The hyletic component of kinaesthetic sensation has generally been treated with suspicion. It is usually set aside in favour of Husserl’s later analysis of kinaesthetic experience which emphasizes its practical dimension. I try to show that a nuanced understanding of the hyletic component allows us to consider its deeper temporal function. From a rather neglected passage in his Ding und Raum I show that Husserl was aware of the temporal peculiarity of kinaesthetic sensation: it is characterized by a unique kind (...) of “sameness”. I then try to explain how the hyletic dimension of kinaesthetic sensation is responsible for this peculiarity. By escaping the contingencies of protentional fulfilment kinaesthetic hyle merely unifies in an actual “belonging-together” our sensing of position and the motivation of the correlative appearances. It is on this basis that it fundamentally shapes at a passive-hyletic level the complex temporal dynamic of the practical dimension of kinaesthetic experience. (shrink)

In his reflections on the spatiotemporal structuring of the life-world, Schütz distinguishes between two forms of intersubjectivity among contemporaries. Firstly, he points at actors sharing both space and time and experiencing a direct, immediate face-to-face communication; secondly, he indicates the intersubjectivity of indirect communication, lacking any commonalities of space and time, such as the correspondence by letter. Apart from the strict exchange of thoughts, the alternating writing gives one the chance to relate to the interpretive patterns and relevancies of the (...) correspondent and thereby to understand more clearly the intellectual position of the proponent. Reflecting on the specificity of the situation, Schütz claims: “The written communication forced upon us by the geographical distance between us should at least have the benefit of encouraging us to put our thoughts, as best we can, into a clear and orderly form” (p. 49). The correspondence between Alfred Schütz and Eri. (shrink)

RESUMEN A partir de los análisis de la cosa perceptiva en la obra de Husserl, se indagará el mundo material como suelo en el cual nuestra vida práctica se sostiene. A partir de sus objeciones al empirismo de Locke, se cuestiona la certeza de la actitud natural sobre la aceptación de una realidad autónoma, para rebatir la noción de un mundo en sí que nos afecta. De este modo, un examen del mundo fenoménico señala que su materia es una dimensión (...) no homogénea ni completa, subrayando una estable variación de las cosas. Con ello, se detecta una ambigüedad esencial según la cual estas se nos ofrecen como apoyo de nuestra praxis. ABSTRACT From Husserl's analysis of the thing perceived, the material world will be investigated as the ground where our practical life is sustained. From Husserl's objections to Locke's Empiricism, the certainty of the natural attitude about the acceptance of an autonomous reality will be questioned, to refute the notion of a world in itself that affects us. Thus, an examination of the phenomenical world will point out that its matter is a non-homogeneous and non-complete dimension, by stressing a stable variation of things. This will reveal an essential ambiguity, according to which the things are offered to us as support for our praxis. (shrink)

The Sublime in a phenomenological sense: The Affective Bodily Experience of Space The aim of the following paper is to redefine the sublime in phenomenological terms, a task long overdue. Departing from Kant, it claims that the phenomenological sublime is an emotion aroused neither by the power of our reason transcending the inadequacy of imagination as it concerns nature, nor by the overwhelming powers of imagination as it concerns an artwork, but by the excess of sensuousness over conceptuality, which is (...) bodily felt. This shift into bodily apprehensions, though advanced by empirical psychologists, took place in the twentieth century resulting from Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's reformulation of the affective sphere of the body and of its concomitant experience of space. Their criticism of compossibility and harmony lead to a disruption of the bodily metaphoric order inherent to artistic representation. This becomes evident in the conception of present architecture, as the works of Tschumi and Eisenman show. The phenomenological emotion of sublimity expresses thus the affective bodily experience of space. (shrink)

Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (...) (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind.​. (shrink)