O debate fomentado nos anos oitenta entre liberais e “comunitaristas” tende a contrastar radicalmente as concepções teóricas de John Rawls e Charles Taylor, sendo o primeiro o representante principal da vertente liberal e o segundo do “comunitarismo”. Ao contrário do que sustenta essa distinção, neste artigo proponho ir para além dela, a fim de defender que há convergências dos autores no que tange à discussão sobre o pluralismo. Em um primeiro momento, apresento os diagnósticos de Rawls e de Taylor quanto (...) ao fato do pluralismo nas sociedades modernas como uma característica contextual irreversível (I). Em um segundo momento, diante da tensão ética insuperável entre divergentes concepções bem, a saída mais viável caminha para a justiça. Para tanto, desenvolvo a concepção de “justiça política” de Rawls em “O Liberalismo Político” e as publicações mais recentes de Charles Taylor como em “Secularism and Freedom of Conscience”, “A Secular Age” e “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism?”, que parecem sustentar certa “virada liberal-rawlsiana” no pensamento do autor (II). Em um terceiro momento, efetuo uma distinção entre o fato do pluralismo (razoável) e o valor do pluralismo, para finalmente concluir o artigo argumentando que tanto Rawls como Taylor tendem a defender o pluralismo como um valor político para as instituições e não como um valor moral abrangente para os indivíduos. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe apresentar como ao longo das três gerações da Teoria Crítica – Max Horkheimer, Jünger Habermas, Axel Honneth – foi-se modificando o vocabulário acerca do que ela deveria denunciar ou expor. Segundo Horkheimer, caberia à Teoria Crítica expor as contradições sociais do sistema de sua época, já o segundo Habermas expõe as tensões inerentes às sociedades complexas e, por fim, Axel Honneth, os desenvolvimentos falhos (ou desviantes) da ideia de liberdade. Cada autor, a sua maneira,.

The thesis aims to provide an interpretation of John Rawls’ social bases of self-respect from the debate on redistribution and recognition in the current state of the art of theories of justice. The first chapter reenacts the reception of Rawlsian theory in the debate based on three critiques: (a) Iris Young's critique of the allocative-distributive paradigm, (b) Axel Honneth’s critique of the legal-political limitation, (c) Nancy Fraser's critique of the redistributive-reductionism. Far from considering the conception of ‘justice as fairness’ as (...) an insensitive terrain for dealing with matters of recognition, criticisms point out, on the contrary, the attempts of liberal Rawlsian theory to move into these issues, mainly taking the social bases of self-respect into account. However, these criticisms agree that Rawls' theory of justice would fail for several reasons. In the following chapters, each of these criticisms is addressed. The second chapter replies to Young's criticism. Contrary to what the author have supposed, ‘justice as fairness’ is better understood as a relational conception of justice rather than an allocative-distributive one. The third chapter addresses Honneth's criticism. On the one hand, the Critical Theorist is right in stating the limitations of Rawls' theory of justice; however, on the other hand, a deontological theory of justice – like the Rawlsian one – conceives these limitations as a normative advantage rather than as a theoretical flaw. The fourth chapter focuses on Fraser's critique. Likewise in her deontological model, it is argued that ‘justice as fairness’ would also have taken the cultural dimension of justice duly into account as well as, more specifically, status inequalities and cultural conflicts. Given the compatibility between their normative models, in the fifth and last chapter, a return to Fraser's deontological recognition via Rawls is advocated. (shrink)

In this study, I aimed to carry out a comparative analysis of the methods of conversational philosophy and sage philosophy as contributions towards overcoming the problem of methodology in African philosophy. The purpose was to show their points of convergence and probably, if possible, their point of divergence as well. I did not intend to show that the method of one is superior or inferior to the other. The objective was to provide an analysis to show that the two methods (...) are essentially the same with little variations. Thereafter, I highlighted their significance as methods of doing African philosophy and discussed their problems as well. I used the methods of analysis and hermeneutics. From the study, I concluded that conversational philosophy is an extension or a modified form of sage philosophy. The implication of this conclusion is that sage philosophy and conversational philosophy should overlap each other in research and purposes. (shrink)

Ever since Freud pioneered the “talking cure,” psychologists of various stripes have explored how autobiographical narrative bears on self-understanding and psychic wellbeing. Recently, there has been a wave of philosophical speculation as to whether autobiographical narrative plays an essential or important role in the constitution of agentic selves. However, embodiment has received little attention from philosophers who defend some version of the narrative self. Catriona Mackenzie is an important exception to this pattern of neglect, and this paper explores Mackenzie’s work (...) on embodiment and self-narrative with the aim of better understanding the adequacy of autobiographical narrative as an account of the agentic self. I argue that Mackenzie’s narrative account of embodied subjectivity and agency is incomplete, for it over-estimates the reach of narrative and underestimates the cognitive and agentic powers of the lived body. (shrink)

Jenny Saville is a leading contemporary painter of female nudes. This paper explores her work in light of theories of gender and embodied agency. Recent work on the phenomenology of embodiment draws a distinction between the body image and the body schema. The body image is your representation of your own body, including your visual image of it and your emotional attitudes towards it. The body schema is comprised of your proprioceptive knowledge, your corporeally encoded memories, and your corporeal proficiency (...) with respect to various environments and activities. Saville is concerned with body image issues, and I discuss how she reconfigures representational practices with respect to feminine body images. However, the most exciting potential for feminist analysis of the state of the female nude derives from the concept of the body schema, for this concept endows the human body with subjectivity and agency. My key question, then, is by what pictorial means and to what extent Saville succeeds in representing agentic womanhood. I argue that interpreting Saville’s paintings from the standpoint of the body schema demonstrates the radicality of her remaking of the female nude and the rapport between her imagery and feminist values. (shrink)

Feminist studies of female genital cutting (FGC) provide ample evidence that many women exercise effective agency with respect to this practice, both as accommodators and as resisters. The influence of culture on autonomy is ambiguous: women who resist cultural mandates for FGC do not necessarily enjoy greater autonomy than do those women who accommodate the practice, yet it is clear that some social contexts are more conducive to autonomy than others. In this paper, I explore the implications for autonomy theory (...) of these understandings of the relation between culture, FGC, and women’s agency. I review the range of worldwide FGC practices – including “corrective” surgery for “ambiguous genitalia” in Western cultures as well as the various initiation rites observed in some African and Asian cultures – and the diverse cultural rationales for different forms of FGC. I argue that neither latitudinarian, value‐neutral accounts of autonomy nor restrictive, value‐saturated accounts adequately explain women’s agentic position with respect to FGC. I then analyze a number of educational programs that have enhanced women's autonomy, especially by strengthening their introspection, empathy, and imagination. Such programs, which engage women's autonomy skills without exposing them to autonomy‐disabling cultural alienation, promote autonomy‐within‐culture. This understanding of autonomy as socially situated, however, entails neither endorsement of FGC nor resignation to its persistence. (shrink)

It is often said that human rights are the rights that people possess simply in virtue of being human – that is, in virtue of their intrinsic, dignity-defining common humanity. Yet, on closer inspection the human rights landscape doesn’t look so even. Once we bring perpetrators of human rights abuse and their victims into the picture, attributions of humanity to persons become unstable. In this essay, I trace the ways in which rights discourse ascribes variable humanity to certain categories of (...) people. I set the stage for my discussion of the human in relation to human rights by examining John Locke’s account of the justification for punishment. For Locke, in committing a crime one abrogates one’s humanity and forfeits one’s rights. Likewise, I argue, human rights discourse takes a scalar view of humanity. I consider victims of genocide who are dehumanized as helpless and passive, victims of state persecution who are super-humanized as righteously agentic, and perpetrators of genocide who are dehumanized as out-of-control beasts. In each case I use relevant testimony to argue that the scalar view of humanity is factually incorrect and morally deplorable. For genocide victims, I discuss testimony that Selma Leydesdorff gathered from women who survived the Srebrenica massacre. For a victim of persecution, I discuss Liao Yiwu’s memoire of his detention and imprisonment in China because of his artwork protesting the Tiananmen Square massacre. For perpetrators of genocide, I discuss testimony Jean Hatzfeld gathered from Hutu men who systematically murdered Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. Finally, I apply my critique of dehumanized and super-humanized victims and dehumanized perpetrators to the problem of transnational trafficking in persons and argue that the view I advocate necessitates reforming immigration policy with respect to persons trafficked into forced labor. (shrink)

In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism from Carruthers' attacks (...) and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers' misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

The “film as philosophy” (FAP) hypothesis turned into a field if its own right during the 2000s, after S. Mulhall’s On Film (2001). In this work, Mulhall defended that some films philosophize for themselves. This caused controversy. Around the same time of On Film’s release, B. Russell published the article “The philosophical limits of film” (2000). This article had one of the first attacks against FAP, posing some main objections based on metaphilosophical grounds, which were called the “generality” and the (...) “explicitness” objections. These objections made by Russell and by M. Smith are based on the idea that film and philosophy are too different in their purposes or ways of presentation, ideas that are grounded in implicit or explicit conceptions of philosophy. In this chapter, these will be analyzed, as well as some other metaphilosophically grounded objections, as a line of reasoning connecting to attempts of responding to them will be drawn. After doing so, it will be concluded that their metaphilosophical grounds are implausible, and, thus, they are not definite objections against FAP. (shrink)

My aim is to extend and complement the arguments that others have already made for the claim that women who are citizens of economically disadvantaged states and who have been trafficked into sex work in economically advantaged states should be considered candidates for asylum. Familiar arguments cite the sexual violence and forced labor that trafficked women are subjected to along with their well-founded fear of persecution if they’re repatriated. What hasn’t been considered is that reproductive rights are also at stake. (...) I explain how reproductive rights are implicated in sex trafficking. Moreover, I contend that sex traffickers’ abuse of women’s reproductive rights is persecutory and that that this persecutory abuse obliges destination states to offer asylum to transnational sex trafficking victims. I start by sketching reproductive human rights doctrine. I then examine studies of women who are in post-trafficking recovery programs in order to ascertain the impact of their past experience of forced sex work on their reproductive freedom and health. On the basis of these findings, I maintain that, among other outrages, sex trafficking systematically violates victims’ reproductive human rights. In view of this abuse, women trafficked into sex work might seem to be prime candidates for asylum in destination states. Yet, economically well-off destination states are not particularly receptive to this idea, and international law provides some justification for their chilliness. Preliminary to challenging them, I explicate four ways in which international anti-trafficking law and international refugee law interfere with viewing women trafficked into sex work as refugees and approving their applications for asylum. The second half of my paper aims to overcome those legal obstacles. In the interest of parsimony and because there are many continuities between U.S. refugee law and anti-trafficking law and the policies of similar destination states, I focus mainly on the U.S. in this part of the paper. To anchor my argument, I spotlight two precedents in refugee law for taking reproductive human rights seriously and several precedents for treating trafficked women as members of a distinct social group as required by refugee law. I then urge that a law enforcement gestalt has gained undue influence over U.S. legal practices where anti-trafficking law intersects with refugee protection law. A human rights gestalt is needed as a counterweight, for otherwise victims of sex trafficking and the reproductive abuse they’ve suffered are erased. Taking up a human rights perspective and mobilizing the precedents I’ve identified, I show that respecting the reproductive human rights of women who have been trafficked into sex work entails that affluent destination states must recognize their right to asylum. (shrink)

In this article we compare the experiences of women members of the board of directors of U.S. and Norwegian corporations. Based on the personal stories of two women directors from each country, we discuss similarities and differences in the role and characteristics of women corporate directors and the processes and behaviours they are involved in as directors within and outside the boardroom. We also investigate the role of gender-related dynamics in these two countries, focusing on board roles and processes, and (...) the visible and invisible board structures with which women corporate directors contend. (shrink)

É amplamente reconhecido que para mitigar a mudança climática antropogênica são necessários urgentes esforços institucionais em várias dimensões: tecnológicos, infraestruturais, mas também socioculturais. Isso significa que, para que haja a transição ecológica para uma sociedade mais verde e sustentável, um conjunto de mudanças estruturais econômicas, políticas e culturais deverão ser rearticuladas nos próximos anos. Por um lado, ao passo que é inegável que, para conter a mudança antropogênica, o uso do poder institucional deve ser usado de modo mais incisivo nas (...) mais diversas esferas que estruturam o social. Por outro lado, não fica evidentemente se as liberdades serão afetadas e, em caso positivo, como elas serão afetadas. Diante da urgência do problema, o artigo propõe normativamente explorar o conflito entre, por um lado, a exigência do uso do poder institucional para conter a mudança climática antropogênica em tempo e, por outro, a garantia pelo mais amplo esquema de liberdades políticas, econômicas e civis nas sociedades democráticas liberais. (shrink)

This paper argues that potential cases of oppression, such as sex trafficking, can sometimes comprise autonomous choices by the trafficked individuals. This issue still divides radical from liberal feminists, with the former wanting to ‘rescue’ the ‘victims’ and the latter insisting that there might be good reasons for ‘hiding from the rescuers.’ This article presents new arguments for the liberal approach and raises two demands: first, help organizations should be run by affected women and be open-minded about whether or not (...) the trafficked individuals should remain in the sex industry. Second, the career choices of trafficked individuals should be expanded by the introduction of an opportunity-extending right to asylum. (shrink)

In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.

This interview was carried out on 13 December 2018 as Michael Williams was in Porto for a meeting of the Contextualism Network organised by the MLAG – Mind, Language, and Action Research Group (Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto). We would like to thank him for his willingness to reply to our questions. -/- .

Stem cell research programme has been celebrated world over as the most promising medical research in the 21st century. However, the method of stem cell research involves the use and unavoidable destruction of human embryo. As a result of this, many theologians, scholars and analysts have condemned the research programme. Their argument is that the embryo use in stem cell research is human person; hence it is immoral. This paper therefore aims at analyzing and examining the issue in order to (...) establish the veracity or otherwise of the moral argument articulated against stem cell research. (shrink)

Em Uma Teoria da Justiça John Rawls ao eleger como bem primário mais importante as bases sociais do autorrespeito (autoestima), aponta que a capacidade do indivíduo de reconhecer seu próprio valor moral e a legitimidade do seu plano de vida também é objeto de justiça social. Martha Nussbaum, Axel Honneth e Avishai Margalit defendem que a humilhação privaria os indivíduos de respeitarem (ou estimarem) a si mesmos. Neste artigo será salientado como cada autor, à sua maneira, salienta pontos sobre a (...) humilhação: a humilhação institucional (Avishai Margalit), a humilhação como a face pública da vergonha social (Martha Nussbaum), e por fim a humilhação como rompimento de expectativas normativas de reconhecimento (Axel Honneth). (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo de reflexión es hacer evidente la relación entre la categoría de performatividad en Judith Butler y el arte de la performance como una aproximación a la construcción de la memoria. Por un lado, el arte de la performance ofrece un problema en torno al registro, al archivo y a la memoria de la acción artística al considerar que el acto es irrepetible, único y fugaz. Esta discusión está vinculada con la reperformación como alternativa de memoria (...) que conserva la naturaleza de esta prácticaartística. Por otro lado, de acuerdo con Butler, la identidad es un efecto de una serie de performances regulados, esto revela cómo la performatividad sugiere un tipo de identidad no esencial donde la memoria está siempre abierta a nuevas inscripciones cuyo soporte está en la reiteración de actos discontinuos. En consecuencia, la repetición de los actos que propone Butler permite comprender que en la reperformance existe otra forma para abordar una memoria restaurada. (shrink)

In 2015, Fainos Mangena published an essay entitled “How Applicable is the Idea of Deep Ecology in the African Context?” where he presented a number of arguments to support his thesis that deep ecology as discussed in the West has no place in the African context. Mangena later presented a counter-version of deep ecology that he claims is based on African philosophy. In this paper, I interrogated Mangena’s arguments for rejecting deep ecology and found that they were based on certain (...) erroneous presuppositions. Further, I developed a critique of Mangena’s Shona version of deep ecology which shows it to be impractical, unappealing, and based on a misunderstanding of the true nature of the modern African environment. I employ the method of conversationalism in this work. Keywords: Deep Ecology, African Environmental Ethics, Fainos Mangena. (shrink)

Não é novidade no ambiente acadêmico as reticências da teórica crítica Nancy Fraser para com a teoria da justiça de John Rawls. Mais especificamente, sua desconfiança é que a justiça rawlsiana não seja capaz de capturar devidamente a complexidade das desigualdades sociais nas sociedades contemporâneas: seja porque sua teoria moral (da justiça) é presumidamente descolada de uma teoria social de fundo; seja porque sua teoria moral (da justiça) é considerada reducionista (ou “monista”). Porém, o espírito do presente artigo não é (...) de aprofundar suas diferenças metodológicas, mas sim colocar as bases para se pensar possíveis “semelhanças de família” entre suas concepções de justiça. Afinal, ambas as formulações se apresentam como abordagens “deontológicas”, ou seja, que priorizam o correto (o justo) sobre o bem. Na primeira seção, retorna-se ao célebre debate redistribuição e reconhecimento, onde Fraser apresenta as novas abordagens liberais – com destaque à de Rawls - como as principais representantes do paradigma redistributivo no cenário contemporâneo. Ao mergulhar nessas passagens, é possível revelar precisamente quais os pontos de concordância e discordância de Fraser para com a teoria deontológica de Rawls. Dando continuidade, na segunda seção é explorado sua principal discordância: o presumido “reducionismo” da teoria da justiça rawlsiana à dimensão redistributiva (econômica), aqui chamada de crítica do reducionismo redistributivo. Se essa objeção procede ou não é objeto da terceira e última seção. Nela, é argumentado que mesmo que as preocupações normativas de Fraser (quanto ao problema do reducionismo) sejam válidas, ainda assim, esse problema não se aplica à teoria rawlsiana. Ao contrário, é argumentado que é possível encontrar “semelhanças de família” entre as concepções de Fraser e Rawls: (a) no seu alicerce e compromisso com o pluralismo, (b) na sua investigação e defesa do status igualitário entre as pessoas e, finalmente, (c) na constatação que o ideal normativo da igualdade democrática entre as pessoas (ou paridade de participação) requer dos arranjos institucionais não somente a redistribuição de recursos e bens econômicos, como também elementos de qualidades diferentes. (shrink)

Philosophers have had surprisingly little to say about the concept of a victim although it is presupposed by the extensive philosophical literature on rights. Proceeding in four stages, I seek to remedy this deficiency and to offer an alternative to the two current paradigms that eliminates the Othering of victims. First, I analyze two victim paradigms that emerged in the late 20th century along with the initial iteration of the international human rights regime – the pathetic victim paradigm and the (...) heroic victim paradigm. Holocaust victims are quintessential instances of the pathetic victim paradigm. They are marked by passivity and innocence in the face of overpowering force and unspeakable humanly inflicted suffering. Aung San Suu Kyi is an exemplar of the heroic victim paradigm – prisoners of conscience, in Amnesty International’s terms. Because heroic victims face off against the repressive power of the state to fight injustice, they are by no means passive, but they must be innocent of wrongdoing – that is, they must use nonviolent means of dissent – to qualify as heroic victims. Second, I problematize the asymmetrical conceptions of innocence that underwrite the two victim paradigms. Whereas the pathetic victim paradigm identifies innocence with passivity, the heroic victim paradigm countenances agentic victims and adverts to a universalist, absolutist stance on the limits of the legitimate use of state power to ascribe innocence to heroic victims. Both conceptions of innocence are out of keeping with well established social and legal practices regarding what constitutes coercive force and innocent victimhood. Consequently, there is reason to be skeptical of the two victim paradigms. Third, I identify two kinds of human rights violations and two categories of victims that AI defends despite their failure to fit the two paradigms – women trafficked into sex work and prisoners on death row. In many cases, women forced to do sex work are not innocent girls who are ignorant of the trafficking system and who helplessly fall prey to smugglers. They are desperately poor women who for that reason are willing to take enormous risks to try to relieve their own and often their families’ deprivation and suffering. Although these women act nonviolently for irreproachable reasons, they lack the public political agendas that characterize heroic victims. Unless non-fulfillment of subsistence rights is recognized as a form of overpowering force that inflicts severe, avoidable suffering, these women do not qualify as pathetic victims either. The victim paradigms pose an even greater obstacle to recognizing that the death penalty is a human rights violation and that death row prisoners are victims. Because a jury concluded that these individuals committed heinous, violent crimes, they are excluded by the heroic victim paradigm. Only if death row prisoners can be proven (usually through DNA evidence) not to have committed the crimes for which they were convicted can these individuals qualify as pathetic victims. In the absence of any reason to believe that they are innocent and especially if they are unrepentant, they are widely regarded as brutal victimizers of others who deserve no sympathy for, let along relief from, the suffering they “brought on themselves.” Finally, I confront the Othering of victims that results from the two victim paradigms, which leads many victims to eschew the label, thereby opting out of human right discourse. I propose revisions in the victim paradigms that eliminate the real-world exclusions they sponsor as well as the Othering of victims of human rights abuses. In particular, I endorse greater attention to what people and the institutions they create do to other people, and I favor a presumption that unnecessary and severe humanly inflicted suffering is a human rights violation. Moreover, I reject the innocence criterion embedded in the two paradigms and urge that it be replaced by a burdened agency criterion. These modifications better align the concept of a victim with a realistic understanding of human subjectivity and agency and allow for a more capacious understanding of who is a bearer of human rights and under what conditions right-holders become victims of rights violations. (shrink)

Generally, we confidently ascribe valuing states to ourselves. We make statements such as “I value democracy” or “I value my best friend” - our sense of who we are depends on doing so. Yet what justifies that confidence? If you were asked “Do you value philosophy, or are you just doing it for the money?”, how might you go about generating such knowledge? I will operate with the notion that valuing involves, at a minimum, a set of distinctive emotional dispositions (...) toward the valued object. Given this view of valuing, a plausible explanation stemming from Tooming and Miyazono is the following: to know whether we value, we need to predict our potential or future emotional reactions. That is, they suggest that affective forecasting is necessary to generate knowledge of valuing states. I argue that, despite its intuitive appeal, affective forecasting is not necessary. I then consider a more modest claim, namely that affective forecasting is still explanatorily powerful when it comes to self-knowledge of valuing states, as it explains the difficulty of generating such knowledge. I reject this further claim, arguing that there is a stronger available explanation: the use of theories about valuing. (shrink)

[English] The paper observed that the various ethics that constitute the system of African environmental ethics are not based on or linked to any known African ontology and formal logic. It argued that the contextualisation of African environmental ethics on African ontology and African logic is essential since Western ontology and logic do not serve to adequately explain and provide proper meanings to the various concepts and propositions employed in the African environmental ethics. Therefore, the paper aimed to, and indeed, (...) link and establishes African environmental ethics on a definite and sound African ontology and formal logic based on Ibuanyidanda complementary ontology and Ezumezu integrativist logic. -/- [Annang] Nwed ndun̄ọ ami akondo ada akud ate k’ idem mme ido ukpeme nkan-n̄kuk ke Africa ada nsan nsan ye ọntọlọgy ye lọgik Africa. Nnwed ami abenne awọ́d ate ke ọntọlọgy ye lọgik mfia agwo iwamma ke adinam awan̄a mme nsio nsio akpọ-ikọ, adaha ikọ, mme usem, ye mme edu ake 'adọhọke ke mme ido ukpeme nkan-n̄kuk ke Africa. Ntak ade anam ukpep mkpọ ami anwana ndiben ido ukpeme nkan-n̄kuk Africa n̄ka n̄ke kọọn̄ ke ọntọlọgy ye lọgik afọnnọ nte itiat ikaba, ade anam anye asan̄a 'ke kem ye Ibuanyidanda Ontology ye Ezumezu Logic. (shrink)

In conflict resolution discourse the two challenging and contrasting concepts, violence and non-violence, are often presented as opposites and contradictory. On the basis of this, one is affirmed against the other. In this article, we aimed to present violence and non-violence as complementary phenomena toward a complementary process of conflict resolution. The objective was to provide an analysis to show that the two concepts can contribute meaningfully to conflict management and resolution. To achieve this aim and objective, we highlighted their (...) significance as methods of resolving and managing conflict, and discussed their problems as well. We used the method of complementary analysis to render a practical account of this discourse; the paper reviewed a number of scenarios where the strategies of violence and non-violence were employed towards conflict resolution and transformation. This enables us to see how the violent and non-violent methods can contribute to resolve the issue of conflict. From the analysis, we concluded that methods of violence and non-violence should overlap each in conflict and peace research. (shrink)

This paper addresses two related topics: 1. The disanalogies between elective cosmetic practices and sex reassignment surgery. Why does it seem necessary for me – an aging professional woman – to ignore the blandishments of hairdressers wielding dyes and dermatologists wielding acids and scalpels? Why does it not seem equally necessary for a transgendered person to repudiate sex reassignment procedures? 2. The role of the body in identity and agency. How do phenomenological insights regarding the constitution of selfhood in relation (...) to the interplay between the body image and corporeal know-how contribute to an account of the agency of transgendered individuals? Studying several paintings by contemporary feminist artist Jenny Saville has advanced my thinking on these topics. Saville’s imagery is an invaluable aid to reflection on these issues because she uses her painterly technique, which critics often dub “virtuoso,” to represent lived human bodies. In her work, viewers encounter representations of subjectivized, agentic corporeity, as distinct from inert, objectified flesh. Moreover, her sympathetic engagement with nonconformist, devalued bodies helps to reconfigure the standard gestalts of the human body that viewers typically carry with them and thus to convert fear and/or disgust into appreciation and understanding. In this paper, I consider three of Saville’s paintings. Plan, Saville’s self-portrait as a nude female whose body has been prepped for liposuction, conveys the pathos of this procedure. Matrix is a nude portrait of self-described “gender variant visual artist” Del LaGrace Volcano. In the words of one critic Saville’s depiction of Volcano’s nude intersexed body “restores beauty to the primitive [female] genital organ.” Passage, another nude portrait of an intersexed individual, is an image of vibrant sexuality despite the presumptively jarring juxtaposition of breasts and a penis. I argue that conceiving the agentic subject as a rational deliberative capability that uses a conjoined body as the instrument of its will makes it impossible to theorize the agency of transgendered people. In contrast, when agentic subjects are understood as embodied subjects and embodiment is understood as a dimension of practical intelligence, the agency of transgendered individuals is intelligible. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between victims’ stories and normativity. As a contribution to understanding how the stories of those who have been abused or oppressed can advance moral understanding, catalyze moral innovation, and guide social change, this paper focuses on narrative as a variegated form of representation and asks whether personal narratives of victimization play any distinctive role in human rights discourse. In view of the fact that a number of prominent students of narrative build normativity into their accounts, (...) it might seem obvious that there is a connection between victims’ stories and moral insight. However, the category of victims’ stories spans an enormous variety of texts – private diaries, memoirs written for publication, interviews with journalists or social scientists, depositions prepared by human rights workers, stories shared with like-minded activists or with support groups, stories told to medical professionals, and testimony in courts, truth commissions and asylum hearings, to mention just some of the possibilities. The different contexts of elicitation and the different rules governing expression in these sites should make us wary of ready generalizations about the nature of victims’ narratives. Moreover, I doubt that existing explications of the way in which norms figure in narratives yield satisfactory theories of the contribution victims’ stories can make to discovering and defending just policies and practices. I consider two of the most prominent accounts of the relation between narrative and normativity. For different reasons, the account Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner present in their work on narrative and law and the account Hayden White presents in his work on narrative and history fail to appreciate the capacity of victims’ stories of abuse to advance understanding of and increase respect for human rights. In defense of the value of victims’ stories, I propose an account of the relation between normativity and a salient type of victim’s narrative that seems especially resistant to integration into human rights discourse. -/- . (shrink)

This study is basically an investigation into the probabilities of place and how such probabilities affect concepts and propositions as they travel through time. I develop the concept of time as a place and argue that time is an infinite phenomenon, which is neither fixed, static, monolithic nor objective. I show that when concepts cross ontological jurisdictions they loss their truth-values because their formative meanings are radicalized by the time zone through which they travelled. The dynamicism of time itself implies (...) that concepts should not be employed in absolute sense at any circumstance. Truth-value is a travelling concept. As a travelling concept it is historical – it depends on what happened. What this demonstrates is that the determinant of truth-value of a concept or proposition is not merely the rules of logic but time constellations. I have demonstrated this in the context of intercultural philosophy by showing the pitfalls that should be avoided when one deals with concepts that travel through time. Truth is a continuous rather than a discreet variable. (shrink)

Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights collects thirteen new essays that analyze how human agency relates to poverty and human rights respectively as well as how agency mediates issues concerning poverty and social and economic human rights. No other collection of philosophical papers focuses on the diverse ways poverty impacts the agency of the poor, the reasons why poverty alleviation schemes should also promote the agency of beneficiaries, and the fitness of the human rights regime to secure both economic development and (...) free agency. The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 considers the diverse meanings of poverty both from the standpoint of the poor and from that of the relatively well-off. Part 2 examines morally appropriate responses to poverty on the part of persons who are better-off and powerful institutions. Part 3 identifies economic development strategies that secure the agency of the beneficiaries. Part 4 addresses the constraints poverty imposes on agency in the context of biomedical research, migration for work, and trafficking in persons. (shrink)

The contention raised in this research is to showcase that indigenous African languages are imperative tools in advancing African philosophy and thought. By extension the genuiness and originality of African philosophical thought is best advanced when it is vocalized and transliterated in the mother tongue of the philosopher. When African philosophical thought is done and articulated in language foreign to the philosopher, then that philosophical thought is weakened within the conceptual expression and foundation. It is also contended that, indigenous languages (...) would address perennial problem of inadequacies of languages especially where there are no direct replacement of concept and terms to explain reality and other state of affairs. (shrink)

Overconfidence is typically damaging to one’s reputation as a trustworthy source of information. Previous research shows that the reputational cost associated with conveying a piece of false information is higher for confident than unconfident speakers. When judging speaker trustworthiness, individuals do not exclusively rely on past accuracy but consider the extent to which speakers expressed a degree of confidence that matched the accuracy of their claims (their “confidence-accuracy calibration”). The present study experimentally examines the interplay between confidence, accuracy and a (...) third factor, namely evidence, in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. Experiment 1 probes the hypothesis that overconfidence does not backfire when a confident but inaccurate claim is justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be wrong is restored if the confidence expressed is based on strong evidence (good confidence-evidence calibration). Experiment 2 investigates the hypothesis that confidence can backfire if a confident and accurate claim is not justified: the trustworthiness of a confident speaker who turns out to be right is damaged if the confidence expressed is based on weak evidence (bad confidence-evidence calibration). Our results support both hypotheses and thus suggest that “confidence-evidence calibration” plays a crucial role in the assessment of speaker trustworthiness. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es comprender la influencia de la gestión del conocimiento en el fortalecimiento de habilidades gerenciales. Se realizó una revisión bibliográfica de 35 autores, a partir de la cual se destacan 7 factores claves en común, en la implementación de modelos de gestión, como: información, aplicabilidad, construcción de conocimiento, trabajo colaborativo, cultura organizacional, transferencia del conocimiento y tecnología. Adicionalmente se identificaron habilidades gerenciales que se deben fortalecer, principalmente el liderazgo inspirador, pensamiento estratégico y comunicación. Este análisis (...) permitió concluir que, en la implementación de modelos de gestión del conocimiento, se desarrollaron procesos meta cognitivos, que involucran el desarrollo de habilidades gerenciales tanto a nivel técnico, como a nivel interpersonal, al igual que el desarrollo de estrategias orientadas al aprendizaje basado en problemas el cual fortalece las competencias directivas. A su vez se identificó la importancia de continuar investigando y definiendo estrategias de capitalización del conocimiento tácito, como ventaja competitiva en una organización. (shrink)

Nyerere’s philosophy of education is one of the most influential and widely studied theories of education. Policy-makers have continued to draw from it for policy re-engineering. In this paper, the Nigerian educational system is examined in the light of the philosophy. This approach is predicated on the informed belief that there are social and historical commonalities between Nigeria and the target-society of Nyerere’s philosophy. To this end, it argues that the philosophy holds some important lessons for Nigeria’s education. For this (...) reason, there is need to inject some doses of its principles into the body polity of Nigeria’s education. The article identifies three areas – school financing, curricula development and entrepreneurial education – where the principles of the philosophy can be practically invaluable for Nigeria. In the final analysis, the paper identifies the linkage between national philosophy of education and national developmental ideology; and argues that a national philosophy of education of any country must be embedded in the national development ideology of that country of which the country’s philosophy of education must drive. (shrink)

[English] This paper aims to discuss ten traditional and contemporary methodological paradigms in African philosophy, and demonstrates how they may apply to African environmental ethics research. The methods include: Ethno-philosophy, Sage Philosophy, Conversational Philosophy, Conceptual Mandelanization, Eco-Afrocentricism, Indigenous Language Analysis, Eco-Afro-feminism, Conceptual Decolonization, Storytelling Philosophy, and Cultural Adaptationism. The significance and limitations of the methodologies are highlighted. The concept and principles of African environmental ethics are analyzed and discussed to facilitate an understanding of the conceptual frameworks that underpin the methodologies. (...) In conclusion, the discourse demonstrates that environmental ethics research in Africa should be based on African philosophical methodologies so as to facilitate production of research that will be relevant in African contexts. -/- [Annang] N̄wed nduongo ami ayem ibene nwọ́d mme n̄kaan nne mfa usung unam nduongo ke vilọsọvi Afrịke , nne nte amọ ekeme iwam unam nduongo mbanga ido ukpeme nkan-nkuk ke Afrịke. Mme usung unam nduongo ami nsehe ade ami: vilọsọvi mben ufọk, vilọsọvi n̄kan ideen, vilọsọvi nneme, vilọsọvi Mandela, “Eco-Afrocentricism”, nduongore usem utiit ajid, vilọsọvi ibaan Afrịke, vilọsọvi mkpọk-nyak, vilọsọvi n̄ke, nne ukpep ido idung agwo. N̄wed ami abene awọd mme ikek nne nde mem idem usung nduongo ami. N̄wed ami atang mkpọ abanga se ido ukpeme nkan-nkuk ke Afrịke anwongo nne mme itai amọ, nne nte amọ ewam mbon nduongo ediọhọ nnanga ekpekakpa ibọrọ nduongo amọ. Ke n̄suuk ikọ, ukpep ami mkpọ abene awọd ate ke ekpena ekama usung nduongo vilọsọvi Afrịke enam nduongo ebanga ido ukpeme nkan-nkuk ke Afrịke man ibọrọ nduongo asanga akekem nne se adiiwam Afrịke. (shrink)

The relationship between energy and ethics is gaining attention in policy rooms around the world. How does one respond to the competing interests of the environment and posterity while also addressing the energy needs of the present human generation? In Western philosophy, this question is currently subject of debate and research. However, the African philosophical analysis that is required to address this concern is generally absent from discourse/literature on energy ethics. This article aims to bridge this gap, by providing broad (...) analysis that has been lacking from the African context. In a way, it seeks to answer such questions already raised in Western philosophy but from African perspectives. This approach is significant given the fact that Western oriented energy humanities and energy ethics seem to be inappropriate or inadequate to understanding energy dynamics in the African context. Therefore, this paper aims to inform global debate and facilitate African-specific understanding of the complex nexus of human-environment-posterity by building the discourse on Braai filosofie. It discusses specific principles that can be deployed to address trade-offs between ethics and energy, thus providing guide to investment decisions on renewable energy projects in Africa. (shrink)

This is an excerpt from a report on the Sensory Substitution and Augmentation Conference at the British Academy in March of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Does sensory substitution generate perceptual or cognitive states?

While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this (...) theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy. (shrink)

This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on African aesthetics by presenting concept of beauty or the beautiful as it evolved from the cultural conception of beauty to the philosophical shift in the concept. It also examined Western concept of beauty in order to show the different contexts of the meaning of beauty in Africa and Western philosophies. In the paper, I focused primarily on analyzing beauty concept in terms of what constitutes beauty and how the beautiful can be known. (...) I showed that unlike individualistic conception of beauty in Western philosophy, beauty concept in African philosophy is both relational and functional. I showed that in African context there is no beauty for beauty’s sake; and that the beautiful is considered in terms of good conducts and physical attractiveness. Finally, I argued that African concept beauty is only intelligible when considered in the context of African ontology. (shrink)

In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all attitudes as revisable. His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information, and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there cannot (...) be any “direct profit in going behind common sense.” Our question is the following: alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common sense fit in? Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct. By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason. (shrink)

Traditional philosophical problem arises from the distinction between being and non-being, something and nothing, what is and what is not. The objective of this paper is about proving that the distinction can be a framework for conflict resolution, by showing the problem to be a result of misunderstanding of the logical relations of the units. Two study questions are developed to guide the research: (i) what is the nature/structure of the logical relation between being and non-being, and (ii) how does (...) an understanding of that relation feed into conflict and peace discourse. The two research questions are contextualized or articulated under the following conceptual frameworks: (i) Parmenidian disjunctive ontology, and (ii) Heideggerian conjunctive ontology. In conclusion, the paper proves Hedeggerian conjunctive ontology to be adequate framework for negotiation of conflict, by showing conflict to be a result of the Parmenidian error of misunderstanding the logical relation of being and non-being as disjunctive rather than conjunctive. (shrink)

The problem of time has been present throughout history of philosophy since its beginnings. However to consider what is time is not a matter of technical theorization, conversely, this results interesting in as much as a reflection on the nature of world, and even the human particularities, cannot evade time problem. Aristotle is a stage under obligation in history of philosophy. My main purpose is to understand why time is problematic and what difficulties we have to meet with (chapter one). (...) On the other hand, I'm interested in the way Aristotle give an account of these difficulties in virtue of the relation among movement or change, magnitude and time, as well as the latter character of number (chapters two and three). Finally, is necessary to present some subsequent problems related with the time theory at stake (chapter four). (shrink)