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  1. The current status of research on concept combination.Lance J. Rips - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):72-104.
    Understanding novel phrases (e.g. upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories (...)
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  • On typicality and vagueness.Daniel Osherson & Edward E. Smith - 1997 - Cognition 64 (2):189-206.
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  • Conceptual Combination: Extension and Intension. Commentary on Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo.James A. Hampton - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (1):53-57.
    Aerts et al. provide a valuable model to capture the interactive nature of conceptual combination in conjunctions and disjunctions. The commentary provides a brief review of the interpretation of these interactions that has been offered in the literature, and argues for a closer link between the more traditional account in terms of concept intensions, and the parameters that emerge from the fitting of the Quantum Probability model.
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  • The red Herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes.Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1996 - Cognition 58 (2):253-70.
    1 There is a Standard Objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes aren't compositional, so concepts can't be prototypes (see, e.g., Margolis, 1994).2 However, two recent papers (Osherson and Smith, 1988; Kamp and Partee, 1995) reconsider this consensus. They suggest that, although the Standard Objection is probably right in the long run, the cases where prototypes fail to exhibit compositionality are relatively exotic and involve phenomena (...)
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  • A Multiple Definitions Model of Classification Into Fuzzy Categories.Thomas M. Gruenenfelder - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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