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  1. Science, God and Ockham’s razor.David H. Glass - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1145-1161.
    In discussions about the existence of God, it is sometimes claimed that the progress of science has removed the need for God. This paper uses a Bayesian analysis of Ockham’s razor to formulate and evaluate this argument, which is referred to as the science explains away God argument. Four different strategies for responding to this argument are presented and evaluated. It is argued that one of these strategies highlights how difficult it is to show that the conditions for applying Ockham’s (...)
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  • Atheism and epistemic justification.J. Angelo Corlett & Josh Cangelosi - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):91-106.
    In a recent article in this journal, Andrew Johnson seeks to defend the “New Atheism” against several objections. We provide a philosophical assessment of his defense of contemporary atheistic arguments that are said to amount to bifurcation fallacies. This point of discussion leads to our critical discussion of the presumption of atheism and the epistemic justification of atheism.
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  • New Atheism and its critics.Whitley Kaufman - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12560.
    What is the significance of the New Atheist movement? This essay argues that it has hindered rather than advanced the philosophical debate, presenting a one‐sided caricature of religion rather than serious intellectual engagement with the topic.
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  • Purism: An Ontological Proof for The Impossibility of God.* Primus - 2020 - Secular Studies 2 (2):160-178.
    This article presents an ontological proof that God is impossible.I define an ‘impossibility’ as a condition which is inconceivable due to its a priori characteristics (e.g. a ‘square circle’). Accordingly, said conditions will not ever become conceivable, as they could in instances of a posteriori inconceivability (e.g. the notion that someone could touch a star without being burned). As the basis of this argument, I refer to an a priori observation (Primus, 2019) regarding our inability to imagine inconsistency (difference) within (...)
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