ZusammenfassungEs wird gezeigt, dass sich die Unterschiede zwischen der Quantenmechanik‐Interpretation von von Weizsäcker/Drieschner und der von Ludwig auf die jeweils unterschiedliche Beantwor‐tung der folgenden Fragen zurückführen lassen:–Was ist der Referent von Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Quantenmechanik?–Sind Gesamtheiten Mengen von Objekten?–Umfasst der Gültigkeitsbereich der Quantenmechanik auch die Messgeräte?

Classical relativistic physics assumes that spatially separated events cannot influence one another (“locality”) and that values may be assigned to quantities independently of whether or not they are actually measured (“realism”). These assumptions have consequences—the Bell inequalities—that are sometimes in disagreement with experiment and with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It has been argued that, even if realism is not assumed, the violation of the Bell inequalities implies nonlocality—and hence that radical changes are necessary in the foundations of physics. We (...) show that this conclusion does not follow unless the locality hypothesis is strengthened in an implausible manner. (shrink)

Bell’s theorem admits several interpretations or ‘solutions’, the standard interpretation being ‘indeterminism’, a next one ‘nonlocality’. In this article two further solutions are investigated, termed here ‘superdeterminism’ and ‘supercorrelation’. The former is especially interesting for philosophical reasons, if only because it is always rejected on the basis of extra-physical arguments. The latter, supercorrelation, will be studied here by investigating model systems that can mimic it, namely spin lattices. It is shown that in these systems the Bell inequality can be violated, (...) even if they are local according to usual definitions. Violation of the Bell inequality is retraced to violation of ‘measurement independence’. These results emphasize the importance of studying the premises of the Bell inequality in realistic systems. (shrink)

We want to consider anew the question, which is recurrent along the history of philosophy, of the relationship between rationality and mathematics, by inquiring to which extent the structuration of rationality, which ensures the unity of its function under a variety of forms (and even according to an evolution of these forms), could be considered as homeomorphic with that of mathematical thought, taken in its movement and made concrete in its theories. This idea, which is as old as philosophy itself, (...) although it has not been dominant, has still been present to some degree in the thought of modern science, in Descartes as well as in Kant, Poincaré or Einstein (and a few other scientists and philosophers). It has been often harshly questioned, notably in the contemporaneous period, due to the failure of the logistic programme, as well as to the variety of “empirical” knowledges, and, in a general way, to the character of knowledges that show them as transitory, evolutive and mind-built. However, the analysis of scientific thought through its inventive and creative processes leads to characterize this thought as a type of rational form whose configurations can be detailed rather precisely. In this work we shall propose, first, a quick sketch of some philosophical requirements for such a research programme, among which the need for an harmonization, and even a conciliation, between the notions of rational (or rationality), of intuitive grasp and of creative thought. Then we shall examine some processes of creative scientific thought bearing on the knowledge and the understanding of the world, distinct from mathematics although keeping tight relations with them. Contemporary physical theories are privileged witnesses in this respect, for in them the rational thought of phenomena makes an intrinsic use of mathematical thought, which contributes to the structuration of the formers and to the expression of their concepts (which entails the physical contents of the latter). The General Theory of Relativity and the Quantum Theory are exemplar to this, as they directly reveal what can be called the “drag of physical thought par the mathematical form”, which makes possible to overcome the limitations of the physical knowledge previously adquired. This process is tightly related to the modalities and to the stucture of the rational thought underlying it. This is what we would like to show. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p303. (shrink)

En esta tesis hacemos un análisis comparativo de las distintas interpretaciones de la mecánica bohmiana en relación con el realismo científico. En primer lugar discutimos si cabe encontrar una interpretación de la teoría que satisfaga el requisito de que toda entidad real existe en el espacio físico tridimensional. Luego, discutimos el desempeño de las distintas interpretaciones de la teoría en relación con el principio de fiabilidad de la medida. Finalmente, analizamos el argumento de las trayectorias surrealistas. De acuerdo con este (...) argumento, una interpretación realista de las trayectorias bohmianas es insostenible puesto que se dan situaciones en las que dichas trayectorias difieren de lo indicado por los detectores de camino. En relación con esta última cuestión derivamos unas condiciones precisas de ocurrencia de las trayectorias surrealistas y defendemos que, si bien es posible que las trayectorias bohmianas difieran de lo indicado por los detectores de camino, no se sigue de ello que una interpretación realista de las mismas sea insostenible. Puesto que siempre cabe encontrar una interpretación de la mecánica bohmiana que satisface los requisitos realistas discutidos, concluimos a favor del vigor realista de la teoría. Además, puesto que la satisfacción de dichos requisitos depende de la interpretación de la teoría considerada, defendemos que en mecánica bohmiana la cuestión de la interpretación es tan relevante como lo es en mecánica cuántica. (shrink)

The concept of contingency serves to bridge the doctrine of creation and natural science in Wolfhart Pannenberg's theology. My paper first analyzes the relation of creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua. Next I suggest three categories of contingency: global, local, and nomological. Under each category I assess Pannenberg's use of physics, cosmology, and philosophy of science. Although I agree with Pannenberg's emphasis on continuous creation and on the role of science in renewing the doctrine of creation, I argue for a (...) shift in the discussion from Pannenberg's topics to others, such as the anthropic principle, quantum physics, and thermodynamics. (shrink)

Fritjof Capra's The Tao of Physics, one of several popularizations paralleling Eastern mysticism and modern physics, is critiqued, demonstrating that Capra gives little attention to the differing philosophies of physics he employs, utilizing whatever interpretation suits his purposes, without prior justification. The same critique is applied and similar conclusions drawn, about some recent attempts at relating theology and physics. In contrast, we propose the possibility of maintaining a cogent relationship between these disciplines by employing theological hypotheses to account for aspects (...) of physics that are free from interpretive difficulties, such as the ability to create mathematical structures with extraordinary predictive success. (shrink)

(1997). Cartesian cut, Heisenberg cut, and the concept of complexity. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 333-355.

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) (...) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine. (shrink)

We describe a series of experimental analogies between fluid mechanics and quantum mechanics recently discovered by a team of physicists. These analogies arise in droplet systems guided by a surface wave. We argue that these experimental facts put ancient theoretical work by Madelung on the analogy between fluid and quantum mechanics into new light. After re-deriving Madelung’s result starting from two basic fluid mechanical equations, we discuss the relation with the de Broglie–Bohm theory. This allows to make a direct link (...) with the droplet experiments. It is argued that the fluid mechanical interpretation of quantum mechanics, if it can be extended to the general N-particle case, would have a considerable advantage over the Bohm interpretation: it could rid Bohm’s theory of its non-local character. (shrink)

Harrigan and Spekkens, introduced the influential notion of an ontological model of operational quantum theory. Ontological models can be either “epistemic” or “ontic.” According to the two scholars, Einstein would have been one of the first to propose an epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Pusey et al. showed that an epistemic interpretation of quantum theory is impossible, so implying that Einstein had been refuted. We discuss in detail Einstein’s arguments against the standard interpretation of QM, proving that there is a (...) misunderstanding in Harrigan and Spekkens’ attribution of an epistemic perspective to Einstein, whose point of view was actually statistical, but in a quasi-classical sense. (shrink)

In this work I argue for the existence of an ontological state in which no entity in it can be more basic than the others in such a state. This is used to provide conceptual justification for a method that is applied to obtain the Schr\"{o}dinger equation, the Klein-Gordon equation, and the Klein-Gordon equation for a particle in an electromagnetic field. Additionally, it is argued that the existence of such state is incompatible with indirect realism; and the discussion suggests that (...) a panexeperientialist view is a straightforward means to embrace it. (shrink)

A formulation by Einstein of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen incompleteness argument found in his scientific manuscripts is presented and briefly commented on. It is the only known version in which Einstein discussed the argument for spin observables. The manuscript dates, in all probability, from late 1954 or early 1955 and hence also represents Einstein's latest version of the incompleteness argument and one of his last statements on quantum theory in general. A puzzling formulation raises the question of Einstein's interpretation of space quantization (...) and the non-classical spin degree of freedom. (shrink)

The publication of the EPR paper in 1935 prompted Heisenberg to draft a manuscript on the question of the completability of quantum mechanics. We give here the English translation of this manuscript with a brief introduction and bibliography.

Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant’s defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This article argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical (unobservable) objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck’s constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the observables of quantum mechanics (...) as empirically real even though they are transcendentally (i.e., preobservationally) ideal.El indeterminismo cuántico parece incompatible con la defensa de la causalidad que hace Kant en su Segunda Analogía. La interpretación de Copenhague de la mecánica cuántica también considera a esta teoría como evidencia a favor del antirrealismo. Este artículo defiende que la ley (trascendental) de la causalidadse aplica solamente al mundo en tanto que observable, y no a objetos hipotéticos (inobservables) como los quarks, detectables solo mediante aceleradores de altas energías. Tomar la constante de Planck y la velocidad de la luz como límites inferior y superior de la observabilidad nos ofrece un modo de interpretar losobservables de la mecánica cuántica como empíricamente reales, incluso aunque estos sean trascendentalmente, es decir, preobservacionalmente, ideales. (shrink)

Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant’s defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This first article of a two-part series argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck’s constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the (...) observables of quantum mechanics as empirically real even though they are transcendentally ideal. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE Se argumenta acerca de la necesidad de reubicar a la epistemología en el esquema filosófico tradicional. De la consideración de paradojas que la teoría cuántica impone –relativas a la necesidad de un cambio de lógica– y siguiendo los planteos wittgenstenianos acerca de la fundamentación de las ciencias formales, del status y tipo de necesidad que sus proposiciones establecen mostramos cómo la epistemología emerge del lado de la filosofía práctica. Ética y política (...) que dejan atrás su lugar de exterior complementario al núcleo duro de la ciencia implicando una inversión de la relación tradicional entre las ciencias naturales y las sociales. (shrink)

The conceptual framework of behaviorism is reconstructed in a logical scheme rather than along chronological lines. The resulting reconstruction is faithful to the history of behaviorism and yet meets the contemporary challenges arising from cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and philosophy. In this reconstruction, the fundamental premise is that psychology is to be a natural science, and the major corollaries are that psychology is to be objective and empirical. To a great extent, the reconstruction of behaviorism is an elaboration of behaviorist views (...) of what it is for a science to be objective and empirical. The reconstruction examines and evaluates behaviorist positions on observation and the rejection of introspection, the behavioral data language, theory construction, stimulus-response psychology, the organization of behavior, complex processes, agency, and the interpretation of mentalistic language. The resulting reconstruction shows behaviorism to be a pragmatic psychological version of positivism based on a behavioral epistemology. (shrink)

Since the very begining of quantum theory there started a debate on the proper role of space and time in it. Some authors assumed that space and time have their own algebraic operators. On that basis they supposed that quantum particles had “coordinates of position”, even though those coordinates were not possible to determine with infinite precision. Furthermore, time in quantum physics was taken to be on an equal foot, by means of a so-called “Heisenberg’s fourth relation of indeterminacy” concerning (...) time and energy. In this paper, the proper role of space and time in the core of non-relativistic quantum phsysics is analyzed. We will find that, rigorously, that relation for time and energy shows a different root. For the role of space, it will be discussed that there is no “coordinate of position” in the conceptual structure of quantum physics because quantum particles are not point-like objects. (shrink)

This paper analyses the early history of David Bohm’s mechanics from the perspective of Ludwik Fleck’s thought-collectives and shows how the thought-style of the scientific community limits the possible modes of thinking and what new possibilities for the construction of a new theory arise if these limits are removed.

An adequate conjunction-implication pair is given for complete orthomodular lattices. The resulting conjunction is noncommutative in nature. We use the well-known lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, to give physical meaning to the given lattice operation.

The main interpretations of the quantum-mechanical wave function are presented emphasizing how they can be divided into two ensembles: The ones that deny and the other ones that attribute a form of reality to quantum waves. It is also shown why these waves cannot be classical and must be submitted to the restriction of the complementarity principle. Applying the concept of smooth complementarity, it is shown that there can be no reason to attribute reality only to the events and not (...) to the wave or to the initial state of a given system. Thereafter, an experiment proposed by the authors is presented, where it is shown that the wave-like behaviour allows predictions that are not allowed on the grounds of a particle-like behaviour. In conclusion, we upheld that quantum waves must be real even if they do not belong to the same ontological level of events, which connected with particle detections. (shrink)

We show that in quantum logic of closed subspaces of Hilbert space one cannot substitute quantum operations for classical (standard Hilbert space) ones and treat them as primitive operations. We consider two possible ways of such a substitution and arrive at operation algebras that are not lattices what proves the claim. We devise algorithms and programs which write down any two-variable expression in an orthomodular lattice by means of classical and quantum operations in an identical form. Our results show that (...) lattice structure and classical operations uniquely determine quantum logic underlying Hilbert space. As a consequence of our result, recent proposals for a deduction theorem with quantum operations in an orthomodular lattice as well as a, substitution of quantum operations for the usual standard Hilbert space ones in quantum logic prove to be misleading. Quantum computer quantum logic is also discussed. (shrink)

I attempt to develop further the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Einstein and developed by Popper, Ballentine, etc. Two ideas are proposed in the present paper. One is to interpret momentum as a property of an ensemble of similarly prepared systems which is not satisfied by any one member of the ensemble of systems. Momentum is regarded as a statistical parameter like temperature in statistical mechanics. The other is the holistic assumption that a probability distribution is determined as (...) a whole as most likely to be realized. This is the same as the chief assumption in statistical mechanics, and maximum likelihood in classical statistics. These ideas enable us to understand statistically (1) the formalism of quantum mechanics, (2) Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, and (3) the origin of quantum equations. They also explain violation of Bell's inequality and the interference of probabilities. (shrink)

The relativistic conception of space and time is challenged by the quantum nature of physical observables. It has been known for a long time that Poincare symmetry of field theory can be extended to the larger conformal symmetry. We use these symmetries to define quantum observables associated with positions in space-time, in the spirit of Einstein theory of relativity. This conception of localization may be applied to massive as well as massless fields. Localization observables are defined as to obey Lorentz (...) covariant commutation relations and in particular include a time observable conjugated to energy. While position components do not commute in the presence of a nonvanishing spin, they still satisfy quantum relations which generalize the differential laws of classical relativity. We also give of these observables a representation in terms of canonical spatial positions, canonical spin components, and a proper time operator conjugated to mass. These results plead for a new representation not only of space-time localization but also of motion. (shrink)

We assume, in the first place, that two kinds of processes occur in nature: the strictly continuous and causal ones, which are governed by the Schrödinger equation and those implying discontinuities, which are ruled by probability laws. In the second place, we adopt a postulate ensuring the statistical sense of conservation laws. These hypotheses allow us to state a rule telling, in principle, in which situations and to which vectors the system's state can collapse, and which are the corresponding probabilities. (...) The way our proposed approach works is illustrated with some examples and with the analysis of the measurement problem. We obtain the exponential decay law. A comparison with other attempts to solve the measurement problem is performed. (shrink)

The standard model of the quantum theory of measurement is based on an interaction Hamiltonian in which the observable to be measured is multiplied by some observable of a probe system. This simple Ansatz has proved extremely fruitful in the development of the foundations of quantum mechanics. While the ensuing type of models has often been argued to be rather artificial, recent advances in quantum optics have demonstrated their principal and practical feasibility. A brief historical review of the standard model (...) together with an outline of its virtues and limitations are presented as an illustration of the mutual inspiration that has always taken place between foundational and experimental research in quantum physics. (shrink)

We further develop a recent new proof (by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger—GHZ) that local deterministic hidden-variable theories are inconsistent with certain strict correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. First, we generalize GHZ's proof so that it applies to factorable stochastic theories, theories in which apparatus hidden variables are causally relevant to measurement results, and theories in which the hidden variables evolve indeterministically prior to the particle-apparatus interactions. Then we adopt a more general measure-theoretic approach which requires that GHZ's argument be modified (...) in order to produce a valid proof. Finally, we motivate our more general proof's assumptions in a somewhat different way from previous authors in order to strengthen the implications of our proof as much as possible. After developing GHZ's proof along these lines, we then consider the analogue, for our proof, of Bohr's reply to the EPR argument, and conclude (pace GHZ) that in at least one respect (viz. that of most concern to Bohr) the proof is no more powerful than Bell's. Nevertheless, we point out some new advantages of our proof over Bell's, and over other algebraic proofs of nonlocality. And we conclude by giving a modified version of our proof that, like Bell's, does not rely on experimentally unrealizable strict correlations, but still leads to a testable “quasi-algebraic” locality inequality.“... to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics.”J. S. Bell. (shrink)

The uncertainty relation in quantum mechanics has been explicated sometimes as a statistical relation and at other times as a relation concerning precision of simultaneous measurements. In the present paper, taking the indefiniteness of individual experiments as represented by diameters of Borel sets in projection-valued measure, we mathematically distinguish four expressions, two statistical and two concerning simultaneous measurements, of the uncertainty relation, study their interrelations, and prove that they are nonequivalent to each other and to the eigenvector condition (EV) in (...) infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. (shrink)

A mechanism is presented by which a classical system could be described by the laws of quantum theory. Conflict with von Neumann's no-go theorem is avoided. Experimental predictions are made.

Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...) material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches. (shrink)

O experimento de Afshar foi proposto recentemente como sendo uma violação do princípio de complementaridade. Reconhecendo a novidade trazida pelo experimento, argumentamos que ele permite um refinamento de tal princípio, a partir do estabelecimento de dois pontos: (1) a possibilidade de modificar o "tipo" de fenômeno (onda ou partícula) sem alterar o estado quântico, e (2) a constatação de que o tipo de fenômeno, associado a um quantum detectado, refere-se a um trecho determinado percorrido pelo objeto quântico. O primeiro ponto (...) é explorado em interferômetros de Mach-Zehnder, com dispositivos de polarização e na montagem dupla de Unruh. O segundo ponto salienta que um fenômeno pode ser corpuscular com respeito a uma região e ondulatório com respeito a outra, estando a novidade de Afshar na proposta de uma maneira de constatar ambos simultaneamente. A restrição (1) acaba tendo um efeito desprezível no experimento de Afshar. Afshar's experiment was recently proposed as a violation of the principle of complementarity. Acknowledging the novelty brought by the experiment, we argue that it allows a refinement of this principle, with the establishment of two points: (1) the possibility of modifying the "type" of phenomenon (wave or particle) without changing the quantum-mechanical state, and (2) the recognition that the type of phenomenon, associated to a detected quantum, refers to a specific region traversed by the quantum object. The first point is explored in Mach-Zehnder interferometers, with polarization devices and in Unruh's double setup. The second point emphasizes that a phenomenon can be corpuscular with respect one region and undulatory with respect to another. Afshar's originality lies in his proposal of a way of ascertaining both simultaneously. Restriction (1) turns out having a negligible effect in Afshar's experiment. (shrink)

The principle of bivalence is the assertion that every statement is either true or else false. Its legal analog, however, must be formulated relative to particular legal systems and in terms of validity rather than truth. It asserts that every statement of law that can be formulated in the vocabulary of a given legal system is valid or else invalid in that system. A line of New York cases is traced, beginning with Thomas v. Winchester . This case, which involved (...) a poison mislabeled as a medicine, established an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser. The court made an exception because a poison is an “imminently dangerous” thing. How far may this exception be applied to other fact‐situations? Some subsequent cases are examined, and it is considered whether there is no correct answer in these instances and, more dramatically, whether more than one correct answer is tenable. In either event the legal analog of bivalence would seem to fail. (shrink)

Two revolutionary concepts of the twentieth century—continental drift and the existence of superdense stars and black holes—had extended histories which ran in curious parallel for five decades. Between the wars each encountered a fierce and emotionally charged resistance which may have had a common psychological root. Each threatened man's instinctive faith in the permanence of matter.

In what follows, I examine three main points which may help us to understand the deep nature of Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics. After having played a fundamental pioneer role in the birth of quantum physics, Einstein was, as is well known, far less enthusiastic about its constitution as a quantum mechanics and, since 1927, he constantly argued against the pretention of its founders and proponents to have settled a definitive and complete theory. I emphasize first the importance of the (...) philosophical climate, which was dominated by the Copenhagen orthodoxy and Bohr's idea of complementarity: What Einstein was primarily reluctant to was to accept the fundamental character of quantum mechanics as such, and to modify for it the basic principles of knowledge. I thus stress the main lines of Einstein's own programme in respect to quantum physics, which is to be considered in relation to his other contemporary attempts and achievements. Finally, I show how Einstein's arguments, when dealing with his objections, have been fruitful and some of them still worthy, with regard to recent developments concerning local nonseparability as well as concerning the problems of completeness and accomplishment of quantum theory. (shrink)

The validity of the conclusion to the nonlocality of quantum mechanics, accepted widely today as the only reasonable solution to the EPR and Bell issues, is questioned and criticized. Arguments are presented which remove the compelling character of this conclusion and make clear that it is not the most obvious solution. Alternative solutions are developed which are free of the contradictions related with the nonlocality conclusion. Firstly, the dependence on the adopted interpretation is shown, with the conclusion that the alleged (...) nonlocality property of the quantum formalism may have been reached on the basis of an interpretation that is unnecessarily restrictive. Secondly, by extending the conventional quantum formalism along the lines of Ludwig and Davies it is shown that the Bell problem may be related to complementarity rather than to nonlocality. Finally, the dependence on counterfactual reasoning is critically examined. It appears that locality on the quantum level may still be retained provided one accepts a newly proposed principle of nonreproducibility at the individual quantum level as an alternative of quantum nonlocality. It is concluded that the locality principle can retain its general validity, in full conformity with all experimental data. (shrink)

We consider the compatibility of the Wootters and Zurek development of information theory as applied to the two-slit experiment with the principle of complementarity. We also consider the limitations of aspects of Wootters and Zurek's analysis, and, independently of complementarity, the extent to which Wootters and Zurek's information theory can be considered a fundamental interpretation of the quantum theory (as applied to particle-wave duality). The question of particle-wave uncertainty relations will also be taken up.