I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism , covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some thoughts (...) on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm. (shrink)

In this article, I summarise the ontological theory of informational privacy (an approach based on information ethics) and then discuss four types of interesting challenges confronting any theory of informational privacy: (1) parochial ontologies and non-Western approaches to informational privacy; (2) individualism and the anthropology of informational privacy; (3) the scope and limits of informational privacy; and (4) public, passive and active informational privacy. I argue that the ontological theory of informational privacy can cope with such challenges fairly successfully. In (...) the conclusion, I discuss some of the work that lies ahead. (shrink)

KDD (Knowledge Discovery in Databases) confronts us withphenomena that can intuitively be grasped as highly problematic, but arenevertheless difficult to understand and articulate. Many of theseproblems have to do with what I call the ``deindividualization of theperson'': a tendency of judging and treating persons on the basis ofgroup characteristics instead of on their own individual characteristicsand merits. This tendency will be one of the consequences of theproduction and use of group profiles with the help of KDD. Currentprivacy law and regulations, (...) as well as current ethical theoryconcerning privacy, start from too narrow a definition of ``personaldata'' to capture these problems. In this paper, I introduce the notionof ``categorical privacy'' as a starting point for a possible remedy forthe failures of the current conceptions of privacy. I discuss some waysin which the problems relating to group profiles definitely cannot besolved and I suggest a possible way out of these problems. Finally, Isuggest that it may take us a step forward if we would begin to questionthe predominance of privacy norms in the social debate on informationtechnologies and if we would be prepared to introduce normativeprinciples other than privacy rules for the assessment of newinformation technologies. If we do not succeed in articulating theproblems relating to KDD clearly, one day we may find ourselves in asituation where KDD appears to have undermined the methodic andnormative individualism which pervades the mainstream of morality andmoral theory. (shrink)

Revelations of personal matters often have negative consequences for social-media users. These consequences trigger frequent warnings, practical rather than moral in nature, that social-media users should consider carefully what they reveal about themselves since their revelations might cause them various difficulties in the future. I set aside such practical considerations and argue that social-media users have a moral obligation to maintain their own privacy that is rooted in the duty to self-censor. Although Anita L. Allen provides a paternalist justification of (...) the duty that supports my position that social-media users are obligated to self-censor what they reveal about themselves, I justify the obligation through considerations that are more palatable to liberals than is paternalism. I accomplish this by arguing that the failure to self-censor often creates for others undue burdens that individuals are obligated morally not to create. In particular, social-media revelations often create undue burdens for those, such as employers and university personnel, who are obligated morally to respect individuals’ privacy in their decision-making processes. I also demonstrate that this argument is not for a broad duty to self-censor, but, rather, for a narrow duty that applies to particular circumstances such as certain uses of social media. (shrink)