In this paper, I will make the case that an associative account of predication in Hume seems to allow for impossible predicative conceptions—that is, the conceiving of impossible states of affairs involving subjects instantiating properties or qualities—which violate his Conceivability Principle. The natural response is to argue that such conceptions are not clear and distinct, but substantive worries are raised about a number of attempted solutions along these lines. This poses a predicament for Hume scholars: either we must modify or (...) abandon the Conceivability Principle, or reject an associative account of predication, or concede that Hume faces a difficulty he cannot solve. (shrink)

My aim is to look into the representational aspect of ideas, exploring not only to what Hume refers as adequate ideas, but also these cases where for a number of reasons an idea does not reach that standard. It has been suggested that the latter are fictions, but an in-depth examination of Hume texts reveals that there are several types of imperfections, such as incompleteness or imprecision that prevent an idea from being adequate. This leads to an analysis of the (...) status of supposed or pretended ideas, and the possibility of there being terms with no ideas annexed to them. (shrink)

This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle and the inconceivability principle. In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments (...) do not hold. But, in a rather different way, we also argue that if Hume’s conceivability arguments hold, then there should be no distinction between levels of modalities. Finally, we argue that after Hume, there are lots of endeavors in logic and philosophy to distinguish different levels of modalities, and to accept new concepts of necessity other than logical necessity. (shrink)

The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about ‘thick’ Causal powers, has been largely motivated by his evident commitment to causal language and causal science. In this, however, it is fundamentally misguided, failing to recognise how Hume exploits his anti-realist conclusions about (upper-case) Causation precisely to support (lower-case) causal science. When critically examined, none of the standard New Humean arguments — familiar from the work of Wright, Craig, Strawson, Buckle, Kail, and others — retains any significant force (...) against the plain evidence of Hume's; texts. But the most devastating objection comes from Hume's own applications of his analysis of causation, to the questions of ‘the immateriality of the soul’ and ‘liberty and necessity’. These show that the New Hume interpretation has misunderstood the entire purpose of his ‘Chief Argument’, and presented him as advocating some of the very positions he is arguing most strongly against. (shrink)

A characteristically Humean pattern of explanation starts by claiming that we have a certain kind of feeling in response to some objects and then takes our having such feelings to provide an explanation of how we come to think of those objects as having some feature that we would not otherwise be able to think of them as having. This core pattern of explanation is what leads Simon Blackburn to dub Hume ‘the first great projectivist.’ This paper critically examines the (...) philosophical and textual basis for interpreting Hume as a causal projectivist. I argue that projectivist interpretations of Hume's account of causation are motivated by two convictions: that beliefs about causation, according to Hume, are not just beliefs about regularity relations and that believing that two events are necessarily connected, according to Hume, is not merely having a belief about something that occurs in one's mind. I suggest that the latter conviction is worth revisiting, both for textual and philosophical reasons. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, argumento que o compromisso de Hume com objetos independentes da mente está baseado em dois tipos de realismo ou sistema de realidades: (a) um realismo ingênuo baseado em uma crença vulgar injustificada que identifica percepções e objetos, e (b) um realismo representacional ou sistema filosófico de dupla existência. Em primeiro lugar, enfatizo que a questão filosófica “Se existem ou não corpos” não pode ser considerada um caso completo de ceticismo não mitigado, porque Hume aceita um ceticismo mitigado (...) compatível com o realismo vulgar e representacional. Além disso, argumento que, enquanto a crença vulgar nos corpos está baseada em um assentimento injustificado, a teoria da dupla-existência está baseada tanto em um assentimento injustificado quanto em um assentimento racionalmente justificado (que corrige o primeiro). Considerando todos esses pontos, concluo que o ceticismo mitigado de Hume permite e exige uma crença ou suposição de existências contínuas e distintas, e que isso deve, na prática, assumir formas vulgares e filosóficas em diferentes momentos. (shrink)

I outline Hume’s views about conceivability evidence. Then I critically scrutinise two threats to conceivability-based modal epistemology. Both arise from Hume’s criticism of claims to knowing necessary causal relationships: Firstly, a sceptical stance towards causal necessity may carry over to necessity claims in general. Secondly, since – according to a sceptical realist reading – Hume grants the eventuality of causal powers grounded in essential features of objects, conceivability-based claims to comprehensive metaphysical possibilities seem endangered. I argue that although normal conceivability-based (...) claims are defeasible, they are prima facie vindicated. Humes Ansichten über Vorstellbarkeit als Indikator für Möglichkeit werden zusammengefasst. Dann werden zwei Schwierigkeiten für eine auf Vorstellbarkeit basierende modale Erkenntnistheorie aufgeworfen. Beide entstehen aus Humes Kritik an Ansprüchen aufWissen notwendiger kausaler Beziehungen. Erstens könnte sich eine skeptische Haltung gegenüber kausaler Notwendigkeit auf Ansprüche, notwendige Zusammenhänge zu kennen, im allgemeinen auswirken. Zweitens gesteht Hume gemäß einem skeptischen Realismus die Eventualität kausaler Kräfte zu, die in wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Dinge gründen. Dies scheint unvereinbar mit der auf Vorstellbarkeit gestützten Behauptung umfassender metaphysischer Möglichkeiten. Dagegen soll gezeigt werden, dass auf Vorstellbarkeit gestützte modale Wissensansprüche zwar widerlegbar, aber prima facie gerechtfertigt sind. (shrink)