Au livre XXV du Peri physeos, épicure met en œuvre une critique de Démocrite, l’accusant de s’ignorer lui-même et de soutenir une doctrine qui entre en contradiction avec ses actes. Pour Épicure, l’existence même de l’éloge et du blâme signifie que l’homme doit être considéré comme assumant, au moins partiellement, la responsabilité de son caractère acquis, de ses pensées et de ses actes. Le livre XXV du Peri physeos, pourtant, loin de prendre ses distances vis-à-vis de l’éthique de Démocrite, doit (...) être considéré comme un retour aux sources démocritéennes par Épicure et ce, par-delà les successeurs de Démocrite. L’étude des fragments et témoignages concernant Démocrite suggère en effet qu’il soutenait à la fois la thèse d’une constitution de l’âme exclusivement atomistique et la possibilité d’une transformation de l’âme par l’homme. On peut en conclure que ce n’est pas tant la perspective démocritéenne que rejette Épicure que la radicalisation déterministe effectuée par les démocritéens de la deuxième ou troisième génération. L’enjeu est donc pour Épicure, en restant fidèle à la physique et à l’éthique démocritéennes originelles, d’apporter des éléments qui permettent de justifier leur compatibilité au sein d’un même système, ce que Démocrite avait sans doute omis de faire. (shrink)

According to Democritus' anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, the case of man is a peculiarity: man, this atom complex, is well aware of himself, yet is not aware of what he must do. Man does not naturally do that which promotes the harmonious ordering of his atoms. We must create a second nature. Now it becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature. Democritus is the is first (...) thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought: he who wishes to do the right thing for both himself and others finds himself subject to the ought requirement to do that which brings the most calm to the atoms. This is a direct connection between being and ought, an extravagant mechanical existentialism. (shrink)

I develop a positive interpretation of Democritus' theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the history and philosophy of these concepts. The interpretation will be defended by a synthesis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democritus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human goodness and (...) success. I will argue that Democritus' account of the virtues and success is naturally interpreted as an intellectualist one. His focus on our intellectual powers as the source of our own agency and cause of our success led him to remarkable breakthroughs in moral psychology, including the development of a kind of cognitive-behavioral therapy for stress and anxiety, and the proposal of an autonomous source of moral sanction. (shrink)

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 334-356, July 2022.

This paper analyses chapter 58 of Theophrastus’ De sensibus, where Democritus’ account of phronein is famously presented. Democritus traces phronein to symmetria of the soul, that is conceived, in turn, as a state of thermic equilibrium, depending on his consideration of psyche as an aggregate of spherical and thin atoms flowing throughout the body and giving it life, movement, and perception. As a consequence, according to him, psychic states go hand in hand with changes in the body. In the following (...) section of this paper, I offer additional evidence in favor of the controversial manuscript reading μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν. As a result, a consistent theory by Democritus can be reconstructed, according to which the balanced state of mobility and temperature of the psychic atoms concentrated in the head that generates a correct thinking necessarily follows the movement of sensible eidola throughout the body. In fact, a number of passages from Hippocratic writings attest that Democritus shared the key features of this explanation with the physiological and medical approach of the time. (shrink)