It is natural to think that social groups are concrete material particulars, but this view faces an important objection. Suppose the chess club and nature club have the same members. Intuitively, these are different clubs even though they have a common material basis. Some philosophers take these intuitions to show that the materialist view must be abandoned. I propose an alternative explanation. Social groups are concrete material particulars, but there is a psychological explanation of nonidentity intuitions. Social groups appear coincident (...) but nonidentical because they are perceived to be governed by conflicting social norms. (shrink)

Philosophers have appealed to a wide variety of different factors in providing a metaphysics of race: appearance, ancestry, systems of oppression, shared ways of life, and so-called “racial essences”. I distinguish four importantly different questions about racial groups that one may be answering in appealing these factors. I then show that marking these distinctions proves quite fruitful, revealing ways of strengthening existing arguments for the non-existence of racial groups, new avenues for addressing challenges to biological and constructionist accounts of race, (...) and a range of hybrid positions that have been largely overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

According to ‘composition as identity’, a composite object is identical to all its parts taken together. Thus, a plurality of composite objects is identical to the plurality of those objects’ parts. This has the consequence that, e.g., the bricks which compose a brick wall are identical to the atoms which compose those bricks, and hence that the plurality of bricks must include each of those atoms. This consequence of CAI is in direct conflict with the standard analysis of plural definite (...) descriptions. According to that analysis, the denotation of ‘the bricks’ can include only bricks. It seems, then, that if CAI is true, ‘the bricks’ doesn’t denote anything; more generally, if CAI is true, there are fewer pluralities than we ordinarily think. I respond to this argument by developing an alternative analysis of plural descriptions which allows the denotation of ‘the bricks’ to include non-bricks. Thus, we can accept CAI, while still believing in all the pluralities we could want. As a bonus, my approach to plural descriptions and plural comprehension blocks recent arguments to the effect that CAI entails compositional nihilism. (shrink)

Peter Van Inwagen argues that The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) either leads to contradiction or it leads to necessitarianism. Although I agree with Van Inwagen that the relationship between the PSR and necessitarianism is close, I argue that the PSR is compatible with innocent versions of necessitarianism. In this project my main argument is that modal realism can account for the PSR and integrate it within an innocent version of necessitarianism. My main claim will be that each fact in (...) each possible world is grounded in the principle of plenitude. Also, while each fact is grounded in plenitude, it avoids rigid necessitarianism because (i) actuality is not captured by the PSR, (ii) things could be otherwise because there are other worlds, and due to the principle of recombination (iii) cardinality of possible worlds is maximized and (iv) there are no necessary connections between distinct individuals. As a result, the relationship between modal realism and the PSR is symbiotic. Through modal realism, the PSR also results as: having its scope extended to the realm of all possibilia rather than being confined to mere actuality; it solves indeterminacy problems like Leibniz’s problem of space or the hard problem of consciousness; it accounts for facts in lawless worlds etc. On the other hand, through the PSR, modal realism gets one more benefit in its inventory because it accounts for the PSR. Thus, modal realism still continues on Lewis’ paradoxical path of proving to be highly pragmatic but counterintuitive at the same time. If added benefits are worth the costs for modal realism is still an open question. (shrink)

Some contemporary states are morally culpable for historically distant wrongs. But which states for which wrongs? The answer is not obvious, due to secessions, unions, and the formation of new states in the time since the wrongs occurred. This paper develops a framework for answering the question. The argument begins by outlining a picture of states’ agency on which states’ culpability is distinct from the culpability of states’ members. It then outlines, and rejects, a plausible-seeming answer to our question: that (...) culpability transmits from a past state’s action to a present state just if the two states share a numerical identity, for example as determined by international law. I advocate a different answer: culpability transmits from a past action to a present state to the extent that the present state ‘descends from’ the aspects of the past state that underpinned the past action. One potential upshot is that some present-day settler-colonies (such as Australia) are culpable for the centuries-ago invasion of their lands by European powers—even though these states did not perform these invasions and indeed did not exist at the time. (shrink)

Within the broader scope of joint actions, there is a particular kind, i.e. transgenerational actions, the realization of which requires a long time span and, consequently, a complex and peculiar subject. This paper starts from the detailed definition of transgenerational actions, such as complex, long-term, and asymmetrical actions and aims at outlining a theory of their subject. Such a theory, without embracing the principles of holism, is able to give account of subjects’ specificities. In particular, this is possible if we (...) focus on the notion of end, as defined by Seumas Miller. The paper will then examine an example of transgenerational action to highlight how a theory which is both non-reductionist and non-holistic allows us to address the question of responsibility – and therefore of normativity, so pressing when it comes to social issues – from another point of view: the phenomenological one. Not implying a notion of collective responsibility, like the one held by traditional plural subject theories, this point of view focuses on the possibility of stimulating the sense of responsibility in the individuals who constitute the collective subject. (shrink)

Deflationism about group knowledge is the view that a group has knowledge if and only if most of its members have that knowledge. The case against deflationism has revolved around epistemic divergence arguments, which typically aim to show that members’ knowledge isn’t necessary for group knowledge. This paper is instead devoted to objections against members’ knowledge being sufficient for group knowledge. Focusing on structured groups in which members occupy roles that are connected by internal links in a social network, we (...) develop a notion of knowledge qua such occupancy. We proceed to argue that if deflationists adopt such knowledge-qua as what constitutes structured group knowledge, they have the resources to counter worries about the sufficiency condition. If instead groups are taken to be feature collectives, then similar worries are much less pressing. Finally, we elaborate on the societal function of knowledge-qua, as well as the different epistemic assessments that arise, depending on whether the role or its occupant is considered. (shrink)

I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.

The following paper explores the categorisation of groups. Indeed, there are different ways to distinguish human groups from one another: on the one hand, sociological analyses focus their attention on the distinction between being inside and outside of groups; on the other hand, collective action theories mainly focus on the distinction between collectives and aggregates, based on the kind of action that groups can perform, i.e., joint or not. In this paper, we offer an alternative view by adopting the agent’s (...) perspective and creating a scale based on the importance the agent attributes to his or her membership to different groups. While this perspective seems to lose objectivity as it does not allow the formulation of an unambiguous scale that applies to all individuals, it does allow us to understand the process of identification and the consequent phenomenon whereby very often we act in accordance with other people’s actions, in a collective way, without prior coordination. A practical example based on the so-called “acting white” will be explored in order to test the paper’s proposal. The analysis intends to offer a common ground on the basis of which it would be possible to have further inquiries on the social dimension of self-experience. (shrink)