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Divine Activity and Human Life

Rhizomata 5 (2):210-238 (2017)

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  1. Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom.Bryan C. Reece - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle thinks that happiness is an activity---it consists in doing something---rather than a feeling. It is the best activity of which humans are capable and is spread out over the course of a life. But what kind of activity is it? Some of his remarks indicate that it is a single best kind of activity, intellectual contemplation. Other evidence suggests that it is an overarching activity that has various virtuous activities, ethical and intellectual, as parts. At stake are questions about (...)
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  • (1 other version)Scholarship on Aristotle's Ethical and Political Philosophy (2011-2020).Thornton Lockwood - manuscript
    In anticipation of updating annotated bibliographies on Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics for Oxford Bibliography Online, I have sought to keep a running tabulation of all books, edited collections, translations, and journal articles which are primarily devoted to Aristotle’s ethical and political writings (including their historical reception but excluding neo–Aristotelian virtue ethics). In general, criteria for inclusion in this bibliography are that the work be: (1) publication in a peer–reviewed or academic/university press between 2011–2020; (2) “substantially” devoted to one of Aristotle’s (...)
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  • Overstraining Human Nature in the Nicomachean Ethics.Doug Reed - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (1):45-67.
    In this paper, I investigate Aristotle’s claim in 'Nicomachean Ethics' III.1 about situations that “overstrain human nature.” By setting out and answering several interpretative questions about such situations, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of this passage. I argue that in (at least some of) these cases, the agent voluntarily does something wrong, even though there is a right action available. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle would think it is possible for a rare agent to perform the right action in (at (...)
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