Through an example of the prohibition against dating in a technical school in southwest China in 1978, this article analyzes how three intersecting forces - the ideology of socialist collectivism, the structure of the work unit system and the socialist sovereign ownership of the body - account for sexual repression in the Maoist period in China. Rather than being an ahistorical, essential component of Maoist socialism, sexual repression (psychic and social) was a historically specific and complex phenomenon. The transformation of (...) sexual repression at a historical moment took the form of an assemblage of the return of love discourse and an emergent desire-centered subjectivity in the great transformation from Maoist socialism to the post-Mao reform period. (shrink)

In its enunciation of “We the people,” the Constitution of the United States of America becomes a constitution of the flesh as it simultaneously invokes a constitution, a nation and a people. Correspondingly, its amendments as a list of rights pertaining to sex and race discrimination, and freedoms of bodily movement and action, assert the Constitution’s authority through the evocation of “natural” human bodies. In this article, I explore the way in which a sovereignty of the United States’ Constitution is (...) realised in the particularlised bodies of its citizens. The fundamental and foundational laws of the United States, and the narratives and myths used to interpret them, are in part rendered legitimate by the Constitution’s embodiment, which extends from its physical manifestation in written documents into the flesh of its citizens. In order to make this argument, I turn to the film The Matrix (1999), the success of which relies on an investment in bodies and the United States’ Constitution as matter through its interwoven narrative themes of human slavery and emancipation, reality and computer-generated simulation. At the same time, The Matrix extends its ideological play into the bodies of its audience, who experience the film’s thrillingly sensorial fantasies of constitutional rights while enjoying its affective special effects. Thus, the sovereign authority of United States constitutional law is experienced as “natural” through the phenomenological experience of cinema. (shrink)

Many of Menander's comedies are structured according to a rape plot pattern in which a young Athenian citizen usually rapes and impregnates a female citizen prior to the opening of the play. In most cases, the rape leads to a happy ending: the marriage of the rapist and victim. This casual treatment of rape is striking because in all other respects Menander's plays are not only scrupulously faithful to Athenian law, they also use Athenian legal and social norms as their (...) own generic conventions. Although the rape of a female citizen was a serious oense in Athenian law, potentially punishable with death, and a flagrant violation of the norms of Athenian citizenship, Menandrian comedy never morally or legally problematizes rape. This study considers how the comedies neutralize the potential legal signicance of rape and what this tells us about Athenian law and the ideology of democratic citizenship. It argues that by portraying a neutral form of rape, Menander's comedies implicitly articulate those factors which had the potential to bring "rape" within the purview of Athenian legal discourse. Menandrian Comedy's strategic fidelity to the norms of Athenian citizenship also tells us something about the gender ideology of Athenian democratic citizenship, that is, the ways in which relations between the sexes support and sustain civic relations between men in Athenian political culture and democratic ideology. While Menander's romantic plots uphold the laws of citizen marriage, they do not passively enact the legal constructs. In one common variant of the rape plot, the gendered construction of citizenship embedded in Athenian law is specically conjoined to democratic norms. In this type of play, a wealthy young citizen rapes and eventually marries the daughter of a seemingly poor citizen. By using rape to generate matrimonial unions between the rich and the poor, these plays extend democratic norms into the social arena. The formation of marriages across class lines disrupts the eects of intergenerationality in reproducing social and economic inequalities. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute qué puede aportar la filosofía a la comprensión del dolor. Para ello, en la sección, apuntamos que la pregunta por el dolor tiene su origen en una experiencia personal. En, analizamos que, para conocer el dolor tenemos que tomar en consideración experiencias subjetivas. Razón por la cual la naturaleza del dolor es esquiva y tenemos que repensar constantemente su significado; al igual que los retos que deben afrontar la ciencia y la filosofía del dolor. Nuestra (...) conclusión sobre esta cuestión, es que la pregunta por el dolor requiere dos esfuerzos sociales: empatía y colaboración. La dimensión humana del dolor es inevitable y, por tanto, una la filosofía del dolor es necesaria. (shrink)

Ownership of the body, its organs, tissues, marrow, fluids, secretions, and other component parts and products must always be contested, for what appears to belong to the individual may instead be turned into property at the expense of the individual and to the benefit of the social collectivity. Legal discourse relies upon and supports scientific discourse. Both are the product and the producer of utilitarian commercial interests. Collectively, they displace the individual self with a ‘body’ of social interest, encouraging entrepreneurship (...) over the interests of the individual, and quieting social and philosophical discussions concerning self and its location. (shrink)

We offer a theory regarding the symbolism of the human body in legal discourse. The theory blends legal theory, the neuroscience of empathy, and biosemiotics, a branch of semiotics that combines semiotics with theoretical biology. Our theory posits that this symbolism of the body is not solely a metaphor or semiotic sign of how law is cognitively structured in the mind. We propose that it also signifies neurobiological mechanisms of social emotion in the brain that are involved in the social (...) and moral decision-making and behavior that law generally seeks to govern. Specifically, we hypothesize that the symbol of a collective human body in the language of law signifies neural mechanisms of pain empathy which generate a virtual, neurally simulated, emotional sense of sharing the feelings or pain of others and of thereby being one-in-body with or virtually equal to them. We speculate that this may be the neural basis of what is signified in legal and political theory as the “body politic” or “sense of equality,” because neuroscience and psychiatry further suggest that such pain empathy may provide the natural, emotional motivation to think and act in a rights-based manner. We conclude that misunderstanding of these neural mechanisms of pain empathy and related misinterpretation of this corporeal symbolism for the same may have long resulted in legal discourse that misinterprets the function of “pain” in the law and misinterprets the associated positive law, specifically the law regarding individual, equality-based rights and criminal justice, in particular, punishment theory. (shrink)

This article focuses on the events surrounding a homosexual Romanian man's attempt to be recognized as a refugee in Britain. Numerous themes emerge such as the nature of authenticity, knowledge, identity, pleasure, evidence and the homosexual refugee as being caught in between two legal apparatuses (that is, fleeing from the hostility of one legal regime and then trying to gain refugee status, and thus legal protection, via a British Immigration Tribunal). In this article, the corporeality and sensuality of legal practices (...) are exposed in the form of `practices of truth'. That is, in this case medico-legal `living individuals' were to perceive, hear, speak, touch and penetrate the `secrets' of Mr Vraciu's body in order to authenticate his sexual identity for the purposes of law. This case also demonstrates the existence of a differend between what I describe as the self-knowledge of homosexuality and the `legal' fact-based, or authorized knowledge of homosexual identity produced through practices of truth. (shrink)

The ArgumentCell lines and other human-derived biological materials have since 1980 become valuable forms of patentable matter. This paper revisits the much-critiqued legal caseMoore v. Regents of the University of Cahfornia, in which John Moore claimed property rights in a patented cell line made from his spleen. Most work to date has critiqued the text of the decision and left the relevant scientific and technical literature unexamined. By mapping out the construction of discontinuity and continuity between human body and cell (...) line in this literature, this paper provides a novel critique of the Moore case regarding the source and mobilization of scientific information in the decision. At the same time, the elisions of the case are used to move to a larger set of questions. Comparative material from the history of the first widely used cell line, HeLa, and a discussion of the relation of the scientific and economic value of cell lines, are aimed at analysis of how new objects such as patented human cell lines come into existence through science and law, and what kinds of definitions and practices make them valued objects of contention in the first place. (shrink)

This article critically examines the ways in which the trope of prosthesis has been used in recent theory to understand human-technology relationships. Analyzing the trope from a number of angles, including disability, factory labor practices, mass production, and marketing, the author scrutinizes ways in which technologies are simultaneously wounding and enabling in ways for which the prosthesis trope cannot account.

This reflection contrasts the dominant imaginary underlying ‘lawofthe Anthropocene’ with an imaginary reaching towards ‘law/sforthe Anthropocene’. It does so primarily by contrasting two imaginaries of human embodiment—law’s existing imaginary of quasi-disembodiment and an alternative imaginary of embodiment as co-woven with the lively incipiencies and tendencies of matter. It draws on ‘transcorporeality’ and ‘sympoiesis’ as inspiration for ‘sympoietic normativities’ as ways of co-living and co-organizing in the face of the catastrophic implications of the Anthropocene emergency.

The much-lamented anthropocentrism of human rights is misleading. Human rights anthropocentrism is radically attenuated and reflects persistent patterns of intra- and interspecies injustice and binary subject–object relations inapt for twenty-first-century crises and posthuman complexities. This article explores the possibility of reimagining the “human” of human rights in the light of anti- and post-Cartesian analyses drawing—in particular—upon Merleau-Ponty and on new materialism. This article also seeks to reimagine human rights themselves as responsibilized, injustice-sensitive claim concepts emerging in the “midst of” lively (...) materialities and the uneven global dynamics of twenty-first-century predicaments. (shrink)

This paper explores how embryos have been representedin law. It argues that two main models haveunderpinned legal discourse concerning the embryo. Onediscourse, which has become increasingly prevalent,views embryos as legal subjects or persons. Suchrepresentations are facilitated by technologicaldevelopments such as ultrasound imaging. In additionto influencing Parliamentary debate prior to thepassage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act1990, images of embryos as persons featureprominently in popular culture, including advertisingand films, and this discourse came to the fore in the`orphaned embryo' debate in (...) 1996. The main opposingdiscourse dismisses embryos as commodifiable objects,which fits with a trend towards legal recognition thatreproductive materials such as sperm may be classifiedas property which may be donated or sold. In thecase of cryo-preserved embryos these competingperspectives have resulted in litigation over thestatus of frozen embryos. In this paper I argue thatit might be productive to shift the debate from thispolarised dispute over whether embryos matter or not,whether they are pre-persons or commodities. Instead,I suggest that we should attempt to locate them in abiotechnological milieu, where cyborg metaphors may beutilised, and questions of how we should treat embryoswould be contextualised alongside our response toother cyborgs. (shrink)