This paper discusses one particular way we may put the idea of sharing in ubuntu philosophy into practice: moderate selflessness. Moderate selflessness is an important tool that might help us pursue other‐regarding behaviour alongside the agent's genuine well‐being interests to help disrupt the antagonistic gap between humanity and nonhumanity. I suggest that, properly understood, moderate selflessness may provide conceptual resources to avoid antagonistic environmental practices, including the concerns of poverty and biodiversity loss.

In this paper, I address human-induced environmental ills we face using an ubuntu-inspired ethical lens. I follow ubuntu scholars to stress the significance for moral agents to embody virtues. Virtue development is essential to carry out obligations and address human impacts on the environment. Thaddeus Metz, in particular, has drawn attention to how embodying ubuntu virtues of humility and friendliness can prompt moral agents to be other-regarding. The view I developed in this paper differs from his ubuntu-inspired account in at (...) least two significant ways. First, humans cannot be in harmonious relationships with some species such as Black Mambas, Hyenas and sea urchins even if they can interact. Second, we must acknowledge the consequentialist dimension of ubuntu ethics and prioritise the different aspects of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics, ranking them to offer possibilities for a more realistic recommendation to change our moral life. This paper demonstrates that the three dimensions of ubuntu ‘mixed’ ethics are fundamental because we need to think about moral consequences, right action and our virtue in accounting for our actions. (shrink)

“I am a person” has more emotive appeal than “I am an entity with moral status.” While scientists and philosophers prefer precise terminology, the public and media favor general terminologies with...

In her paper titled “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) takes a swipe at the functionalist account of personhood. The problem with the functionalist view of personhood is that...

Undoubtedly, the discipline of nursing has been influenced extensively by both Western and Eastern/Asian philosophies. What remains unknown or, perhaps, poorly articulated is the potential influence of African philosophy on the onto‐epistemology of nursing. As a starting point, this article sought to examine the core claims of African philosophy and how they may offer new meanings to the metaparadigm domains of interest in the discipline of nursing. At the core of African philosophy is the notion of personhood (which is distinguished (...) from what it means to be a human being), community, solidarity, and relationality. A major claim of African philosophy is the notion that ‘a person is a person through persons’ which may mean that nursing will be relevant from the African philosophical perspective if it is able to attain this. Health and illness from the African philosophical perspective are defined relationally which shifts attention from the biomedical framework to holism and relational care. The sick ‘person’ is also distinguished from the sick ‘human being’ which has the potential of leading to exclusion from the African philosophical viewpoint. Put together, the African philosophical stance potentially extends the meaning of the metaparadigm domains of interest to the discipline of nursing which warrants further exploration. (shrink)

Examining the literature on the question of life’s meaning from an African perspective, I find that existing theories almost solely stem from the context of traditional African thought. Thus, very little, if anything at all, is said about contemporary African accounts of meaningfulness. It is this gap that this article fills. In this article, I identify two major accounts of meaningfulness that can be derived from the contemporary African context. The first is what I call “living a religious life ” (...) theory and the second is a conglomeration of three theories of meaning, which I call the cluster view. The first view locates meaning in living honorably and pursuing the religious ideals of one’s religious sect. The second view locates meaning in a cluster of ideals and in the pursuit of these ideals. (shrink)

In a joint article1 with Wenceslaus Kwindingwi, Bernard Matolino declared an end to ubuntu. The declaration, they argue, is a result of the failure of ubuntu in practice and theory in modern African societies. This declaration triggered strong reactions, and an analysis of these responses suggests the need for continuous interrogations of African ideals and beliefs and their relevance to modern African thought. In this article, I argue that Kwindingwi and Matolino’s argument is in line with Matolino’s broader scepticism about (...) Afro-communitarianism in general. In other works, he insists that attempts to theoretically and practically ground postcolonial African philosophy in ideas of Afro-communitarianism exaggerate its functionality. I aim to show that Matolino’s Socratic process and the outcomes, as demonstrated in the “The end of ubuntu”, aim to produce quality understanding and reasoned defence of the traditional ideas aimed to guide modern African thought. The rejectionist approach should be seen as a nudge to make the advocacy for African ideals and beliefs, such as ubuntu, match up with the knowledge of them and how they operate in reality. (shrink)