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  1. Computing in the nick of time.J. Brendan Ritchie & Colin Klein - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):169-179.
    The medium‐independence of computational descriptions has shaped common conceptions of computational explanation. So long as our goal is to explain how a system successfully carries out its computations, then we only need to describe the abstract series of operations that achieve the desired input–output mapping, however they may be implemented. It is argued that this abstract conception of computational explanation cannot be applied to so‐called real‐time computing systems, in which meeting temporal deadlines imposed by the systems with which a device (...)
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  • Sisäisyys ja suunnistautuminen. Inwardness and orientation. A Festchrift to Jussi Kotkavirta.Arto Laitinen, Jussi Saarinen, Heikki Ikäheimo, Pessi Lyyra & Petteri Niemi (eds.) - 2014 - SoPhi.
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  • Ahistorical homology and multiple realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory and offer (...)
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  • Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.
    Recently the functional model of reduction has become something like the standard model of reduction in philosophy of mind. In this paper, I argue that the functional model fails as an account of reduction due to problems related to three key concepts: functionalization, realization and causation. I further argue that if we try to revise the model in order to make it more coherent and scientifically plausible, the result is merely a simplified version of what in philosophy of science is (...)
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  • The politics of mental illness.Ronald de Sousa - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):187-202.
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  • Nemo psychologus nisi physiologus.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (June):168-185.
    This article finds little to disagree with in Neurophilosophy The sole area of disagreement is with Professor Churchland's attitude to common?sense psychology. Unfortunately, though, the author has already attempted to describe what should be the proper view of common?sense psychology in an earlier article in this very journal. Therefore the present article tries to build on the earlier one, advocating an instrumentalist constraal of many ordinary?language mental terms ? a construal with which Professor Churchland is unlikely to agree, but which, (...)
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  • Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis.William G. Lycan - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):48-62.
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  • Wittgensteinian philosophy and empirical psychology.Richard Rorty - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):151 - 172.
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  • (7 other versions)(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics. Orlando: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one.
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  • Naturalizing intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.
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  • Functionalism, sensations, and materialism.Larry J. Eshelman - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.
    I wish to defend a functionalist approach to the mind-body problem. I use the word ‘functionalist’ with some reluctance, however; for although it has become the conventional label for the sort of approach taken by such philosophers as H. Putnam and D. C. Dennett, I believe it is somewhat misleading. The functionalist, as I understand him, tries to show how there can be machine analogues of mental states and then argues that just as we are not inclined to postulate an (...)
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  • Preface.Raphael van Riel & Albert Newen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):5-8.
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