Li (禮) and yi (義) are two central moral concepts in the Analects. Li has a broad semantic range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that the li comprise strictures of correct behavior. The li are a distinguishing characteristic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and protocols that were thought to constitute the wise (...) practices of ancient moral exemplars filtered down through dynasties of the past. However, even while the li were extensive and meant to be followed diligently, they were also understood as incapable of exhausting the whole range of activity that constitutes human life. There were bound to be situations in life where there would be no obvious recourse to the li for guidance. As part of their reflections on the good life, the Confucians maintained another moral concept that seemed to cover morally upright exemplary behavior in these types of situations. This concept is that of yi or rightness. In this chapter, I begin with a brief historical sketch to provide some context, and will then turn to li and yi in turn. In the end, I will suggest how li and yi were both meant to facilitate the supreme value of social harmony that pervades much of the Analects and serves as its ultimate orientation. (shrink)

One of the challenges of reading ancient Chinese philosophical texts is to recognize that certain keywords have attained significantly different senses in the more recent language, and to try to reconstruct, on the basis of contemporary documents, what these terms would have meant to classical audiences. One such term is zhong å¿ , which is often mechanically translated as loyalty. Throughout the imperial period, and in many Eastern Zhou contexts, zhong did indeed mean something very similar to loyalty. However, simply (...) plugging in the word loyalty every time one encounters zhong can lead to seriously incorrect translations, especially when dealing with texts from before the third century BCE. This article discusses a range of complex early meanings including treating people right, being honest with oneself in dealing with others, and adjudicating a case fairly. In addition, the relationship with zhong 中 is explored by means of a revealing Western Zhou bronze inscription. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Analects of Kongzi (better known to English-speakers as 'Confucius') to non-specialist readers, and discusses two major lines of interpretation. According to one group of interpretations, the key to understanding the Analects is passage 4.15, in which a disciple says that 'loyalty' and 'reciprocity' together make up the 'one thread' of the Master's teachings. More recently, some interpreters have emphasised passage 13.3, which discusses 'correcting names': bringing words and things into proper alignment. This paper argues that both (...) approaches are mistaken, based on interpolated and unrepresentative passages. The paper closes with a brief suggestion that the Analects reveals a thinker who emphasises cultivating virtues that allow for the appreciation of complex individual contexts, rather than one who seeks systematic generalisations. An afterword to the paper suggests that we should avoid both 'methodological dualism' (which posits a radical incommensurability between Western and Eastern philosophies) and 'the perennial philosophy' (which ignores differences in favour of similarities). (shrink)

This article develops a novel theory of sport that I call ‘Confucian mutualism’. Confucian mutualism is underpinned by the Confucian Golden Rule and the Confucian conception of human dignity. It resembles the mutualist theory of sport developed by Robert L. Simon in maintaining that sport participants ethically ought to prioritize promoting sporting excellence both in themselves and in their co-participants. However, while Simon’s mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in proficiency at sport constitutive skills, Confucian mutualism maintains that sporting excellence (...) consists in success at achieving the Confucian virtues through sport participation. I provide a preliminary case for why Confucian mutualism’s virtue-centric conception of sporting excellence makes it better able than Simon’s mutualism to explain why sporting excellence is stance-independently ethically significant for all sport participants. I do so by trying to show that we have prima facie justification for believing that Confucian mutualism is not vulnerable to certain kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at Simon’s mutualism. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices in (...) aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

This paper introduces a new form of virtue ethics—patient-centered virtue ethics—and argues that it is better placed to compete with Contractualism, Kantianism, and Utilitarianism, than existing agent and target-focused forms of virtue ethics. The opening part of the paper draws on T.M. Scanlon’s methodological insights to clarify what a theory of narrow morality should aim to accomplish, and the remaining parts argue that while familiar agent and target-focused forms of virtue ethics fail to meet those criteria, patient-centered forms promise to (...) do better. In addition, the paper rebuffs some prominent objections to virtue ethics that don’t adequately take into account the distinction between giving an account of the nature and importance of moral rightness and wrongness and giving an account of what makes acts right and wrong. (shrink)

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes (...) close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself. (shrink)

The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of morality that has actually existed, actually been lived.This essay offers a contribution to the consilience of the humanities, social sciences, and life sciences in accord with naturalism (in a spirit closer to Slingerland 2008 than Wilson 1998). Human beings have a shared nature produced by evolutionary history and modified by culture, where 'culture' refers to "information (...) capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission" (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 5). .. (shrink)

The “social-political-hierarchical” qualifications have long been identified as the essential features of the Confucian golden rule. This essay challenges this prevailing characterization by revealing the relation and differences between Confucius’ original shu 恕 and a series of post-Confucius reformulations in ancient Confucianism. Specifically, the premise of equality, which underlies Confucius’ formulation of shu in correlation with ren 仁, rendered shu incompatible with asymmetrical relationships. Besides the advantage of overcoming this limitation by adapting the golden rule structure of shu to specified (...) asymmetrical relationships, the post-Confucius formula, especially “the measuring square” in the Great Learning, was devised to guide one to infer universalizable rules of conduct for various roles in diverse relationships. On this basis, I demonstrate a pivotal shift in the golden rule practice of ancient Confucianism—a shift of focus from its correlation with ren to its conformity with li 禮 as the system of rules of conduct and the principle of “discriminations.”. (shrink)

Confucius endorses a balance between generalism and particularism in ethics and aesthetics. Rather than standards, his rules are defeasible guides for perception, thought, and action balanced by particularizing capacities of judgment. These rules have opaque and open-ended hedges that strengthen a generalization by restricting its application. A similar architecture for ethical and aesthetic rules reflects a broad view of ethics and aesthetics as intertwined and continuous. Hence, whether one chooses a generalist or particularist ethics depends on one's corresponding choices in (...) aesthetics, and vice versa. This fundamental finding about value theory invites philosophers everywhere to investigate the teachings of Confucius. (shrink)

This essay explores the correlation between shu 恕 and ren 仁 in Confucius’ teachings and its broader implications concerning the role of the golden rule. It first shows that whereas the golden rule is premised on equality between agent and recipient, Confucius’ correlation of shu with ren aims mainly at establishing a more solid foundation for the hierarchy-specific duty of the ruler to care for the ruled. It thus reveals that this conflict arises from the golden rule’s incompatibility with asymmetrical (...) relationships, a long-standing issue concerning its validity as a moral axiom. It then addresses this conflict by demonstrating that the golden rule can effectively function in conformity with humanity even in asymmetrical relationships by way of inducing an agent’s viewpoint to shift from existing sociopolitical asymmetry to one-to-one human equality. On this basis, lastly, it examines the concurrence of the ideas of shu, human nature, and ren in ancient China. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss reciprocity as it unfolds within the context of a Confucian relational ethic. I discuss the relationship between reciprocity and the virtue of shu or 'sympathetic understanding' and then go on to argue that the goods that grow out of reciprocal relationships are necessary for Confucian ethics. These include social equilibrium, a rich sense of self-esteem, and reliable expectations concerning the actions of others. Finally, I discuss the difficulties of acting reciprocally in socially disproportional relationships and (...) in those that involve the manifestation of ill will. It is suggested that Confucian ethics provides a viable account of reciprocity that remains relevant for those living in modern contexts. " The rules of ritual propriety value reciprocity, If I give a gift and nothing is returned, that is contrary to propriety; If the thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return, that is also contrary to propriety. ". (shrink)

This is a study of the ninth chapter of the Huai-nan-tzu, a Chinese philosophical text compiled in the mid-second century BC. The chapter (entitled Chu-shu [The techniques of the ruler]) has been consistently interpreted as a proposal for a benign government that is rooted in the syncretic Taoist principles of the Huai-nan-tzu and is designed to serve the best interests of the people. I argue, on the contrary, that the text makes skilful (and deliberately deceptive) use of vocabulary from the (...) major philosophical traditions of the day, in an attempt to subdue all philosophical sectarianism and wrench various antecedent philosophical ideas into the justification of a supreme political state. The best interests of the people are understood as nothing more than their material needs, since the text also denies that the ruler's subjects are possessed of 'minds' in any philosophical sense. It is this process of systematically undermining other philosophical traditions that I call 'insidious syncretism. '. (shrink)

There is a remarkable and surprising connection to be found between an argument of Søren Kierkegaard’s and one of Zhuangzi’s—what I call the ‘social misfit’ critique. I will argue that this connection highlights a hitherto unacknowledged parallel between the moral thought of their respective targets: Hegel in the case of Kierkegaard and Confucius in the case of Zhuangzi. Specifically, it reveals a significant parallel between Hegel’s movement from Moralitat to Sittlichkeit and Confucius’ position on the central and irreducible role of (...) li (ritual or propriety) in morality. I will begin by briefly tracing the ‘social misfit’ critique as it is found in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and in the Zhuangzi. In Section 2, I will sketch Hegel’s argument for the indispensability and irreducibility of social norms (Sittlichkeit) for morality, and reflect on the implications of this move for the possibility of social criticism. Finally, I will argue that Confucius can be understood as articulating a vision of morality and of social criticism very close to Hegel’s. (shrink)