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  1. Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases: A Pragmatist Approach.Nate Jackson - 2016 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (1):237-259.
    I argue that John Dewey’s analysis of imagination enables an account of learning from imaginary cases consistent with Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. Moreover, this account provides a more robust account of learning from cases than Dancy’s own. Particularism is the position that there are no, or at most few, true moral principles, and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. On a particularist framework, one cannot infer from an imaginary case that because a feature has a particular moral (...)
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  • Habits and Mental Perspectives: Educating Moral Particularism.Nate Jackson - 2017 - The Pluralist 12 (2):27.
    Moral particularism, broadly understood, is the position that morality resists codification into a set of rules or principles.1 Jonathan Dancy, particularism's main contemporary proponent, maintains that there are few, if any, true moral principles, and moral reasoning and judgment do not require them. Instead, acts are justified by the salient features of particular situations, and moral reasoning requires attunement to these elements. In rejecting a rule-bound approach to morality, particularists deny pictures of moral education emphasizing knowledge and application of principles. (...)
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  • Comment on Nate Jackson’s “John Dewey and the Possibility of Moral Particularist Education”.James W. Mock - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):77-80.
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