The author of the article analyses the historical and philosophical principles used by B. Russell, L. Couturat, E. Cassirer, H. Heimsoeth, W. Kabitz, B. Jansen, D. Mahnke and others to interpret the relation between logic and metaphysics in the philosophy of G. W. Leibniz. The article proves that the approach of W. Kabitz is a significant regression compared to the approach of E. Cassirer due to the ignoring of Leibniz's contribution to the history of logic, methodology and theory of cognition, (...) as well as due to the too narrow modernised understanding of logic. The author disagrees with the interpretation of B. Jansen, who based Leibniz's philosophy on non-cholastic pre-established harmony. The disadvantage of D. Mahnke's approach is, in the author's opinion, a failure to understand that synthesis for the sake of synthesis can never be creative, and the construction of a universal philosophical system can never be the goal of true philosophical creativity. (shrink)