theory, first and foremost, the well-known measurement problem. The main aim of this essay is to show the possibility to solve the conundrums affecting quantum mechanics via the methodology provided by the primitive ontology approach. Using Bohmian mechanics as an example, the paper argues for a (...) realist attitude towards quantum theory. In the second place, it discusses the Quinean criterion for ontology and its limits when it comes to quantum physics, arguing that the primitive ontology programme should be considered as an improvement on Quine’s method in determining the ontological commitments of a theory. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss how Bohm's interpretation models spin measurements and how the two ways in which spin is a contextual property pertains to the Kochen-Specker theorem. I then present locality principles from which a Bell Inequality can be derived, and I identify which of the locality principles Bohm's interpretation violates at which times. I also present reasons why the spin vector should not be attributed to the Bohmian particles.

The basic purpose of this essay, the first of an intended pair, is to interpret standard von Neumann quantum theory in a framework of iterated measure algebraic truth for mathematical (and thus mathematical-physical) assertions — a framework, that is, in which the truth-values for such assertions are elements of iterated boolean measure-algebras (cf. Sections 2.2.9, 5.2.1–5.2.6 and 5.3 below).The essay itself employs constructions of Takeuti's boolean-valued analysis (whose origins lay in work of Scott, Solovay, Krauss and others) to provide a (...) metamathematical interpretation of ideas sometimes considered disparate, heuristic, or simply ill-defined: the collapse of the wave function, for example; Everett's many worlds'-construal of quantum measurement; and a natural product space of contextual (nonlocal) hidden variables. (shrink)

In this paper we derive the Schrödinger equation by comparing quantum statistics with classical statistical mechanics, identifying similarities and differences, and developing an operator functional equation which is solved in a completely algebraic fashion with no appeal to spatial invariances or symmetries.

Space is a particular, the particular thing structuring our world. It has shape. And size. And reference to space and its properties is fundamental to physical explanation. This, in a nutshell, is Nerlich's position. Espousing it Nerlich marches against the tide of philosophical opinion which dominated the first half or more of this century.His arguments are laid out in a wholly enjoyable book: clearly and simply written, ‘meaty’ in argument and lucid in explanation. The book does not have the same (...) technical scope in theoretical physics as do its relevant companions. Rather, the book is a sustained argument aimed at establishing the theses with which I began and its content has been selected accordingly. But the clarity of presentation and consistency of argument recommend it as a major contribution to the field. It is especially to be recommended to the non-technical philosopher. And there is another important reason for commending it: much of the argumentation of the book is not to be found elsewhere, it fills an important gap in the field. I need hardly add that I find myself in sympathy with Nerlich's position. (shrink)