The paper argues that pain is not a good counter-example to the privation theory of evil. Objectors to the privation thesis see pain as too real to be accounted for in privative terms. However, the properties for which pain is intuitively thought of as real, i.e. its localised nature, intensity, and quality are features of the senso-somatic aspect of pain. This is a problem for the objectors because, as findings of modern science clearly demonstrate, the senso-somatic aspect of pain is (...) neurologically and clinically separate from the emotional-psychological aspect of suffering. The intuition that what seems so real in pain is also the source of pain’s negative value thus falls apart. As far as the affective aspect of pain, i.e. ”painfulness’ is concerned, it cannot refute the privation thesis either. For even if this is indeed the source of pain’s badness, the affective aspect is best accounted for in privative terms of loss and negation. The same holds for the effect of pain on the aching person. (shrink)

The problem of animal suffering considers whether God would allow millions of years of animal pain, disease, and death. Philosophers who debate this issue often assume that pain and suffering are evils a loving God would not allow without good reason. Moreover, a considerable amount of the debate regarding the problem of animal suffering involves whether animals are capable of experiencing pain and suffering. But this raises the question of whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil. In this essay I (...) explore the nature of pain and suffering from a Thomistic perspective. First I briefly explain how the intrinsic values of pain and suffering are crucial regarding the problem of evil and the problem of animal suffering in particular. Next I explain the Thomistic concepts of pain and suffering and show that they do not contradict their contemporary philosophical and scientific counterparts. Afterward I determine whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil experiences that an all-good God should refrain from causing. I conclude that pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil and that the problem of animal suffering is not a problem in addition to the problem of natural evil. (shrink)

Following the rise of virtue and character education, educational philosophers have recently given much attention to questions relating to virtue and the good. This, however, has not been paralleled by a similar interest in vice and evil, which, in this context, are examined only rarely. In this article, I use the work of the American philosopher John Kekes as a backdrop for discussing the role coping with vice and evil should play in virtue and character education. I show how Kekes’ (...) assumptions that people have natural inclinations towards both virtue and vice and that evil and vice are an inevitable part of human existence lead to the idea that character education should explicitly discuss not only the virtues but also the vices, that it should promote self-control and that it should bring people to recognize that they have mixed moral inclinations. I then argue that even if we reject Kekes’ key assumptions, embracing these three ideas that attempt to provide means to counter the vices might still have marked benefits for character education. The article concludes by suggesting that while the ideas that stem from Kekes’ approach should not necessarily be embraced, the themes that they raise call for greater consideration and further analysis. (shrink)

This thesis explores possibilities that arise from regarding theodicy as the activity of descriptive understanding of Christian belief and practice as found in the classical theistic framework. First, any theodicy as an activity is analysed in terms of the role of philosophy, the place of epistemology, the basis of theology, and the taking of an apologetic stance. It is then argued that traditional approaches to theodicy suffer from methodological weaknesses which derive from formulating theodicy in terms of unbelief, and from (...) strictly theoretical analysis. The superiority of philosophical description is argued as better suited to understanding religious belief as held in the community of believers, with especial reference to relationships that hold between language and reality. A critical exploration follows of the approach to theodicy of a proponent of philosophical description, D.Z. Phillips, and consideration is given to the status of evaluations made by believers. In the light of this critique, two attempts are made to describe the shape of Christian theodicy using the interperson model of theological language. The first attempt, based on a description of actual interpersonal relationships, is found eventually to be open to serious objections. A second attempt is then made, based not only on interpersonal language, but using a distinction between "surface" and "depth" in religious language, and by arguing for the presence of an epistemological "direction" in religious belief. On this basis, a Theodicy of Dependence is developed as best describing the shape of Christian belief held in a world which is frequently hostile. (shrink)

Not all theists who are members of the Abrahamic faiths will sign up to a particular metaphysics of evil: some may be sceptical theists, and others may be uninterested in metaphysical questions altogether. In this paper, I argue that theists in the Abrahamic faiths who are interested in metaphysics and who are not sceptical theists should endorse a privative account of evil. This is because a privative view of evil is the only metaphysic of evil that is compatible with the (...) theism of the Abrahamic faiths. In order to persuade you of this, I will explain the religious importance of the privative view, and show how the three alternatives to the privative view that might initially appear compatible with theism are not, after all, compatible with the particular theism of the Abrahamic faiths. Privative views are often objected to on the basis that pain is an evil that does not seem like a privation. I will put forward one (non-exclusive) defence of the privative view of evil in response to this objection, drawing on the work of Herbert McCabe. (shrink)

We review and synthesize over two decades of research on ethical culture in organizations, examining eighty-nine relevant scholarly works. Our article discusses the conceptualization of ethical culture in a cross-disciplinary space and its critical role in ethical decision-making. With a view to advancing future research, we analyze the antecedents, outcomes, and mediator and moderator roles of ethical culture. To do so, we identify measures and theories used in past studies and make recommendations. We propose, inter alia, the use of validated (...) measures, application of a wider range of theories, adoption of longitudinal studies, and study of group-level data in organizations. We explore research possibilities in new and emergent forms of organizations, ways of organizing work, and technology in ethical decision-making, such as the role of artificial intelligence. We also recommend the study of a broad range of leadership styles and their influence in shaping ethical cultures in organizations. (shrink)

This thesis was on how God is related to the truth-values of propositions on possible worlds - specifically, those propositions that do not seem to be about Him and constitute His ideas for what to create. It opened with a survey of some historical positions with special emphasis on Aquinas, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant. Next, some criticisms were given for these so-called deity theories with the most space given to Brian Leftow’s critiques. The second chapter detailed Brian Leftow’s theological modality. (...) In it, secular modality is excogitated in an instant from eternity when God gets a set of creaturely natures in one imaginative act. His preferences that are based on His nature then determine the modality of what God thinks up. A number of objections were raised for the Leftowian project and the last chapter attempted to supplement an older deity theory with some insights from Leftow in order to avoid his initial criticisms. (shrink)