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  1. Why Naturalize Consciousness?Wayne Wright - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.
    This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti- naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the (...)
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  • Explanation and the Hard Problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.
    This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a (...)
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  • Naturalism and the Philosophy of Colour Ontology and Perception.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (2).
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  • Perception, Color, and Realism.Wayne Wright - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
    One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color (...)
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  • The Individual Variability Problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
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  • Précis of Outside Color.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):215-222.
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  • Color Realism: True or Not?Z. G. ma - 2017 - Asian Research Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 4 (4):01-05.
    Color realism refers to that things are colored, or colors are real. Although the view goes in a minority opinion, Byrne & Hilbert defend it based on the physical properties of color and the peculiarly assumed hue-magnitudes. However, hues are mind-dependent and cannot be used as a measure of the physical properties of things. As a result, the defense fails to justify the proposition of color realism.
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  • Editorial for Minds and Machines Special Issue on Philosophy of Colour.M. Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):123-132.
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  • Constancy, Categories and Bayes: A New Approach to Representational Theories of Color Constancy.Peter Bradley - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):601 – 627.
    Philosophers have long sought to explain perceptual constancy—the fact that objects appear to remain the same color, size and shape despite changes in the illumination condition, perspective and the relative distance—in terms of a mechanism that actively categorizes variable stimuli under the same pre-formed conceptual categories. Contemporary representationalists, on the other hand, explain perceptual constancy in terms of a modular mechanism that automatically discounts variation in the visual field to represent the stable properties of objects. In this paper I argue (...)
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