In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain circumstances (...) certain kinds of accommodation. They must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person's convictions of conscience, which are strong ethical commitments upon which depends the moral integrity of those having such convictions. I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. Finally, against the objection that such a view risks leading to the proliferation of demands for accommodation, I maintain that a deliberative approach to religious accommodation is in a good position to put serious hurdles in the path of unreasonable demands. (shrink)

abstract The most well‐known liberal‐egalitarian defence of cultural rights, provided by Will Kymlicka, presents culture as a primary good, and thus a resource that ought to be distributed according to some fair egalitarian criteria. Kymlicka relies on the intuition that inequalities between persons that are the result of brute luck rather than personal choice are unjust in making the case for various multicultural rights. This article makes two main claims. First, the standard luck egalitarian intuition on which Kymlicka's argument relies (...) cannot justify what he calls ‘polyethnic rights,’ in particular cultural and religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Second, I argue that such exemptions are justifiable by appealing to the public value of fair equality of opportunity, properly construed. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical engagement with Cécile Laborde’s book, Liberalism’s Religion. It elaborates several objections to Laborde’s account of religious accommodations, and sketches an alternative approach.

Egalitarian theories of religious freedom deny that religion is entitled to special treatment in law above and beyond that granted to comparable beliefs and practices. The most detailed and influential defense of such an approach is Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager's Religious Freedom and the Constitution (2007). In this essay I develop, elucidate, and show the limits of the strategy adopted by Eisgruber and Sager. The strategy requires that religion be analogized with other beliefs and practices according to a robust (...) metric of comparison. I argue that Eisgruber and Sager fail to develop a consistent and coherent metric and I further suggest that this failure is symptomatic of the broader difficulty encountered by liberal theory in fitting the concept of religious freedom into a broadly egalitarian framework. (shrink)

Issues of religious toleration might be thought dead and advocacy of religious toleration a pointless exercise in preaching to the converted, at least in most contemporary European societies. This paper challenges that view. It does so principally by focusing on issues of religious accommodation as these arise in contemporary multi-faith societies. Drawing on the cases of exemption, Article 9 of the ECHR, and law governing indirect religious discrimination, it argues that issues and instances of accommodation are issues and instances of (...) toleration. Special attention is given to issues that arise when the claims of religious belief conflict with those of other legally protected characteristics, especially sexual orientation. The paper uses a concept of toleration appropriate to a liberal democratic political order—one that replaces the ‘vertical’ ruler-to-subject model of toleration that suited early modern monarchies with a ‘horizontal’ citizen-to-citizen model appropriate to a political order that aims to uphold an ideal of toleration rather than itself extend toleration to those whose lives it regulates. (shrink)

The decision of the German regional court in Cologne on 26 June 2012 to prohibit the circumcision of minors is important insofar as it recognises the qualitative similarities between the practice and other prohibited invasive rites, such as female genital cutting. However, recognition of similarity poses serious questions with regard to liberal public policy, specifically with regard to the exceptionalist treatment demanded by certain circumcising groups. In this paper, I seek to advance egalitarian means of dealing with invasive rites which (...) take seriously cultural diversity, minimise harm and place responsibility for the burdens and consequences of beliefs upon those who promote practices. (shrink)

Work is something with which most people have to engage. For many of us, it is also something towards which we feel ambivalent or worse. In this paper, I argue for the need to think about the meaning of this ambivalence when discussing the issue of state neutrality and the justification of state’s decisions as they pertain to the economy. Where the kinds of work some people have to perform issue in costs extensive enough to undermine their integrity, the neutrality (...) of a state’s decision is insufficient justification. In these circumstances, states must find ways to grant such workers an exemption, allowing them to renegotiate the extent and quality of the work they do. I examine unconditional basic income as a means of fulfilling this function. (shrink)

Work is something with which most people have to engage. For many of us, it is also something towards which we feel ambivalent or worse. In this paper, I argue for the need to think about the meaning of this ambivalence when discussing the issue of state neutrality and the justification of state’s decisions as they pertain to the economy. Where the kinds of work some people have to perform issue in costs extensive enough to undermine their integrity, the neutrality (...) of a state’s decision is insufficient justification. In these circumstances, states must find ways to grant such workers an exemption, allowing them to renegotiate the extent and quality of the work they do. I examine unconditional basic income as a means of fulfilling this function. (shrink)

This review article assesses the usefulness of two substantial recent books on religion by liberal political philosophers, Cécile Laborde and Aurélia Bardon, Religion in Liberal Political Philosophy, and Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion. It opens by situating these books against the landscape of UK-based work on the place of public religion in liberal democracy by both liberal political philosophers and Christian political theologians. Noting the relative paucity—by comparison with those from North America—of contributions on the theme from both quarters, it welcomes (...) these books as providing important clarifications for political theologians of how many of the precise tensions between religion and liberal democracy might be better understood and how debate between the two disciplines might thereby be enhanced. (shrink)