This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the (...) third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions. (shrink)

The traditional divisions in the methodology of educational research include two types of methods: quantitative and qualitative. These comprise e.g. quasi-experiment, comparative research, observat...

It has become increasingly common for philosophers to distinguish between objective and subjective rightness, and there has been much discussion recently about what an adequate theory of subjective rightness looks like. In this article, I propose a new theory of subjective rightness. According to it, an action is subjectively right if and only if it minimizes expected objective wrongness. I explain this theory in detail and argue that it avoids many of the problems that other theories of subjective rightness face. (...) I end by responding to some objections. (shrink)

In response to Russia’s war of aggression and the accompanying human rights violations in Ukraine, several scholars have called for all multinational companies to divest and leave the country; otherwise, they become accomplices to the aggressor. This article reconstructs the arguments in favor of this general call. The first contribution of this article is to extend complicity theory to the context of crimes of aggression and atrocities to promote this demand. Although this extension of complicity theory ensures internal coherence, the (...) call for a general divestment of all companies is tantamount to comprehensive economic sanctions. In contrast, recent developments in sanction theory as part of just war theory suggest that targeted sanctions are the legitimate sanctions that states prefer. Therefore, the second contribution is to evaluate sanctions morally and analyze and discuss the moral implications of three categories of goods and services (sanctioned, essential, and nonessential). This discussion shows no moral justification for a general call for all companies to leave an aggressor state. Companies have moral obligations to comply with legitimate sanctions, moral duties concerning essential goods, and moral permissions concerning nonessential goods. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 3-20, March 2022.

In this paper, I motivate and defend the distinction between an objective and a subjective moral sense of “ought.” I begin by looking at the standard way the distinction is motivated, namely by appealing to relatively simple cases where an agent does something she thinks is best, but her action has a tragic outcome. I argue that these cases fail to do the job—the intuitions they elicit can be explained without having to distinguish between different senses of “ought.” However, these (...) cases are on the right track—I argue that more sophisticated versions of the cases provide strong motivation for the distinction. I then discuss two important problems for the distinction: the “which ‘ought’ is more important?” problem, and the “annoying profusion of ‘oughts’” problem. I argue that each of these problems can be solved in several different ways. (shrink)