(Conference proceedings 2014) This presentation (International Development Ethics Association, July 2014) considers economic vulnerability, exploring the risk of deprivation of necessary resources due to a complex and rarely discussed vulnerability that arises from hope. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological account of French petit-bourgeois aspiration in The Social Structures of the Economy has recently inspired Wendy Olsen to introduce the term “aspiration paradox” to characterize cases wherein “a borrower's status aspirations may contribute to a situation in which their borrowings exceed their capacity to (...) repay,” leaving the individual much the worse, due to an aspiration to betterment. If such financial opportunities were not made available to these people – if some were denied loans due to a careful assessment of their vulnerability – would they be better off? We should seriously consider that they might be. I will hazard the straightforwardly paternalistic suggestion that limiting access to lending to those who are vulnerable to their aspirations can be a just policy. Because aspiration paradox is a cross-cultural phenomenon, and because lending frequently involves asymmetries in mathematical education between borrowers and lenders, I hope to elude at least some of the charges of colonialism that have gained a stronger purchase on adaptive preference arguments. (shrink)

Before the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, the vast majority of social scientists were not paying much attention to the politics of central banking, despite the fact that, since their creation, central banks have been pivotal institutions between private financial institutions and public authorities (Singleton, 2010). During the past decades, central banks acquired considerable independence from public officials under the Central Bank Independence (CBI) template (McNamara, 2002). Governments justified their decisions to delegate monetary competences by relying on a narrow conception of (...) monetary policy, in which central bankers should only seek to control inflation and ignore the implications of their policies on other economic issues such as financial stability or wealth inequalities (Issing et al., 2001; Marcussen, 2009). Heterodox economists and critical political economists opposed this view by declaring that monetary policy is fundamentally political as it deals with complicated policy trade-offs, which generates winners and losers (Epstein & Gintis, 1995; Forder, 2005). However, until 2007, their concerns were very marginal and remained at the fringes of the political debate. The vast majority of policy-makers, economists, and central bankers themselves agreed on the fact that the CBI template was the optimal institutional arrangement between fiscal and monetary authorities. (shrink)

How promising is Bitcoin as a currency? This paper discusses four claims on the advantages of Bitcoin: a more stable currency than state-backed ones; a secure and efficient payment system; a credible alternative to the central management of money; and a better protection of transaction privacy. We discuss these arguments by relating them to their philosophical roots in libertarian and neoliberal theories, and assess whether Bitcoin can effectively meet these expectations. We conclude that despite its advocates’ enthusiasm, there are good (...) reasons to doubt that Bitcoin can fulfill its promises and act as a functioning currency, rather than as a mere speculative asset. (shrink)

An impressive variety of new forms of money has aroused in recent decades from various groups of people and various kinds of institutions. These currencies are at the heart of intense debates, which raise important, but often neglected, normative issues. The diversity of their goals, uses and charac-teristics is so large that it makes some preliminary distinctions necessary. This paper aims at provid-ing a proper background for the discussion of the possible merits and drawbacks of different kinds of currencies. It (...) proposes a classification that demarcates currencies according to how they relate to several crucial normative issues. Its aim is to show, for every type of currency, and as unambiguously as possible, to which side of these controversies it lies. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the proposal that central banks should issue digital currencies (CBDC) to provide a public alternative to private digital accounts and cryptocurrencies. We build on some The promises and perils of central bank digital currencies recent themes in political economy research to give a broader and more balanced perspective than the existing literature, highlighting both the promises and perils of CBDC. We argue that, on the one hand, the present state of the private financial sector is problematic and (...) regulators should seek to tackle the issues of financial power, financial instability and lack of adequate monetary policy options. On the other hand, implementing CBDC comes with risks of its own, such as that of creating a “Frankenstein scenario” where too much power is given to unelected technocrats. Our tentative conclusion is therefore that CBDC should be seen as a second-best option, while the primary focus of policy makers should be on the possibility of financial re-regulation. (shrink)

To what extent are questions of sovereign debt a matter for political rather than scientific or moral adjudication? We answer that question by defending three claims. We argue that (i) moral and technocratic takes on sovereign debt tend to be ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, and that therefore (ii) sovereign debt should be politicised all the way down. We then show that this sort of politicisation need not boil down to the crude Realpolitik of debtor-creditor power relations—a (...) conclusion that would leave no room for normative theory, among other problems. Rather, we argue that (iii) in a democratic context, a realist approach to politics centred on what Bernard Williams calls ‘The Basic Legitimation Demand’ affords a deliberative approach to the normative evaluation of public debt policy options. (shrink)

Locke argues that the consent of market participants to the introduction of money justifies the economic inequalities resulting from monetarization. This paper shows that Locke’s argument fails to justify such inequalities. My critique proceeds in two parts. Regarding the consequences of the consent to money, neo-Lockeans wrongly take consent to justify inequalities in the original appropriation of land. In contrast, I defend the view that consent can only justify inequalities resulting directly from monetized commercial exchange. Secondly, regarding the nature of (...) consent, neo-Lockeans uncritically accept Locke’s account of money as a natural institution. In contrast, I argue that money is an irreducibly political institution and that monetary economies cannot develop in the state of nature. My political account of money has far-reaching implications for the normative analysis of the global monetary system and the justification of the economic inequalities consequent upon it. (shrink)

This special issue introduces the study of financial technologies and finance to the field of philosophy of technology, bringing together two different fields that have not traditionally been in dialogue. The included articles are: Digital Art as ‘Monetised Graphics’: Enforcing Intellectual Property on the Blockchain, by Martin Zeilinger; Fundamentals of Algorithmic Markets: Liquidity, Contingency, and the Incomputability of Exchange, by Laura Lotti; ‘Crises of Modernity’ Discourses and the Rise of Financial Technologies in a Contested Mechanized World, by Marinus Ossewaarde; Two (...) Technical Images: Blockchain and High-Frequency Trading, by Diego Viana; and The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations of Cryptocurrencies, by Wessel Reijers and Mark Coeckelbergh. (shrink)

Rightwing theorists argue that we owe the current financial crisis to the democratization of credit, or financial inclusion: politics interfered with the market to benefit marginalized actors, only to cause instability and risk. Leftwing theorists focus instead on financialization: namely, the shift of profit-making activities from industry to finance. These views implicitly draw on Schumpeter and Marx. Much like their intellectual progenitors, they emphasize exogenous processes to explain financial change. Here I claim that the connection between financial innovation and financial (...) inclusion is endogenous. I suggest two main typologies of financial innovators: Market Utopians (MUs) and Populist Innovators (PIs). Financial inclusion, I submit, is the byproduct of the quest for power of the latter. (shrink)

The main goal of this thesis is to provide a clear basis for the analysis of alternative currencies, such as Bitcoin, LETS, Local currencies, the WIR or Carbon currencies. It attempts to determine whether alternative currencies might constitute just and workable alternatives, either in the form of small-scale experiments or in the form of more radical reforms. The first chapter proposes a new way to classify currencies. The second examines the case in favour of monetary plurality. The third analyses the (...) claims in favour of restricting the use of money locally, within a community, or to certain goods. The fourth studies the link between money and the market. Finally, a post-scriptum focuses on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. This thesis highlights that these currencies are drivers of several potential conflicts. Their widespread use might conflict with the adequate management of monetary policy, with social justice, and with liberal values. These conflicts are potential, for they would come into existence only if alternative currencies increased in scope. However, there is no reason to disregard potential conflicts when the case in their favour relies mostly on their potential benefits. (shrink)

Contemporary reflections on capitalism as a social-historical formation build on the legacy of classical theorists and comparative analysts. To clarify the main lines of this ongoing debate, it seems useful to distinguish three dichotomies that have been central to interpretations of capitalist development. The question of unity and diversity has been most prominent in the controversies of the past few decades; its ramifications range from micro-economic research on ‘varieties of capitalism’ to less sustained discussions about the place and role of (...) capitalism within the framework of multiple modernities. Another key distinction contrasts systemic perspectives on capitalism with historical ones. In this regard, Schumpeter’s work is particularly interesting, but as an illustration of the problematic rather than an answer to the basic questions. The notion of a spirit of capitalism is most frequently associated with Weber’s work, where the spirit appeared as the source of a dynamic to which it then fell victim. Reconsiderations of the issue have raised questions about more durable versions and more varied expressions of the spirit, less likely to be eliminated by a self-propelling dynamic. Finally, comments on the articles included in the special issue suggest that they all have something to say on all three aspects of the field, but that their most innovative content may consist in attempts to move beyond systemic models of unity. (shrink)

Jens Beckert’s 2009 article on the constitution and dynamics of markets is a bold attempt to define a novel research agenda. Deeming uncertainty and coordination essential for the constitution of social action in markets, Beckert proposes a framework centered on the resolution of three coordination problems: valuation, cooperation, and competition. The empirical study of these three coordination problems has the potential to contribute considerably to the sociological analysis of markets. However, the assertion that such a theoretical vantage point can explain (...) the constitution and dynamics of markets is not compelling because it (1) conflates social interaction with social structures, (2) fails to address power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures, and (3) neglects the historically contingent and socially contested nature of markets themselves. The present article shows that these three pitfalls are the result of starting from the problem of order and building upon uncertainty as the basis of action in markets, lending the suggested framework a methodologically individualist bent. Therefore, Beckert’s suggested framework is in danger of mystifying the very power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures that are at the heart of the constitution and dynamics of markets. (shrink)

Nach einem weit verbreiteten Urteil gibt Kant der Ökonomie in seinem Werk keinen nennenswerten Raum. Die vorliegende Studie widerlegt dies, indem sie Kants Äußerungen zu ökonomischen Themen systematisiert: zur Selbstständigkeit, zum Kaufmann, zum Handel, zum Geld, zur „Staatswirthschaft" sowie zum technischen Fortschritt. Sie erschließt Kants Ökonomie aus der Ergänzung rechtlicher und ethischer Pflichten durch deren anthropologische Ausführungsbedingungen. Dabei geht sie aus von einem zeitgenössischen Verständnis der Ökonomie als Wissenschaft vom Wohlstand. Im deutschsprachigen Raum des 18. Jahrhunderts konkurrieren hier drei Paradigmen (...) miteinander: das aristotelische, das smithianische und das kameralistische. Sie identifizieren jeweils das Haus, den Markt oder den Staat als zentrale Handlungssphäre der Ökonomie. Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Kants praktische Philosophie für Ergänzungen aus jeder dieser ökonomischen Handlungssphären offen ist, solange diese freiheitliche Prinzipien erfüllen; sie ist damit nicht, wie gelegentlich behauptet, auf eine einzige Wirtschaftsordnung festgelegt, etwa auf eine rein marktliberale. Relevant ist dies für die Kant-Forschung, für die Wirtschaftsphilosophie sowie für die Ideengeschichte. (shrink)

Does the very existence of money depend in any sense on our “recognition” of it? According to certain functionalist views, no such attitudes are necessary. This paper argues to the contrary for recognition dependence, of a minimal sort. What’s needed in a population is (1) the functional know-how of money use, (2) an ideational structure founded upon people’s thinking about what others are thinking, and (3) wide enough acceptance of a payment or settlement obligation (as expressed, e.g., when someone asks (...) a vendor “So what do I owe ya?”). (shrink)

This special issue introduces the study of financial technologies and finance to the field of philosophy of technology, bringing together two different fields that have not traditionally been in dialogue. The included articles are: Digital Art as ‘Monetised Graphics’: Enforcing Intellectual Property on the Blockchain, by Martin Zeilinger; Fundamentals of Algorithmic Markets: Liquidity, Contingency, and the Incomputability of Exchange, by Laura Lotti; ‘Crises of Modernity’ Discourses and the Rise of Financial Technologies in a Contested Mechanized World, by Marinus Ossewaarde; Two (...) Technical Images: Blockchain and High-Frequency Trading, by Diego Viana; and The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations of Cryptocurrencies, by Wessel Reijers and Mark Coeckelbergh. (shrink)

In this review article, I survey books by three authors, each of which address the issues of debt and personal indebtedness. The authors are: Greta Krippner; David Graeber; and Maurizio Lazzarato. They argue, and I agree, that whilst money is broadly beneficial, its use in a capitalist context increases personal indebtedness, subjugates the individual, and reduces freedom. I briefly outline their positions, each of which make important contributions. However – contrary to Krippner’s lack of normative commitment, Graeber’s suggestion that we (...) need to forgive the debt and start again, or Lazzarato’s suggestion that we should to stop paying back debt and refuse to work – I suggest that we need to return to socialist principles, based on the premise that capitalism is no alternative. (shrink)

The issue of the relation between financial derivatives, money and crisis remains one of on-going debate within Marxism. This paper takes issue with a recent contribution to this debate by Tony Norfield. We contend that the relationship between financial derivatives and the concept of ‘money’ needs to be framed in the context of a changing understanding of liquidity, and that issues of crisis and renewed accumulation are better understood though this path than via debates about speculative versus real investment and (...) productive versus unproductive capital. Indeed these latter taxonomies are being superseded by current developments within finance, and Marxian analysis needs to be attuned to these current developments. (shrink)

Teleological thinking about money reasons from what money is for to both how it ought to be used and what forms it should take. One type, found in Aristotle’s argument against usury, takes teleological considerations alone to decisively settle normative questions. Another type, found in Locke’s argument about monetary durability, takes teleological considerations to contribute to the settling of normative questions, but sees them as one consideration among many. This paper endorses the type made by Locke while rejecting the type (...) made by Aristotle, and identifies further teleological tendencies in the work of Adam Smith and other philosophers. (shrink)

The traditional Lockean justification of property rights has been argued to be no longer valid in a world in which much wealth does not derive from acquisitions of natural resources, and in which much property, such as money, is intangible. This means that libertarians need to reconsider whether and why property rights are justified for objects that fall outside of the scope of the Lockean justification. This paper gives a justification of property rights in relation to modern money, which uses (...) the self-ownership principle as its central premise. Since modern money is a form of credit, I start with a justification of credit property rights. I then consider both money under gold convertibility and present-day fiat systems, showing that the justification of credit property rights remains valid under these conditions. (shrink)

How can a partial, revisable utopia of ‘decent society’ be used as a yardstick for assessing today’s impersonal forms of social integration? In economic life — this essay’s focus — Polanyi’s hopes that the ‘economic system’ might cease ‘to lay down the law to society’ is a start. Recently, financial firms sold commodified promises and obligations on the allure of democratizing credit and providing financial ‘choice’ to millions. Yet these ‘civilities’ exploited people’s hopes for a dignified life. Any new, partial (...) utopia (as Keynes’s was too — to remove the egregious, humiliating features of ‘the society in which we live’) is yet to be devised. Maria Markus’s concept is useful to ask whether the instrumental-ism of macro-economic concepts is a distortion of the institutions of money or intrinsic to them. Could solidaristic compromises through civil society minimize disrespectful relationships embedded in money to create decent institutions? (shrink)

In the Marxist tradition, capitalism is understood as a commodified society based on markets. The article argues that the ultimate justification of this position does not lie in any ‘materialistic’ approach, but in the disembedding of markets that was the result of the historical ‘Great Transformation’ analysed by Karl Polanyi. Disembedded markets are not an economic subsystem within society but take the place of the most encompassing social system, which Durkheim had reserved for religion. The article distinguishes between spatial, social, (...) material and temporal dimensions of disembedding, thereby elaborating and correcting the analysis of Karl Polanyi. As a genuine form of society, disembedded markets give rise to the epistemological dilemma, which, as Luhmann had shown, is fundamental to any encompassing social theory: Society as a whole cannot be viewed by any observer. According to this viewpoint, economic theories take on ‘theological’ functions, as they provide rationality and legitimacy to a reality that is unknowable. (shrink)

Central banks have accumulated unparalleled power over the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Key for this development was the articulation and differentiation of monetary policy as a distinct policy domain. While political economists emphasize the foundational institutional changes that enabled this development, recent performativity-studies focus on central bankers’ invention of expectation management techniques. In line with a few other works, this article aims to bring these two aspects together. The key argument is that, over the last few decades, central banks have (...) identified different strategies to assume authority over “expectational politics” and reinforced dominant institutional forces within them. I introduce a comparative scheme to distinguish two different expectational governance regimes. My own empirical investigation focuses on a monetarist regime that emerged from corporatist contexts, where central banks enjoyed “embedded autonomy” and where commercial banks maintained conservative reserve management routines. I further argue that innovations towards inflation targeting took place in countries with non-existent or disintegrating corporatist structures and where central banks turned to finance to establish a different version of expectation coordination. A widespread adoption of this “financialized” expectational governance has been made possible by broader processes of institutional convergence that were supported by central bankers themselves. (shrink)

The commons is a concept increasingly used with the promise of creating new collective wealth. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crises, finance and money have been criticized and redesigned to serve the collective interest. In this article, we analyze three types of complementary currency systems: community currencies, inter-enterprise currencies, and cryptocurrencies. We investigate whether these systems can be considered as commons. To address this question, we use two main theoretical frameworks that are usually separate: the “new commons” (...) in organization studies and the “common good” in business ethics. Our findings show that these monetary systems and organizations may be considered as commons under the “common good” framework since they promote the common interest by creating new communities. Nevertheless, according to the “new commons” framework, only systems relying on collective action and self-management can be said to form commons. This allows us to suggest two new categories of commons: the “social commons,” which fit into both the “new commons” and the “common good” frameworks, and the “commercial commons,” which fit the “common good” but not the “new commons” framework. This research advances a new conceptualization of the commons and of the ethical implications of CCs. (shrink)

Money markets are at the heart of financialized capitalism, as those markets that provide the funding liquidity needed for credit creation and leveraged trading. How have these markets evolved, grown, and become critical for larger financial flows? To answer this question, I distinguish an early period of financial globalization marked by regulatory arbitrage, offshoring, deregulation, and informal trading practices from a period of regime-consolidation marked by formal institutionalization. Concentrating on repo markets as the key funding sources for market-based banking, I (...) demonstrate that new institutional arrangements for these markets were initiated by private sector associations, but supported and authorized by public authorities. Bond trader groups codified new contractual arrangements and these were validated via reforms of bankruptcy codes and changes in central banks’ policy frameworks in the United States and European Union. Through these modifications and re-articulations in institutional conditions, transactions and large exposures on money markets became routine affairs—for shadow banking actors like money market funds as well as for commercial banks. The article concludes by discussing the continuity of regime-consolidation efforts after the transatlantic financial crisis and hypothesizes that they reveal “neo-patrimonial” features. (shrink)