This article concerns itself with the reception of Rous' 1911 discovery of what later came to be known as the Rous Sarcoma Virus (RSV). Rous made his discovery at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research which had been primarily established to conduct research into infectious diseases. Rous' chance discovery of a chicken tumor led him to a series of conjectures about cancer causation and about whether cancer could have an extrinsic cause. Rous' finding was received with some scepticism by the (...) scientific community that held that cancer was not infectious and favored explanations which located the origins of cancer in the inner mechanism of the cell. After 4 years of unsuccessful effort to isolate and further determine the virus Rous felt compelled to discontinue his work on cancer viruses. When 55 years later, the significance of Rous's discovery was attested by the award of the Nobel Prize, it opened up debates about the issues of delayed recognition and scientific reputation. This article also considers why Rous' hypothesis of a viral origin of cancer could not be incorporated into the existing body of knowledge about cancer before the 1950s. (shrink)

It is argued that the major interpretations of tobacco mosaic virus which were suggested in the first half of the 20th century can be ordered into two conflicting approaches. It is shown that explaining the existence of these different approaches as views from different perspectives, is a mistaken metaphor. The different approaches resulted in the "construction" of different research objects as answers to the questions "What is a virus"? Although these different conceptions did exclude each other, they co-existed because of (...) the consensus concerning the existence of tobacco mosaic "disease". (shrink)

This paper examines the vital role played by electron microscopy toward the modern definition of viruses, as formulated in the late 1950s. Before the 1930s viruses could neither be visualized by available technologies nor grown in artificial media. As such they were usually identified by their ability to cause diseases in their hosts and defined in such negative terms as “ultramicroscopic” or invisible infectious agents that could not be cultivated outside living cells. The invention of the electron microscope, with magnification (...) and resolution powers several orders of magnitude better than that of optical instruments, opened up possibilities for biological applications. The hitherto invisible viruses lent themselves especially well to investigation with this new instrument. We first offer a historical consideration of the development of the instrument and, more significantly, advances in techniques for preparing and observing specimens that turned the electron microscope into a routine biological tool. We then describe the ways in which the electron microscopic images, or micrographs, functioned as forms of new knowledge about viruses and resulted in a paradigm shift in the very definition of these entities. Micrographs were not mere illustrations since they did the work for the electron microscopists. Drawing extensively on primary publications, we adduce the role of the new instrument in understanding the so-called eclipse phase in virus multiplication and the unexpected spinoffs of data from electron microscopy in naming and classifying viruses. Thus, we show that electron microscopy functioned not only to provide evidence, but also arguments in facilitating a reordering of the world that it brought into the visual realm. (shrink)

An important question facing contemporary philosophy of science is whether the natural sciences in terms of their historical records exhibit distinguishing developmental patterns or structures. At least two philosophical stances are possible in answering this question. The first pertains to the plurality of the individual sciences. From this stance, the various sciences are analyzed individually and compared with one another in order to derive potential commonalities, if any, among them. The second stance involves a general philosophy of science in which (...) a thorough theory of the natural sciences is developed. The latter stance strives to account for more than possible commonalities among the sciences but also to provide a broad-spectrum philosophical framework to account for, or to explicate, the nature of science itself and its progress. In this paper, the second stance is taken in which an evolutionary philosophy of science is proposed. To that end, Thomas Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science is initially discussed and critiqued. An evolutionary philosophy of science is then proposed based on a revision of Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science in terms of George Gaylord Simpson’s various tempos and modes for biological evolution. Next, two historical case studies from the biological sciences are reconstructed to illustrate the robustness of the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science for explicating the progress of the natural sciences. A concluding section discusses the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science with respect to providing a broad-spectrum framework or general philosophy of science for understanding the nature and progress of the natural sciences. (shrink)

This paper considers the foundational role of the contagium vivum fluidum—first proposed by the Dutch microbiologist Martinus Beijerinck in 1898—in the history of virology, particularly in shaping the modern virus concept, defined in the 1950s. Investigating the cause of mosaic disease of tobacco, previously shown to be an invisible and filterable entity, Beijerinck concluded that it was neither particulate like the bacteria implicated in certain infectious diseases, nor soluble like the toxins and enzymes responsible for symptoms in others. He offered (...) a completely new explanation, proposing that the agent was a “living infectious fluid” whose reproduction was intimately linked to that of its host cell. Difficult to test at the time, the contagium vivum fluidum languished in obscurity for more than three decades. Subsequent advances in technologies prompted virus researchers of the 1930s and 1940s—the first to separate themselves from bacteriologists—to revive the idea. They found in it both the seeds for their emerging virus concept and a way to bring hitherto opposing thought styles about the nature of viruses and life together in consensus. Thus, they resurrected Beijerinck as the founding father, and contagium vivum fluidum as the core concept of their discipline. (shrink)

This paper follows the circuitous path of theories concerning the origins of viruses from the early years of the twentieth century until the present, considering RNA viruses in particular. I focus on three periods during which new understandings of the nature of viruses guided the construction and reconstruction of origin hypotheses. During the first part of the twentieth century, viruses were mostly viewed from within the framework of bacteriology and the discussion of origin centered on the “degenerative” or the “retrograde (...) evolution theory.” However, concomitantly, in the context of origin-of-life theorizing, the notion that viruses are vestiges of a prebiotic world was also being contemplated. In the 1960s the idea that viruses were genetic elements that “escaped” from cells became prevalent. These traditional hypotheses are being revisited nowadays by evolutionary virologists, who have placed them within a new conceptual framework that is supported by cutting-edge genomic and proteomic data. Two current, opposing scenarios of virus origin are presented. The philosophical dimensions of “revisiting” the original hypotheses are briefly discussed. (shrink)

In 1936, Frank Macfarlane Burnet published a paper entitled “Induced lysogenicity and the mutation of bacteriophage within lysogenic bacteria,” in which he demonstrated that the introduction of a specific bacteriophage into a bacterial strain consistently and repeatedly imparted a specific property – namely the resistance to a different phage – to the bacterial strain that was originally susceptible to lysis by that second phage. Burnet’s explanation for this change was that the first phage was causing a mutation in the bacterium (...) which rendered it and its successive generations of offspring resistant to lysogenicity. At the time, this idea was a novel one that needed compelling evidence to be accepted. While it is difficult for us today to conceive of mutations and genes outside the context of DNA as the physico-chemical basis of genes, in the mid 1930s, when this paper was published, DNA’s role as the carrier of hereditary information had not yet been discovered and genes and mutations were yet to acquire physical and chemical forms. Also, during that time genes were considered to exist only in organisms capable of sexual modes of replication and the status of bacteria and viruses as organisms capable of containing genes and manifesting mutations was still in question. Burnet’s paper counts among those pieces of work that helped dispel the notion that genes, inheritance and mutations were tied to an organism’s sexual status. In this paper, I analyze the implications of Burnet’s paper for the understanding of various concepts – such as “mutation,” and “gene,” – at the time it was published, and how those understandings shaped the development of the meanings of these terms and our modern conceptions thereof. (shrink)

Though viruses have generally been characterized by their pathogenic and more generally harmful effects, many examples of mutualistic viruses exist. Here I explain how the idea of mutualistic viruses has been defended in recent virology, and I explore four important conceptual and practical consequences of this idea. I ask to what extent this research modifies the way scientists might search for new viruses, our notion of how the host immune system interacts with microbes, the development of new therapeutic approaches, and, (...) finally, the role played by the criterion of autonomy in our understanding of living things. Overall, I suggest that the recognition of mutualistic viruses plays a major role in a wider ongoing revision of our conception of viruses. (shrink)

The technique of nuclear transplantation – popularly known as cloning – has been integrated into several different histories of twentieth century biology. Historians and science scholars have situated nuclear transplantation within narratives of scientific practice, biotechnology, bioethics, biomedicine, and changing views of life. However, nuclear transplantation has never been the focus of analysis. In this article, I examine the development of nuclear transplantation techniques, focusing on the people, motivations, and institutions associated with the first successful nuclear transfer in metazoans in (...) 1952. The conflict between embryologists and geneticists over the mechanisms of differentiation motivated Robert Briggs to pursue nuclear transplantation experiments as a way to resolve the debate. Briggs worked at the Lankenau Hospital Research Institute, a research facility devoted to the study of cancer. The goal of understanding cancer would play a role in the development of the technique, and the story of nuclear transplantation sheds light on the role that biomedical contexts play in biological research in the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

“Inventing AIDS.” “Constructing cancers.” Relax; no bioterrorist mischief is implied. Like “Construction of nature,” “Social construction of illness,” “Social construction of scientific facts,” and many others, these are titles of scholarly books and projects in science, technology, and medicine studies. They express a fashion shared by doctrines loosely known under the rubric of postmodernism. It is recognizable by the frequent scare quotation marks around words such as truth, reality, scientific, and objectivity. The scare quotes convey the message that scientific knowledge (...) is so permeated by politics and cultural biases that it cannot be true and any claim to objectivity is illusory. (shrink)

The Influenza Pandemic of 1918–20 in medical debate. The history of the so called Spanish Influenza 1918–1920 is summarized especially in regard to the developments in medical debate. In Germany, Richard Pfeiffer, who had discovered Haemophilus influenzae after the previous pandemic 1890 / 91, managed it to defend his thesis that his “bacillus” was the causative agent of the flu, by modifying his theory moderately. The Early Virology of influenza in postwar times was still fixed to bacteriology and did not (...) yet have the force of school-building. Aggressive therapy, e.g. with derivatives of chinine, were used in a concept of polypragmasy. The connection between influenza in animals and influenza in mankind was unknown or of no major interest till the rise of virology as an academic discipline in the 1950s. Since the outbreak of avian influenza in Asia 1997 virological archaeology is challenged to fill the historical part in the attempt to fight the threat of the highly pathogenic bird flu. In the beginning of the “short 20. century” politicians and doctors had no interest to build a “monument” of influenza. Today, virological reductionism does not have the power to (re-)construct such a monument. (shrink)

This article concerns itself with the reception of Rous’ 1911 discovery of what later came to be known as the Rous Sarcoma Virus. Rous made his discovery at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research which had been primarily established to conduct research into infectious diseases. Rous’ chance discovery of a chicken tumor led him to a series of conjectures about cancer causation and about whether cancer could have an extrinsic cause. Rous’ finding was received with some scepticism by the scientific (...) community that held that cancer was not infectious and favored explanations which located the origins of cancer in the inner mechanism of the cell. After 4 years of unsuccessful effort to isolate and further determine the virus Rous felt compelled to discontinue his work on cancer viruses. When 55 years later, the significance of Rous’s discovery was attested by the award of the Nobel Prize, it opened up debates about the issues of delayed recognition and scientific reputation. This article also considers why Rous’ hypothesis of a viral origin of cancer could not be incorporated into the existing body of knowledge about cancer before the 1950s. (shrink)