Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”.Fabian Pregel - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91 (1):243-252.
    I discuss a contemporary solution to the dynamic problem of old evidence (POE), as proposed by Sprenger. Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Origins of Old Evidence.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):481-494.
    The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour [1980], is still widely regarded as one of the most pressing foundational challenges to the Bayesian account of scientific reasoning. Many solutions have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks and none is considered to be definitive. Here, we introduce and defend a new kind of solution, according to which hypotheses are confirmed when we become more confident that they provide the only way of accounting for the known evidence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations