I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...) anti-realism, McLeod provides an original contribution to essentialist epistemology, engaging with current debates about modality and suggesting that standard essentialist approaches to some issues in the philosophies of logic and language require revision. -/- This book offers valuable insights to professional philosophers, postgraduates and advanced undergraduates interested in metaphysics, philosophy of logic or the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This essay examines the reasons for Hegel's frequently professed claim that Kant's Critique of Judgment simultaneously reveals the internal limits of critical philosophy and opens the door to his own system of speculative idealism. It evaluates Hegel's contention that the conceptions of aesthetic experience, organic purposiveness, and the intuitive intellect developed in the third Critique together conspire to undermine the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the theories of nature and freedom advanced in the first and second Critiques . Finally it (...) explains how Hegel understands his logic and real philosophy as a realist and quasi-naturalistic alternative to Kant's subjective idealism, one that purports to generate a system of categories adequate not only to dead matter but also to organic life and free self-conscious spirit. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Hegel pense qu’il n’y a rien de plus important à comprendre que la liberté pour nous autres humains, et rien que nous ne comprenions plus mal. Tout son système philosophique, de fait, avec son ampleur et sa précision incroyables, peut être compris comme une unique démonstration très élaborée de l’importance et de la signification de la liberté. Qui plus est, la philosophie de Hegel n’est pas seulement à propos de la liberté, mais elle prétend aussi la produire. Car la (...) recherche philosophique sur ce que cela signifie que d’être libre aboutit chez lui à l’idée que la liberté dépend de la pratique de la philosophie. Comprendre cette position — ce qui est l’objectif principal du présent article — requiert d’examiner ce que Hegel a à dire au sujet de la liberté, de la philosophie et de leur interconnexion. La section 1 prépare cet examen en situant la liberté dans le système de Hegel. La section 2 présente l’explication du concept de liberté qu’il nous fournit dans sa Logique. La section 3 exploite cette explication logique pour interpréter la thèse de Hegel, dans sa Realphilosophie, que tous les êtres spirituels, et eux seuls, sont libres. La section 4 réfléchit sur le rôle attribué à la philosophie dans la libération de tels êtres spirituels. Et la section 5, enfin, conclut l’article en discutant quelques questions qui peuvent être soulevées au sujet de mon interprétation du traitement hégélien de la liberté. (shrink)

One of the most interesting debates in Hegel scholarship today comes from the question of how to interpret Hegel’s treatment of contradiction in the Science of Logic.1 Some interpreters claim that Hegel defiantly disregards the basic law of noncontradiction, which states that something cannot both be and not be in the same time, manner, or place, proposing instead that for Hegel true contradictions really do exist, and not only in rational conception but equally in the very fabric of reality. However, (...) other interpreters propose less direct readings of Hegel’s thesis from productive contradiction, either by limiting Hegel’s conception of contradiction to only certain forms, such as only in... (shrink)

Os principais objetivos do artigo podem ser formulados da seguinte forma: a) Hegel tem uma noção forte de contingência. Contingência não é, para ele, a ausência simples de necessidade, tampouco subdeterminidade simples. Contingencia é uma noção original, que tem o mesmo peso e a mesma dignidade lógica e metafísica que a noção de necessidade; b) essa noção forte de contingência é decisiva para a concepção de Hegel de subjetividade na medida em que pode ser remetida a sua filosofia do real. (...) À diferença do que é assumido em muitas outras interpretações comuns de Hegel, sugiro que a possibilidade de ir da necessidade à contingência caracteriza uma parte essencial da liberdade subjetiva, tanto quanto a possibilidade de ir contingência à necessidade. Isso tem consequências importantes, especialmente na filosofia da história, que aparece não como apriorística ou dogmática, mas como aberta à contingencia ; e, c) consistentemente com o reconhecimento da irredutibilidade da contingencia à conceitos a priori, Hegel também reconhece a necessidade da narração não-filosófica da contingência e nos fornece algumas pistas importantes sobre isso e sobre sua relação com a filosofia. Ao longo da minha argumentação dessas três teses, espero fornecer evidências para a tese de que a construção dogmática na filosofia da história de Hegel pode ser atenuada pela referência ao entendimento de Hegel da contingência. Em uma escala geral, isso também mostra que o fundamento lógico da filosofia do real de Hegel não pode ser abandonado sem que se prejudique o potencial da filosofia de Hegel de contribuir aos debates filosóficos contemporâneos. Meu argumento estrutura-se como se segue. Eu irei, primeiramente, comentar algumas passagens da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel do começo da Lógica Subjetiva sobre a lógica da contingência e a presença da contingência na estrutura lógica da subjetividade. Eu irei, então, ilustrar, com referência a um caso específico, o papel desempenhado pela contingência na filosofia hegeliana da história. Na última seção, discutirei a relação entre verdade e contingência, por um lado, e filosofia e narratividade, por outro, tentando esboçar as principais linhas da narração da contingência sob bases hegelianas. (shrink)

It is a commonplace among certain recent philosophers that there is no such thing as theessenceof anything. Nietzsche, for example, asserts that things have no essence of their own, because they are nothing but ceaselessly changing ways of acting on, and reacting to, other things. Wittgenstein, famously, rejects the idea that there is an essence to language and thought — at least if we mean by that somea priorilogical structure underlying our everyday utterances. Finally, Richard Rorty urges that we “abandon (...) […] the notion of ‘essence’ altogether”, along with “the notion that man's essence is to be a knower of essences”.It would be wrong to maintain that these writers understand the concept of essence in precisely the same way, or that they are all working towards the same philosophical goal. Nevertheless, they do share one aim in common: to undermine the idea that there is some deeper reality or identityunderlyingandgroundingwhat we encounter in the world, what we say and what we do. That is to say, they may all be described asanti-foundationalistthinkers — thinkers who want us to attend to the specific processes and practices of nature and humanity without understanding them to be the product of some fundamental essence or “absolute”. (shrink)

It is a commonplace among certain recent philosophers that there is no such thing as the essence of anything. Nietzsche, for example, asserts that things have no essence of their own, because they are nothing but ceaselessly changing ways of acting on, and reacting to, other things. Wittgenstein, famously, rejects the idea that there is an essence to language and thought – at least if we mean by that some a priori logical structure underlying our everyday utterances. Finally, Richard Rorty (...) urges that we ‘abandon … the notion of “essence” altogether’, along with ‘the notion that man's essence is to be a knower of essences’. (shrink)