The aim of this article is to consider the prospects of a liberal conception of religious freedom in some Muslim-majority states. Part I offers a brief sketch of three approaches to religious freedom that inform my view. Part II then presents a liberal framework for religious toleration that draws ideas from Rainer Forst’s Toleration in Conflict, as well as some perennial themes in classical liberal thought. I briefly examine three case studies in Part III: the Turkish Republic; the Arab Spring (...) states; and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. This is followed by a short conclusion. (shrink)

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We (...) believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration. (shrink)

With some qualifications, this article endorses Brian Leiter’s argument that religious accommodation should not shift burdens from believers to non-believers. It argues that religious believers should take responsibility for their beliefs and for meeting the demands of their beliefs. It then examines the implications of that argument for British law on indirect discrimination as it relates to religion or belief: burden-shifting from believers to employers and providers of goods and services should be deemed acceptable only insofar as the burden incurred (...) by the employer or provider is ‘insignificant’. Legal exemptions should satisfy a similar test. Why should there be religious accommodation at all, even if it entails no significant burden-shifting? The author agrees with Leiter in finding the most plausible answer in the claims of conscience rather than in general theories of equality or features special to religion. Those claims can reasonably be made in respect of liberty of conscience but also when conscience is merely disadvantaged. (shrink)

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We (...) believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration. (shrink)

This article offers a normative analysis of the state of religious accommodation law in the UK. It identifies five ‘normative gaps’ in the law where the legal discussion could benefit by employing the analytical lens of political theory. These gaps concern (i) what sorts of religious (or non-religious) beliefs should enjoy protected status; (ii) how the law should address issues of individual choice and responsibility; (iii) whether there is a genuine distinction between manifesting and being motivated by one’s beliefs; (iv) (...) what sorts of interests count against accommodation claims; and (v) the relationship between human rights and discrimination law, the two pillars of religious accommodation law in the UK. The first half of the article sets out these issues, while the second half offers some preliminary conclusions and ways of resolving them. The Conclusion traces the contours of a satisfactory theory of religious accommodation law. (shrink)