The Black-Scholes model of options pricing establishes a theoretical relationship between the “fair” price of an option and other parameters characterizing the option and prevailing market conditions. Here I discuss a common application of the model with the following striking feature: the output of analysis apparently contradicts one of the core assumptions of the model on which the analysis is based. I will present several attitudes one might take toward this situation and argue that it reveals ways in which a (...) “broken” model can nonetheless provide useful information. (shrink)

Intersectionality theory explores the special sorts of disadvantage that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. One significant methodological problem for the quantitative study of intersectionality is the difficulty of acquiring data sets large enough to produce significant results when one is looking for intersectional effects. For this reason, we argue, simulation methods may be particularly useful to this branch of theorizing because they can generate precise predictions and causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and can (...) thus guide future empirical work. We illustrate this point through models which show that intersectional oppression can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of preferences and abilities. The conditions necessary to derive such disadvantage are relatively minimal. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases. (shrink)

Knowledge transfer across different contexts has become an increasingly prevalent feature of current science. As such, it is a relevant topic also for history and philosophy of science. This special issue presents a set of papers that study knowledge transfer in various disciplines. The contributions approach the topic from either an integrated history and philosophy of science perspective, 2) a systematic philosophical perspective, or 3) a historical perspective. This overview article is organized in three sections. The introduction provides some background (...) and context of the topic. The second section specifies the three components of knowledge transfer, i.e., knowledge, context, and the transfer process. It motivates our take on this topic and then outlines the central ideas of each paper. The third section reflects on the kinds of methods used to study processes of knowledge transfer. The article concludes by highlighting some of the features of such processes, some of the main challenges and obstacles that those processes involve, and possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological (...) theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article. (shrink)

The omnipresence of the same basic equations, function forms, algorithms, and quantitative methods is one of the most spectacular characteristics of contemporary modeling practice. Recently, the emergence of the discussion of templates and template transfer has addressed this striking cross-disciplinary reach of certain mathematical forms and computational algorithms. In this paper, we develop a notion of a model template, consisting of its mathematical structure, ontology, prototypical properties and behaviors, focal conceptualizations, and the paradigmatic questions it addresses. We apply this notion (...) to three widely disseminated and powerful model templates: the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses, scale-free networks, and the Kuramoto model of synchronization. We argue that what appears to be an interdisciplinary model transfer between different domains turns out, from a broader perspective, to be the application of transdisciplinary model templates across a multitude of domains. We also point out a further feature of template-based modeling that so far has not been discussed: template entanglement. Such entanglement enhances and makes manifest the conceptual side of model templates. (shrink)

According to the free energy principle, life is an “inevitable and emergent property of any random dynamical system at non-equilibrium steady state that possesses a Markov blanket” :20130475, 2013). Formulating a principle for the life sciences in terms of concepts from statistical physics, such as random dynamical system, non-equilibrium steady state and ergodicity, places substantial constraints on the theoretical and empirical study of biological systems. Thus far, however, the physics foundations of the free energy principle have received hardly any attention. (...) Here, we start to fill this gap and analyse some of the challenges raised by applications of statistical physics for modelling biological targets. Based on our analysis, we conclude that model-building grounded in the free energy principle exacerbates a trade-off between generality and realism, because of a fundamental mismatch between its physics assumptions and the properties of actual biological targets. (shrink)

We introduce ‘model migration’ as a species of cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer whereby the representational function of a model is radically changed to allow application to a new disciplinary context. Controversies and confusions that often derive from this phenomenon will be illustrated in the context of econophysics and phylogeographic linguistics. Migration can be usefully contrasted with concept of ‘imperialism’, that has been influentially discussed in the context of geographical economics. In particular, imperialism, unlike migration, relies upon extension of the original model (...) via an expansion of the domain of phenomena it is taken to adequately described. The success of imperialism thus requires expansion of the justificatory sanctioning of the original idealising assumptions to a new disciplinary context. Contrastingly, successful migration involves the radical representational re-interpretation of the original model, rather than its extension. Migration thus requires ‘re-sanctioning’ of new ‘counterpart idealisations’ to allow application to an entirely different class of phenomena. Whereas legitimate scientific imperialism should be based on the pursuit of some form of ontological unification, no such requirement is need to legitimate the practice of model migration. The distinction between migration and imperialism will thus be shown to have significant normative as well as descriptive value. (shrink)

A conspicuous feature of contemporary modelling practices is the use of the same mathematical forms and modelling methods across different scientific domains. This model transfer raises many philosophical questions concerning, for example, the exact object of transfer, the relationship between the model and the target domain, the specific challenges such transfer confronts, and the ways in which model transfer relates to scientific progress. While the interest in studying model transfer has increased among philosophers of science in recent years, the phenomenon (...) has not yet received its due attention. The literature is scattered and much of it has addressed questions around the factors that might explain model transfer, such as whether the different target phenomena to which a model is applied eventually prove to be structurally and dynamically similar, or whether they have to share more fundamental ontological features that explain the interdisciplinary success of distinct models. This chapter surveys the existing literature on model transfer with the main goal of highlighting the main findings of existing discussions and pointing out open issues whose discussion would improve our understanding of this highly relevant phenomenon in science. (shrink)

Recent case studies have revealed that purely formal analogies have been successfully used as a heuristic in physics. This is at odds with most general philosophical accounts of analogies, which require analogies to be physical in order to be justifiably used. The main goal of this paper is to supply a philosophical account that justifies the use of purely formal analogies in physics. Using Bartha’s (2010) articulation model as a starting point, I offer precise definitions of formal and physical analogies (...) and propose a new submodel of analogical reasoning that accounts for the successful use of purely formal analogies in the development of renormalization group methods for use in particle physics in the early 1970’s (Fraser 2020). Two distinctive features of this new applied mathematics submodel for analogical reasoning are that the conclusion of the argument from analogy includes both an entire model (and not only a hypothesis or a prediction) and the construction procedure for this model. A third important difference from arguments from physical analogy is that only the prima facie plausibility of the conclusion is established, and not stronger types of plausibility associated with confirmation. The use of purely formal analogies is justified because they are suited to supporting conclusions of this sort. Formulating a general philosophical account of analogies that covers purely formal analogies also serves two additional purposes: (1) to highlight the features of this case that are novel in the context of examples of analogies traditionally considered by philosophers and (2) to establish that physicists should not automatically dismiss purely formal analogies when evaluating heuristics for the development of new models. (shrink)