Bolzano propôs uma teoria da verdade que se diferencia das restantes por defender que as proposições são objetivas (não são juízos nem frases) e, consequentemente, que também as proposições verdadeiras (e as falsas) são objetivas (não constituem a correspondência entre um juízo/uma frase e um facto objetivo nem uma qualquer relação entre juízos/frases). Para além disso, considero que propõe uma teoria metafísica da correspondência (à qual não adiro), de acordo com a qual a verdade consiste na correspondência entre uma proposição (...) objetiva e um facto. (shrink)

I argue that deflationary theories of truth reveal an important lesson for the broader theory of truth: although the notion of truthmaking has played an essential role in many traditional theories of truth, it can be separated from and survive the rejection of substantive theories of truth. I argue that many of the traditional substantive theories of truth are unified in defining truth in terms of the ontological grounds that are needed to account for truth. Deflationists reject the idea that (...) a theory of truth needs such metaphysical implications, but in so doing they need not rule out the possibility of developing an independently motivated theory of truthmaking. I argue that deflationists can and should embrace truthmaker theory, once it is shorn from its connection to the traditional project of defining truth. (shrink)

In recent decades, postmodernists and sociologists of science have argued that science is just one of many human activities with social and political aims -- comparable to, say, religion or art. They have questioned the objectivity of science, and whether it has any unique ability to find the truth. Not surprisingly, such claims have evoked a negative response from proponents of the traditional view of science; the debate between the two sides has been called the science wars. In the debate, (...) scientists have made few attempts to meet the postmodern critique on its own grounds, through serious reflection on the everyday practice of science. Yet that is the only way to understand the nature of science and the features that distinguish science from other activities. (shrink)

Searching for common ground in philosophy, science and theology, it seems to us that it would be reasonable to maintain the position of realistic pragmatism that Charles Sanders Peirce had called pragmaticism. In the pragmaticist manner, we typify the knowledge and select the types of knowledge that might be useful for understanding the problems that are of interest to us. We pose a question of how it would be possible to obtain practically useful information about reality, first from the perspective (...) of natural sciences, and then from that of theology; that is, to diversify the ways of knowledge and just maybe, to move toward a productive dialogue between science and religion. (shrink)

Truth matters for organization studies, but it has been neglected as a topic of research. Positivist scholars do not tend to question assumptions about the relationship between knowledge and the world, while critical theorists tend to view ‘truth’ as an outdated, metaphysical way to describe it. However, the pragmatic philosophical tradition of inquiry into truth has not yet received enough attention within organization studies. This essay presents a genealogical account of that tradition by conducting a close reading of texts by (...) C.S. Pierce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. Following this reading, we identify pragmatic truths that pertain to the qualitative v. quantitative, rigor v. relevance, and positivist v. critical tensions that currently animate our field. (shrink)