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  1. What It Might Be Like to Be a Group Agent.Max F. Kramer - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel [1] argues that yes, collective entities (including the United States, taken as a whole), may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer [2], Tononi and Koch [3], and List [4] reject the claim. List does so on the (...)
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  • The Problem of Other (Group) Minds.Orli Dahan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1099-1112.
    In recent papers, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if physicalism is true, then the United States is probably conscious. My primary aim here is to demonstrate that the source of Schwitzgebel’s conditional argument is the “Problem of Other Minds,” which is a general problem; wherefore, Schwitzgebel’s conclusion should be revised and applied not only to physicalism, but to most contemporary theories of the mind. I analyze the difference between Schwitzgebel’s argument and other arguments against functionalism, arguing that the difference between them (...)
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  • Is the United States Phenomenally Conscious? Reply to Kammerer.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):877-883.
    In Schwitzgebel I argued that the United States, considered as a concrete entity with people as some or all of its parts, meets plausible materialistic criteria for consciousness. Kammerer defends materialism against this seemingly unintuitive conclusion by means of an “anti-nesting principle” according to which group entities cannot be literally phenomenally conscious if they contain phenomenally conscious subparts who stand in a certain type of functional relation to the group as a whole. I raise three concerns about Kammerer’s view. First, (...)
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  • Self-Building Technologies.François Kammerer - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (4):901-915.
    On the basis of two thought experiments, I argue that self-building technologies are possible given our current level of technological progress. We could already use technology to make us instantiate selfhood in a more perfect, complete manner. I then examine possible extensions of this thesis, regarding more radical self-building technologies which might become available in a distant future. I also discuss objections and reservations one might have about this view.
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