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  1. Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this dissertation, I argue for a new conception of the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
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  • Responsibility of AI Systems.Mehdi Dastani & Vahid Yazdanpanah - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (2):843-852.
    To support the trustworthiness of AI systems, it is essential to have precise methods to determine what or who is to account for the behaviour, or the outcome, of AI systems. The assignment of responsibility to an AI system is closely related to the identification of individuals or elements that have caused the outcome of the AI system. In this work, we present an overview of approaches that aim at modelling responsibility of AI systems, discuss their advantages and shortcomings to (...)
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  • When ignorance excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.
    An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According (...)
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  • Ignorance, Knowledge, and Two Epistemic Intuitions.Pierre Le Morvan - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2123-2132.
    One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance and supports the Standard View of Ignorance.
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