The French existentialists Simone de Beauvoir and Jean‐Paul Sartre are renowned philosophers of freedom. But what “existentialist freedom” is is a matter of disagreement amongst their interpreters and, some argue, between Beauvoir and Sartre themselves. Since the late 1980s several scholars have argued that a Sartrean conception of freedom cannot justify the ethics of existentialism, adequately account for situations of oppression, or serve feminist ends. On these readings, Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about freedom—making existentialist ethics, resistance to oppression, and feminism (...) coherently defensible. This article identifies four conceptions of freedom in order to clarify the questions of whether and how they disagreed, arguing that some incompatibilist readings of Sartre and Beauvoir conflate or confuse these conceptions in ways that render their conclusions unconvincing. However, there are stronger grounds on which to claim that Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about morality—and the conditions of its possibility. (shrink)

IntroductionThe main objective of my paper is to argue that Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian in four important respects, viz. its point of departure, consciousness, freedom and dualism. Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is Cartesian insofar as it begins its inquiry into human existence by taking the Cartesian cogito as its stating point. Sartrean consciousness with its essential character of intentionality is Cartesian since it has moorings in Descartes’ conception of the mind the essential nature of which is self-isolation or self-detachment. Sartrean (...) freedom with its nihilating or negating structure has its basis in the Cartesian thesis that the human mind is basically skeptical and secretes nothingness in questioning itself and the world. And, the gaping divide between the Sartrean being-for-itself and being-in-itself has its roots in the insurmountable Cartesian dualism of the two substances, the mind and the body.Materials and MethodsThe seminal/original points discussed in the paper are: Sartre adopted the Cartesian substantial cogito by transforming it into a phenomenological subjectivity which is non-substantial; he gave a phenomenological turn to the Cartesian idea that the mind is of the nature of self-isolation; Sartre gave an ontological status to the Cartesian conception that human reality secretes nothingness by treating it as the inner structure of consciousness, the being of freedom; and Sartrean dualism is more incorrigible than the Cartesian, for Sartre has introduced “non-being,” the impassable empty distance, between consciousness and its object.Conclusion Sartre remains to be a redoubtable dualist despite his claim to the contrary that he overcame all the traditional dualisms through his conception of the monism of the phenomenon; in this, Sartre has taken a metaphysical stance, if not mystical, which is antithetical to phenomenology; and he sustained the dualism in his own inimitable, subtle way to construct an ontology implying division and conflict as the fundamental modes of human existence, the idea having implications for sociopolitical action. The paper brings out all these points under the Section, ‘Cartesian Moorings’ by taking as the background the foregoing analytical discussion of the four constituents of Sartre’s phenomenology, namely, Being, Nothing, Consciousness and Freedom. (shrink)

This paper suggests that design ethics can be enriched by considering ethics beyond the traditional approaches of deontology, teleology, and virtue ethics. Design practice and design ethics literature tend to frame ethics in design according to these approaches. The paper argues that a fundamental and concrete ethical understanding of design ethics can also be found in Sartrean Existentialism, a philosophy centered on the individual and his/her absolute freedom. Through the analysis of four core concepts of Sartrean Existentialism that define a (...) specific ethics, the paper illustrates why such philosophical approach is relevant to design ethics. The paper also shows how Sartrean Existentialism and its ethics apply to critical issues of professional practice in design such as professional engagement and design decision-making. The paper finally argues that Sartre’s philosophy and ethics is a perspective that offers the designer in design practice a solid ground to engage his/her ethical dilemma. (shrink)

This dissertation reassesses the complex philosophical relationship between Sartre and psychoanalysis. Most scholarship on this topic focuses on Sartre’s criticisms of the unconscious as anathema both to his conception of the human psyche as devoid of any hidden depths or mental compartments and, correlatively, his account of human freedom. Many philosophers conclude that there is little common ground between Sartrean existentialism and psychoanalytic theory. I argue, on the contrary, that by shifting the emphasis from concerns about the nature of the (...) unconscious to questions about the role of imagination in psychical life, we can see that Sartre and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory develop strikingly similar accounts of human subjectivity. After establishing the historical background of Sartre’s career-long engagement with psychoanalysis, I demonstrate the proximity of Sartre and Lacan on the nature of unconscious thought. I proceed to develop the claim that there is a homology between the concept of unconscious fantasy in psychoanalysis and the concept of the imaginary in Sartre’s philosophical corpus. Despite the concept of fantasy being one of the more structuralist-inspired aspects of Lacan’s metapsychology, I show that Sartre’s concept of the imaginary is likewise a structural feature of the psyche, one which establishes the coordinates within which the subject engages with the world. For Sartre, Freud, and Lacan fantasies form the core of subjectivity, giving form to the basic patterns of one’s character. Taken together, these three thinkers furnish a nuanced view of fantasy/the imaginary. On the one hand it is determining insofar as it is responsible for many of the psychopathologies met with in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it is liberating insofar as the agency of the subject is implicated in the formation of fantasy. I thereby show that Sartre does not fit the caricatured picture of a radical voluntarist that is often attributed to him and that psychoanalysis can accommodate a conception of human freedom. (shrink)