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Doug Reed
University of Rhode Island
  1.  55
    Deficient Virtue in the 'Phaedo'.Doug Reed - forthcoming - Classical Quarterly.
    In this paper I investigate two passages in the 'Phaedo' where Socrates contrasts the full virtue of the philosopher with a sort deficient virtue. I argue that despite the apparently different appraisals Socrates offers, there is a single form of deficient virtue in the dialogue, one based on the calculation of bodily pleasures and pains. In the course of making my argument, I offer a detailed account of social virtue, a condition Plato mentions in several dialogues. Finally, I end by (...)
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  2. Degrees of Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics.Doug Reed - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):91-112.
    I argue that Aristotle believes that virtue comes in degrees. After dispatching with initial concerns for the view, I argue that we should accept it because Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as the highest degree of virtue. I support this interpretation of heroic virtue by considering and rejecting alternative readings, then showing that heroic virtue characterized as the highest degree of virtue is consistent with the doctrine of the mean.
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  3.  39
    The Objects of Stoic Eupatheiai.Doug Reed - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (3):195-212.
    The Stoics claim that the sage is free from emotions, experiencing instead εὐπάθειαι (‘good feelings’). It is, however, unclear whether the sage experiences εὐπάθειαι about virtue/vice only, indifferents only, or both. Here, I argue that εὐπάθειαι are exclusively about virtue/vice by showing that this reading alone accommodates the Stoic claim that there is not a εὐπάθειαι corresponding to emotional pain. I close by considering the consequences of this view for the coherence and viability of Stoic ethics.
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