Regulation is often applied to business behavior to ensure that the social costs of doing business are included in the cost and pricing structures of the firm. Because the consumer benefits from the transaction that generated the social costs, asking the consumer to bear the burden imposed by the transaction is fair. However, there may be a lack of Justice m the internal and external distribution of the social costs of doing business if consumers are the only party bearing that (...) burden, or if the costs are being shifted to employees or taxpayers when a closer stakeholder is also benefiting from the transaction – the stockowner. A social justice perspective requires that those benefiting from a transaction share in the burdens of it. We propose that a Tobin-like tax on stock transactions might be a just means of achieving greater justice in the distribution of the social cost burden. (shrink)

The view that CSR performance can be improved most effectively through external pressures is shown to be invalid for most firms. In exploring why this is the case, the authors demonstrate that most small and medium enterprises are not exposed to the same pressures as large firms, and that this undermines many of the assumptions that underpin the externally driven business case (EDBC) for voluntary CSR practices. The analysis does this by looking at the external drivers of one of the (...) components of CSR; namely, the environmental behaviour of firms. This shows that the strength of the EDBC is largely determined by five factors. Importantly, the analysis provides the basis for the claim that -- and helps to explain why -- the EDBC for voluntary environmental behaviour is likely to remain a weak form of pressure for many small firms. (shrink)

Fossil fuel divestment movements have gained momentum since 2011, aimed at ending fossil fuel use and a move toward a cleaner, affordable, and sustainable energy system, for business and society. The present study investigates the direct impact of fossil fuel divestment announcements on stock prices of firms listed on the United States' stock exchanges. Using an event study and guided by the United Nation's sustainable development goals (SDGs), we test the effects of 116 divestments announcements between 2014 and 2019 on (...) 51 publicly traded fossil fuel companies. Our results suggest that there is a negative effect of these announcements on fossil fuel firm stock prices. Also, we find that the type of fossil fuel firm (coal or oil and gas), the type of divestment (partial, coal only, or full), the timing of the announcement, and the size of the divesting investor have some explanatory power in relation to the (cumulative) abnormal returns following the divestment announcements. While the negative impact on stock prices is not surprising, the reaction from the divested firms after such large divestitures is not consistent with what may be expected, given past reactions to divestitures seeking to achieve different social goals. Given the SDGs, it seems clear why investors are divesting themselves from fossil fuel firms, but why has the reaction to the 116 divestments led to very little change in the way these publicly traded fossil fuel firms do business given their direct and growing impacts on society? We conclude the study with some suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Investors with a pro-social or sustainability agenda increasingly attempt to influence firm managers to adopt socially responsible behavior, either through positive/reward tactics or negative/punishment tactics. This paper considers how investors can use each approach to differentially influence managers to make more CSR investments. The paper uses game theory with an all-pay contest structure to model how a large institutional investor could reward firms for CSR activities by creating a socially responsible investment fund (reward contest) or punish firms via shareholder activism (...) (punishment contest). We identify conditions under which the punishment contest induces a higher level of CSR activity among firms compared to the reward contest. Managers bearing substantial private costs stemming from the activism is one such condition. Spillover effects are seen as the other managers in the economy engage in CSR to avoid being punished by the investor’s activism. This level of engagement is not the case when rewards are used—only those managers with an expectation of being rewarded increase their CSR activity in that scenario. This suggests, for example, that incorporating thresholds or tiers (e.g. gold, silver, and bronze-level winners) can increase the effectiveness of reward contests. Implications for designing both positive and negative CSR inducements are explored. We also identify the ethical dilemmas that relate to such influence attempts. (shrink)

The authors apply marginalization theory to develop a model of boycotts that incorporates both individual motives and corporate strategic issues. Overall, their analysis of more than 25,000 individual evaluations of 59 companies suggests that members of marginalized groups are more likely to boycott. Individuals are less likely to boycott companies about which they are knowledgeable and more likely to boycott companies that are organized boycott targets. In addition, the authors find systematic differences in the types of boycotts associated with strategic (...) issues that are supported by members of marginalized groups. Overall, boycott supporters tend to be upwardly mobile members of marginalized groups. (shrink)

A firm’s social performance can shape the impressions of key stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and investors, that influence subsequent decision making and relationships to the firm. To test this notion, we examine how a firm’s public recognition for exemplary social performance can serve as a positive signal of the firm’s business performance to shareholders. We conduct an event study of firms named to Working Mothermagazine’s list of “Most Family- Friendly Companies” for the first time between 1989 and 1994. (...) We find statistically significant, positive, abnormal returns for such firms, in particular for firms whose shares are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. (shrink)