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On Newton’s method: William L. Harper: Isaac Newton’s scientific method: Turning data into evidence about gravity and cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 360pp, $75 HB [Book Review]

Nick Huggett, George E. Smith, David Marshall Miller & William Harper

Metascience 22 (2):215-246 (2013)

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(1 other version)What is theoretical progress of science?Juha Saatsi - 2016 - Synthese:1-21.details The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations
Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (2):281-317.details The term ‘realism’ and its contrasting terms have various related senses, although often they occlude as much as they illuminate, especially if ontological and epistemological issues and their tenable combinations are insufficiently clarified. For example, in 1807 the infamous ‘idealist’ Hegel argued cogently that any tenable philosophical theory of knowledge must take the natural and social sciences into very close consideration, which he himself did. Here I argue that Hegel ably and insightfully defends Newton’s causal realism about gravitational force, in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
(1 other version)What is theoretical progress of science?Juha Saatsi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):611-631.details The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories ‘latching better onto unobservable reality’ in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 18 citations
Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Hegel Bulletin 36 (2):159-183.details Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's (1930) retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’ (WdL,GW21:47.1-3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL,GW12:19.34-38), and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’ (WdL,GW12:23.12,.16-17). I present (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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