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The program put forward in von Wright's last works defines deontic logic as ``a study of conditions which must be satisfied in rational normgiving activity'' and thus introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics. In this paper a formal explication for von Wright's program is proposed within the framework of settheoretic approach and extended to a twosets model which allows for the separate treatment of obligationnorms and permission norms. The three translation functions connecting the language of deontic logic with the language (...) 

The ambition of the paper is to provide a solution to the problem posed by Von Wright (1999): how is it possible that the two actions, one of producing P and the other of preventing P can have different deontic status, the former being obligatory and the latter being forbidden. The solution for the problem is sought for by an investigation into connections between imperative and deontic logic. First, it is asked whether a solution could be found in Lemmon's (1965) (...) 