A prominent defence of a market in organs from living donors says that if we truly care about people in poverty, we should allow them to sell their organs. The argument is that if poor vendors would have voluntarily decided to sell their organs in a free market, then prohibiting them from selling makes them even worse off, at least from their own perspective, and that it would be unconscionably paternalistic to substitute our judgements for individuals' own judgements about what (...) would be best for them. The author shows that this ‘Laissez-Choisir Argument’ for organ selling rests on a mistake. This is because the claim that it would be better for people in poverty to sell their organs if given the option is consistent with the claim that it would be even better for them to not have the option at all. The upshot is that objections to an organ market need not be at all paternalistic, since we need not accept that the absence of a market makes those in poverty any worse off, even from their own point of view. The author goes on to argue that there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that people in poverty would in fact be harmed by the introduction of a market for live donor organs and that the harm constitutes sufficient grounds for prohibiting a market. (shrink)

It is commonly claimed that when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid, and Z is only permitted to φ if this reduces harm or increases optionality for Y. This article demonstrates that Y’s consent in such cases is valid if Y is choosing between options that include all those Z has a duty to offer Y and no autonomy-reducing options Z has a duty to not offer Y. When these conditions are met, Z acts (...) permissibly in φ-ing even if φ-ing does not reduce harm for Y or increase Y’s optionality. (shrink)

People tend to be repulsed by the idea of cash markets in kidneys, but support the trading of kidneys through paired exchanges or chains. We reject anti-commodification accounts of this reaction and offer an egalitarian one. We argue that the morally significant difference between cash markets and kidney chains is that the former allow the wealthy greater access to kidneys, while the latter do not. The only problem with kidney chains is that they do not go far enough in addressing (...) equality concerns, and we show how the introduction of cash payments by the state could remedy this. (shrink)

In accordance with a recent statement released by the World Health Organization, the Canadian province of Ontario is moving to ban payment for plasma donation. This is partially based on contentions that remuneration for blood and blood products undermines autonomy and personal dignity. This paper is dedicated to evaluating this claim. I suggest that traditional autonomy-based arguments against commodification of human body parts and substances are less compelling in the context of plasma donation in Canada, but that there is another (...) autonomy-based objection to paid plasma donation that has not received sufficient attention. Namely, the stigma that surrounds exchanging plasma for payment makes it difficult to make an autonomous decision to engage in this activity. I suggest that this problem can be overcome in one of two ways; by banning payment for plasma, or by reducing the stigma surrounding this practice. I provide an indication of how we might work to achieve the latter, contending that this possibility should be taken seriously, due to the difficulties in achieving a sufficient supply of plasma without remuneration. (shrink)

James Stacy Taylor advances a thorough argument for the legalization of markets in current (live) human kidneys. The market is seemly the most abhorrent type of market, a market where the least well-off sell part of their body to the most well off. Though rigorously defended overall, his arguments concerning exploitation are thin. I examine a number of prominent bioethicists’ account of exploitation: most importantly, Ruth Sample’s exploitation as degradation. I do so in the context of Taylor’s argument, with the (...) aim of buttressing Taylor’s position that a regulated kidney market is morally allowable. I argue that Sample fails to provide normative grounds consistent with her claim that exploitation is wrong. I then reformulate her account for consistency and plausibility. Still, this seemingly more plausible view does not show that Taylor’s regulated kidney market is prohibitively exploitative of impoverished persons. I tack into place one more piece of support for Taylor’s conclusion. (shrink)

Drawing on empirical evidence in medicine, economics, law, and anthropology, I argue that a market is uniquely capable of meeting the demand for transplantable kidneys, and that it may be arranged so as to operate safely. The welfare gains, expected to accrue to both vendors and recipients, are sufficient to justify sales. Having spelled out the considerations recommending a kidney market, I address the most forceful objections facing the proposal. Despite its currency, the claim that incentives will crowd out altruistic (...) donors and result in a decrease in supply is empirically unsupported and predicated on an implausible view of donorsâ motives. A host of objections claim vendorsâ will not give informed consent. Many such objections identify easily remediable problems, or impose unreasonable standards â standards that would rule out morally permissible kidney donation. And all presuppose a model of morally transformative consent that, I argue, is deficient. Two further challenges point to harms inflicted on those who do not participate in the market. Some claim that those in poverty will be subject to harmful social and legal pressure to vend. This objection fails to distinguish between being pressured to perform a specific act, and being under general economic pressure and having the option to perform an act. It, moreover, presupposes vending more common than is possible. Others worry that the market will give rise to unfair pecuniary externalities. This objection also presupposes that kidney sales will occur more often than is possible. But more importantly, the normative consideration that is supposed to make such externalities especially objectionable, in fact, recommends allowing sales. I also make a political case for kidney sales. I offer an account of the stateâs proper role in the market. I begin with a conception of democratic equality according to which the state is responsible to secure for its citizens the preconditions for democratic participation. I then show that this end would be promoted were the state to end the current prohibition on sales. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that the current methods of providing health care in the West need to be reformed. Such reforms must operate within the practical limitations to which any future system of health care will be subject. These limitations include an increase in the demand for costly end-of-life health care coupled with a reduction in the proportion of the population who are working taxpayers (and hence a reduction in the proportionate amount of health care funding that can be secured (...) through taxation) and the fact that the imposition of bureaucratic regulations on health care systems is costly. Recognizing these limitations should naturally lead one to consider market-based reforms. Yet despite the practical impetus for such reforms, there is still widespread concern that market-based health care is unethical. The purpose of this paper is to address this concern and, in so doing, to pave the way for the market-based reform of health care to proceed. (shrink)

An increasingly common objection to kidney sales holds that the introduction of monetary incentives may undermine potential donors’ altruism, discourage donation, and possibly result in a net reduction in the supply of kidneys. To explain why incentives might be counterproductive in this way market opponents marshal evidence from behavioral economics. In particular, they claim that the context of kidney sales is ripe for motivational crowding. This reasoning, if sound, would have a profound influence on the debate over kidney sales. What’s (...) perhaps the principal reason to favor a market – the increase in supply it would bring – would be called into doubt. However, on inspection it becomes apparent that the evidence touted by market opponents not only lends no credence to their claims, but also provides some positive reason to doubt them. The near-ubiquitous references to motivational crowding in the literature on kidney sales are fundamentally misplaced. (shrink)

The exploitation of participants is a significant problem in biomedical research, especially in the developing world. However, there is a gap between this problem and the theoretical literature on exploitation. This thesis will attempt to bridge it, considering Wertheimer and Sample’s theories. Whereas Wertheimer holds that exploitation is merely an unjust distribution of the “social surplus” arising from a transaction, Sample, whose approach this thesis endorses, construes exploitation as a lack of respect for a person’s true value. This thesis will (...) show that codes of ethics with legal force take a Wertheimerian approach, and that the aspirational codes, which insist that research respond to local health priorities, are more Samplian. Finally, it will argue that the current system of research funding and oversight cannot guarantee that research is responsive to the needs of the developing world and thus fails to prevent exploitation. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’objectif est de montrer que l’acceptation politique et sociale des mécanismes d’appariement pour les reins mis au point par Roth, Ünver et Sönmez nous fournit de quoi comprendre le rejet de la logique marchande dans le cadre de certains biens. Nous nous pencherons particulièrement sur trois explications généralement convoquer pour expliquer ce rejet : (I) le caractère corrupteur de la monnaie, (II) l’idée selon laquelle le marché en tant que tel devrait être rejeté, et (III) l’hypothèse selon (...) laquelle le rejet du marché reposerait avant tout sur le fait que ce dernier engendrerait un rapport de domination entre l’offreur et le demandeur. Par le biais d’une analyse comparative entre les propositions de marchés aux organes (rejetées dans la plupart des pays) et les systèmes d’appariement proposés par Roth, Ünver et Sönmez (2004, 2005, 2007) - mis en place dans un grand nombre de pays - nous nuancerons ces explications au profit d’une quatrième : le marché aux organes est rejeté non pas parce qu’il génère de la domination, mais parce qu’il présuppose la vulnérabilité des offreurs potentiels : sans vulnérabilité, pas de marchés d’organes. (shrink)