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Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance

In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press. pp. 151 (2010)

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  1. Realism and Representation: The Case of Rembrandt's Hat.Michael Morris - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):909-932.
    Some artistic representations—the painting of a hat in a famous picture by Rembrandt is an example—are able to present vividly the character of what they represent precisely by calling attention to their medium of representation. There is a puzzle about this whose structure, I argue, is analogous to that of a familiar Kantian problem for traditional realism. I offer a precise characterization of the puzzle, before arguing that an analogue for the case of representation to the Kantian solution to the (...)
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  • Against the Additive View of Imagination.Nick Wiltsher - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.
    According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra- sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The (...)
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  • Pictorial Aesthetics and Two Kinds of Inflected Seeing-In.Giulia Martina - 2016 - Estetika 53 (1):74-92.
    Inflected seeing-in is a special experience of the vehicle and subject of a picture, which are experienced as related to each other. Bence Nanay recently defended the idea that inflected picture perception is central to the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. Here I critically discuss his characterization of inflection, and advance a new one, that better accounts for the structure and content of inflected experience in terms of properties of the pictures themselves and also clarifies the distinctive contribution of inflection to (...)
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  • Perceiving Pictures.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
    I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates Richard Wollheim’s concept of the “twofoldness” of our experience of pictures: (...)
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  • Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception.Walter Hopp - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):130-153.
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  • Trompe L’Oeil and the Dorsal/Ventral Account of Picture Perception.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):181-197.
    While there has been a lot of discussion of picture perception both in perceptual psychology and in philosophy, these discussions are driven by very different background assumptions. Nonetheless, it would be mutually beneficial to arrive at an understanding of picture perception that is informed by both the philosophers’ and the psychologists’ story. The aim of this paper is exactly this: to give an account of picture perception that is valid both as a philosophical and as a psychological account. I argue (...)
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  • Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.
    Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: the picture surface, the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and the three dimensional depicted object. As and can come apart, we get a more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where the notion of twofoldness, which has played an (...)
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  • Depicting Depictions.René Jagnow - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):453-479.
    How is it possible for a picture to depict a picture? Proponents of perceptual theories of depiction, who argue that the content of a picture is determined, in part, by the visual state it elicits in suitable viewers, that is, by a state of seeing-in, have given a plausible answer to this question. They say that a picture depicts a picture, in part, because, under appropriate conditions of observation, a suitable viewer will be able to see a picture in the (...)
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  • Pictorial Experience: Not so Special After All.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.
    The central thesis (CT) that this paper upholds is that a picture depicts an object by generating in those who view the picture a visual experience of that object. I begin by presenting a brief sketch of intentionalism, the theory of perception in terms of which I propose to account for pictorial experience. I then discuss Richard Wollheim’s twofoldness thesis and explain why it should be rejected. Next, I show that the socalled unique phenomenology of pictorial experience is simply an (...)
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  • The Singularity of Experiences and Thoughts.Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Topoi:1-15.
    Recently, various people have maintained that one must revise either the externalistically-based notion of singular thought or the naïve realism-inspired notion of relational particularity, as respectively applied to some thoughts and to some perceptual experiences. In order to do so, one must either provide a broader notion of singular thought or flank the notion of relational particularity with a broader notion of phenomenal particularity. I want to hold that there is no need of that revision. For the original notions can (...)
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  • Painting and Philosophy.Michael Newall - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (4):225-237.
    This article is primarily concerned with the philosophical problems that arise out of a consideration of painting. By painting I mean of course not any kind of application of paint to a surface – house painting for instance – but painting as an art, to use Richard Wollheim's phrase. Since Plato, philosophy has intermittently been concerned with these problems, and over the past 30 years, painting has come under a new focus as philosophy of art has increasingly turned its attention (...)
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