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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Relational Autonomy, Personhood, and African Traditions
Philosophy East and West 65 (4):1005-1029 (1005-1029)
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The intersection between virtue and care ethics is underexplored in contemporary moral philosophy. This thesis approaches care ethics from a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical perspective, comparing the two frameworks and drawing on recent work on care to develop a theory thereof. It is split into seven substantive chapters serving three major argumentative purposes, namely the establishment of significant intertheoretical agreement, the compilation and analysis of extant and new distinctions between the two theories, and the synthesis of care ethical insights with neo-Aristotelianism (...) |
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Purpose: The objective of this study is to determine the importance of supplementary medical ethics course for resident physicians. In this study, we assessed the current state of their knowledge of medical ethics and aimed to improve and deepen their understanding of clinical scenarios to increase their awareness of the link between the practice of medicine and ethical issues. Methods: The course was held for groups of 10-12 people for 3 days a week for a total of 6 hours. Tests (...) |
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This article proffers a personhood-based conception of a meaningful life. I look into the ethical structure of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy to develop an account of a meaningful life. In my view, the ethics of personhood is constituted by three components, namely (1) the fact of being human, which informs (2) a view of moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, and (3) which specifies the final good of achieving or developing a morally virtuous character. (...) |
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This paper provides a critical reflection and exploration of African development with reference to enhancing human flourishing in Amartya Sen’s capability theory. However, we identify some core limitations to Sen’s theory of development due to its reliance on neoliberal principles. These principles can be discouraging for African self-directed emancipatory development projects. We argue that the notion of communitarianism in Africa can provide alternative perspectives that can counter the influence of neoliberalism. We first delve into the philosophical understanding of development and (...) |
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The notion of a distinction between merely formal freedom and real, substantive freedom is common in both philosophy and political rhetoric. However, Ian Carter contends that this distinction faces coherence and usefulness problems. Contra Carter, I argue that it is coherent, meaningful, and clarifies significant philosophical disagreements about the right to freedom. I define the formal-substantive freedom distinction by outlining a non-univocal conception of each term, then explain why the distinction so conceived is both philosophically and practically significant. I review (...) |
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Thaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. In (...) |
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