This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons. We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view, showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.

The subject of the first section is Carnapian modal logic. One of the things I will do there is to prove that certain description principles, viz. the ''self-predication principles'', i.e. the principles according to which a descriptive term satisfies its own descriptive condition, are theorems and that others are not. The second section will be devoted to Carnapian modal arithmetic. I will prove that, if the arithmetical theory contains the standard weak principle of induction, modal truth collapses to truth. Then (...) I will propose a different formulation of Carnapian modal arithmetic and establish that it is free of collapse. Noteworthy is that one can retain the standard strong principle of induction. I will occupy myself in the third section with Carnapian epistemic logic and arithmetic. Here too it is claimed that the standard weak principle of induction is invalid and that the alternative principle is valid. In the fourth and last section I will get back to the self-predication principles and I will point to some of the consequences if one adds them to Carnapian Epistemic arithmetic. The interaction of self-predication principles and the strong principle of induction results in a collapse of de re knowability. (shrink)