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The folk on knowing how.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.details
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(1 other version)Animal action in the space of reasons.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.details
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(1 other version)Nonconceptual content and the sound of music.Michael Luntley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.details
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Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order Model.Laura Danón & Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
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Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception.Arnon Cahen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2355-2383.details
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The Argument from Animal and Infant Perception.Eva Schmidt - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):97-110.details
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References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 361-386.details
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El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo.Federico Burdman - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (19):475-495.details
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The animal concepts debate: a metaphilosophical take.Josefa Toribio - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):11-24.details
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Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?Alva Noë - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.details
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(1 other version)Non‐conceptual Content and the Sound of Music.Michael Luntley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.details
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Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.details
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Searle's derivation of promissory obligation.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2007 - In Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Springer.details
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Social Enactive Perception: Practices, Experience, and Contents.Alejandro Arango - 2016 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt Universitydetails
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Why the content of animal thought cannot be propositional.Mariela Aguilera - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (2):183-207.details
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(1 other version)Modals vs. Morals. Blackburn on Conceptual Supervenience. Dohrn - 2012 - GAP 8 Proceedings.details
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