This paper considers what function—if any—colocation of bodies may have in the Stoic theory of blending (κρᾶσις), by examining (1) whether colocation is part of the definition of what blending is; and (2) whether colocation is posited by the Stoics as a requirement necessary for the definition to be satisfied. I reconstruct the standard, Chrysippean definition of blending, and I show that the answer to (1) is ‘no’; further, I argue that the evidence gives no reason to affirm (2). Thus, (...) it appears that colocation does not have a central function in the Stoic theory of blending. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a new interpretation of Stoic ontology. I aim to explain the nature of, and relations between, (i) the fundamental items of their physics, bodies; (ii) the incorporeal items about which they theorized no less; and (iii) universals, towards which the Stoic attitude seems to be a bizarre mixture of realism and anti-realism. In the first half of the paper I provide a new model to explain the relationship between those items in (i) and (ii). This (...) model clears up several problems in Stoicism and gives a precise answer to the question of how bodies and incorporeals differ in their mode of being. The second half of the paper considers the vexed issue of the status of those items in (iii), Stoic universals. (shrink)

The reference to Albinus in a refutation of Bardesanes († c. 222) by Ephrem the Syrian († 373) is not unknown to modern commentators. This text, edited and translated into English since the beginning of the twentieth century, is regularly mentioned, albeit rather cursorily, by scholars of Middle Platonism. Although much has been clarified between the first publication of the book just over a century ago and the present day, the following pages aim to continue the exploration. The aim will (...) be to better understand what has so far remained unnoticed: the dependence of Albinus’ work on Posidonius on three crucial points: (1) his classification of incorporeals, (2) his doctrine of comprehensive representation, and (3) the deep relationship between (1) and (2). (shrink)

Some notes discussing some of the ancient and medieval background to the absolute-relational debate. Final version appears as Appendix C in my book, Geometric Possibility.